Feb 16, 2021commission on auditdisallowanceforum shoppingcorporate lawgovernment auditingsupreme court

Judicial Stability and Forum Shopping: Lessons from a Landmark COA Disallowance Ruling

The Supreme Court clarifies appeal periods in COA disallowance cases and the binding effect of corporate board resolutions on subsidiaries.


The Supreme Court's 2021 ruling in Advincula v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 209712) offers important lessons for government employees, corporate officers, and lawyers navigating the often-confusing terrain of audit disallowances. The case clarifies two critical points: first, how appeal periods in Commission on Audit (COA) cases are computed; and second, that a parent company's board resolution does not automatically authorize its subsidiary to spend money.

The Facts of the Case

The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), a government-owned and -controlled corporation, passed a board resolution authorizing the payment of Annual Gift Checks (AGCs) to its personnel. Its subsidiary, BCDA Management and Holdings, Inc. (BMHI), relied on this parent resolution and released AGCs to its own employees and board members worth over P2.9 million.

The COA disallowed the payments. It found that BMHI's own board never passed a resolution authorizing the AGCs, and that the payments lacked the executive approval required by Administrative Order No. 37 and DBM Circular No. 16-98. The COA also held the payees, the approving officer, and the certifying officers liable to refund the amounts.

The Issue Before the Court

The petitioners—BMHI employees who received the AGCs—argued that the COA Proper gravely abused its discretion. They claimed that the COA Proper wrongly entertained a motion for reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary period, and that it reversed an earlier ruling that had absolved them from liability.

The Ruling: Appeal Periods Are Computed from the Notice of Disallowance

The Supreme Court sided with the COA on the merits but found a more fundamental problem: the petitioners' appeal to the COA Proper was itself filed late.

Under the COA Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party has six months from receipt of the notice of disallowance to appeal to the Director. If the Director issues an adverse ruling, the party has only the remaining portion of that original six-month period to appeal to the COA Proper. The appeal to the Director merely "tolls" or pauses the running of the period; it does not start a fresh one.

In this case, the petitioners received the notice of disallowance on November 12, 2004, and filed their appeal to the Director on May 12, 2005—the very last day of the six-month period. When the Director ruled against them on March 19, 2008, they had no time left to appeal to the COA Proper. Their appeal, filed in September 2008, was therefore belated. The Director's decision had already become final and executory.

The Court emphasized that a final and executory decision is immutable and can no longer be disturbed.

The Ruling: Parent Board Resolutions Do Not Bind Subsidiaries

Even setting aside the procedural lapse, the Court found the disallowance substantively correct. Under the Corporation Code, the corporate powers of a corporation are exercised by its own board of directors. A resolution passed by a parent company's board does not automatically authorize a subsidiary to act.

Here, BMHI paid the AGCs based solely on BCDA's board resolution. BMHI's own board never convened to approve the grant. This violated the fundamental principle under the Government Auditing Code (Presidential Decree No. 1445) that no money shall be paid out of public funds except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.

The Ruling: Payees Must Refund, Even in Good Faith

The Court also clarified the liability rules for disallowed expenditures. Payees who received the disallowed amounts are liable to refund them regardless of good faith. The payment, having been made in error, gives rise to a civil obligation under the principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti.

Approving and certifying officers, on the other hand, are presumed to have acted in good faith. They are liable only if shown to have acted with bad faith or malice. In this case, the approving and certifying officers were held solidarily liable because they signed the disbursement vouchers despite the clear absence of a BMHI board resolution.

Practical Takeaways

  • Appeal deadlines in COA cases are strict. The six-month period runs from receipt of the notice of disallowance, not from the Director's decision. Do not assume a fresh period begins after an adverse ruling.
  • A parent company's board resolution is not enough. Subsidiaries must secure their own board approval for corporate acts, including the grant of benefits.
  • Public funds require specific legal authority. Disbursements must be anchored on a statute or other specific authority, not merely on a corporate resolution.
  • Payees of disallowed amounts should expect to refund. Good faith is not a defense against liability to return amounts received from an unlawful disbursement.
  • Approving and certifying officers face solidary liability when they approve or certify disbursements despite obvious legal defects.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

Have a question about this topic?

This article is general information, not legal advice. Ask ASG Legal AI for a cited, plain-language answer on your own situation — free, no sign-up.