Jul 31, 2009judicial ethicsadministrative lawpractice of lawjudgescode of judicial conduct

Practicing Law During Suspension: Judicial Ethics and Integrity

A judge's preventive suspension does not lift the ban on private law practice. The Supreme Court explains why.


A judge who is preventively suspended from office may still be bound by the prohibition against the private practice of law. In Binalay v. Lelina, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2132, July 31, 2009), the Supreme Court ruled that suspension does not equal dismissal, and a suspended judge remains subject to the strict ethical rules that govern members of the judiciary.

The Case: A Suspended Judge Who Returned to Practice

Judge Elias O. Lelina, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Cabarroguis, Quirino, was preventively suspended in 1998 while facing administrative and criminal charges. He was detained from November 1998 until his acquittal in July 2005. While still under preventive suspension, he filed a motion asking the Court for permission to practice law during the remainder of his suspension—or, alternatively, to be considered resigned.

Before the Court could rule on that motion, the judge had already begun practicing law. He appeared as counsel for defendants in a criminal case in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and for a plaintiff in a civil case in Cabarroguis. He signed pleadings as a partner of the "Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices." When confronted, he argued that the ban on private practice applied only to judges in active service, not to those under suspension. He also cited financial hardship, saying he was forced to practice law to support his family.

The Issue: Does Suspension Lift the Ban on Private Practice?

The central question was whether a judge under preventive suspension could engage in the private practice of law. The Supreme Court answered with a clear no.

The Ruling: Suspension Does Not Remove Judicial Obligations

The Court relied on Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which prohibits judges and other judicial officers from engaging in the private practice of law. It also cited Section 11, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which states that judges shall not practice law while holding judicial office.

The Court applied the maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus—where the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts. Since neither rule distinguishes between active judges and suspended judges, no such distinction can be made. A judge who is merely suspended, not dismissed, remains bound by the prohibition.

The Court also rejected the judge's defense of financial hardship. The duty to comply with the Rules and the Code of Judicial Conduct does not yield to personal circumstances. Notably, the judge's own attempt to seek permission to practice law showed that he was aware of the prohibition.

Indirect Practice Is Also Prohibited

The Court went further. It held that a judge cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly. By allowing his name to remain in the firm name "Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing & Associates Law Offices," the judge held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer. This created the impression that the firm had improper influence with the court—a violation of judicial ethics.

The Penalty

The unauthorized practice of law is a less serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The penalty ranges from suspension of one to three months without salary and other benefits, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.

Because the judge was not a first-time offender—he had previously been suspended for gross misconduct—the Court imposed the maximum penalty: suspension from office for three months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Practical Takeaways

  • Preventive suspension is not a license to practice law. A suspended judge remains bound by the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
  • Financial hardship is not a valid defense. Personal circumstances do not excuse violations of judicial ethics.
  • Indirect practice is also prohibited. A judge cannot use a law firm name or other arrangements to circumvent the ban.
  • The ban protects the integrity of the judiciary. It ensures judges give full time and attention to judicial duties and prevents the appearance of impropriety.
  • Prior infractions matter. The Court considers a respondent's disciplinary history in determining the penalty.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

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