Dec 3, 2009constitutional-lawright-to-travelwrit-of-amparohold-departure-ordercriminal-procedure

Right to Travel vs Public Interest: Examining the Scope of the Writ of Amparo

The Supreme Court explains why the writ of amparo cannot question travel restrictions such as hold departure orders issued in pending criminal cases.


In Reyes v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009), the Supreme Court clarified that the writ of amparo is not a general remedy for every restraint on liberty. A priest held by a Hold Departure Order (HDO) after dismissal of his rebellion case tried to use the writ to question the order—and lost. The case matters because it draws the boundary between the amparo's narrow protective scope and more ordinary legal disputes over travel and criminal procedure.

From Hotel Siege to the Bureau of Immigration

Petitioner Reverend Father Robert P. Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. After inquest proceedings, the Department of Justice (DOJ) panel found probable cause for rebellion against him and 36 others, and an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

On December 1, 2007, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez issued HDO No. 45, ordering the Bureau of Immigration to include petitioner's name in the Hold Departure List "in the interest of national security and public safety." On December 13, 2007, the RTC dismissed the rebellion charge against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Despite the dismissal, the HDO remained, and on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held and interrogated by immigration officers at the NAIA when he tried to fly to Hong Kong.

Instead of asking the RTC to lift the HDO, petitioner went directly to the Court of Appeals for a writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.

The Issue: Does Amparo Protect the Right to Travel?

The sole question was whether the HDO's restraint on petitioner's right to travel amounted to a violation of his right to liberty entitling him to the writ of amparo. The writ, under Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, protects any person whose right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official. But the Supreme Court had already ruled in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906) and Tapuz v. Del Rosario (G.R. No. 182484) that, in its present form, the amparo rule is confined to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.

The Ruling: A Narrow and Extraordinary Remedy

The Court dismissed the petition. It acknowledged that the right to travel is part of the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, but emphasized that the right "is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice," citing Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 115132-34). Because a criminal case was pending against petitioner, the restriction on his travel was not unlawful.

More importantly, petitioner failed to

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