[ G.R. No. 196094. March 05, 2018 ]

[ G.R. No. 196094. March 05, 2018 ]

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SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 196094. March 05, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. AMADO "JAKE" P. MACASAET,* ENRIQUE P. ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS REYES (DECEASED),** RESPONDENTS.

(1)

In the second petition (G.R. No. 196094), whether the Information is sufficient in form and substance to charge Macasaet and Romualdez[52] with the crime of libel; and

(2)

In the first and third petitions (G.R. Nos. 196720 and 197324), whether the cases filed against Macasaet and Romualdez should be dismissed because their right to a speedy disposition of the cases has been violated.

The Court's Ruling

G.R. No. 196094

There is merit in the second petition.

As to the persons who may be liable for libel and the venue of the libel case, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC), provides:

ART. 360. Persons responsible. - Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed or vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions for which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.

Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in this chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. (As amended by R.A. No. 1289, June 15, 1955 and R.A. No. 4363, June 19, 1965.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,[53] a case about the venue of a criminal action for written defamation or libel, the amendment of Article 360 of the RPC was explained, viz.:

Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.

Before Article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed xxx. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.

Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

xxxx

To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts. (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; xx x).[54]

The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel were also restated in Agbayani, thus:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.[55]

In the present case, the venue is apparently the place where the alleged defamatory article in Malaya was printed and first published.

The CA's ruling that the criminal action for libel was filed with the wrong venue was founded on the following:

Ostensibly, the Information only shows that the article was written and published in Malaya which has an address in Port Area, Manila. There is no allegation of the situs where the article was printed and first published. It is fatally defective because it failed to specify whether the address of Malaya, is the same place where the article was printed and first published. We must emphasize that the address of the publisher is not necessarily the place of publication. The address would generally refer to the name or description of a place of residence, business, etc., where a person may be found or communicated with. It may include the business address, billing address, mailing address or the residence address of an entity or establishment. To be sure, it is not identical with the place of publication. While it is possible that the address of Malaya is the same place where it conducts its business of publication, We cannot presume such identity without transgression to the basic principle that penal laws are strictly interpreted against the State and liberally construed in favor of the accused. Presumption will be disfavored when it collides against the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. Thus, without stating more, We find the allegations in the Information insufficient to confer the RTC of Manila with jurisdiction over the case.[56]

The Court in Bonifacio v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149[57] made the following clarification in case the basis of the venue of the libel criminal action is the place where the libel was printed and first published:

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.[58] (Emphasis supplied)

Admittedly, the Information under scrutiny, without using the phrase "printed and first published," merely states:

That on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor, respectively of Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila City defamed private complainant Narciso Y. Santiago, Jr., did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by writing and publishing an article in the Malaya xxx.[59]

The Information does not specifically indicate that Port Area, Manila is the editorial or business office of Malaya, following the formulation in Bonifacio. And, it cannot be presumed as the CA further claims that the "address of Malaya is the same place where it conducts its business of publication."[60]

The Court disagrees with the CA; it finds the Information sufficient.

Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor defamed Santiago on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and publishing an article in the Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila. To the Court, it is clear that Port Area, Manila is where the defamatory article was written and published because that is the address of Malaya, an unquestionably printed newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the Information did not expressly state "first published" is of no moment because the word "published" does not exclude the first publication.

In turn, the accused do not deny that Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business offices of Malaya and interestingly, they did not raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction to dismiss Criminal Case No. 08-263272 despite the fact that the Information filed before RTC Manila, Br. 36 is similarly worded as the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed before RTC Manila, Br. 37 as to the address of Malaya being at Port Area, Manila City and the non-inclusion of the phrase "printed and first published."

According to Bonifacio, "the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers."[61] The Information in question complies with the Bonifacio directive because it alleges with particularity Port Area, Manila as the place where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published as evidenced or supported by the records of the case.[62] The Information need not parrot the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase "printed and first published." If there is no dispute that the place of publication indicated in the Information, which is Manila in the present case, is the place where the alleged defamatory article was "printed and first published," then the law is substantially complied with. After all, the filing of the Information before an RTC of the City of Manila would, borrowing the phraseology of Bonifacio, forestall any inclination to harass the accused. Besides, it is incumbent upon the accused to show that Port Area, Manila is not the business or editorial office of Malaya in the face of evidence in the records of the case that it is so.

The DOJ Consolidated Resolution in its summary of the pertinent facts stated that: "Records also show that Malaya is published by the People's Independent Media, Inc., with editorial and business offices at Port Area, Manila xxx."[63] The Consolidated Review Resolution[64] of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal dated September 28, 2007 which initially dismissed the nine libel complaints of Santiago and Ynares for lack of jurisdiction indicated the venue where the complaints should be filed, viz.:

In the case of complainant Santiago, Jr., his libel complaints should be filed either in Manila, where the libelous matters appearing in ABANTE and MALAYA were first printed and published, or in the place where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. However, the records do not show Pasig City as to (sic) the actual residence of complainant Santiago, Jr. at the time of the commission of the offense charged, except to say that he held office at No. 3 West Fourth St., West Triangle, Quezon City. And even if we consider this address as his actual place of residence, or his office address as a public official, which he did not state in his complaints, still, the filing of these complaints before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Rizal violates the rule on venue as provided for in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.[65]

Thus, the CA erred in dismissing the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 and nullifying the Orders dated November 3, 2009 and January 29, 2010 of the RTC Manila, Br. 37, denying the accused's motion to dismiss.

G.R. Nos. 196720 and 197324

The first and third petitions are also meritorious.

The accused posit that the CA erred in affirming the RTC ruling that, even though the delay was not disputed or the reason for it was not explained by the Prosecution, the accused's right to speedy trial was not violated, and that the accused are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of their cases for failing to plead such defense during the preliminary investigation.

Indeed, the Constitution guarantees in the Bill of Rights, Article III, Section 14(2) that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused xxx shall enjoy the right xxx to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial xxx" and in Article III, Section 16 that: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Congress has also enacted in February 12, 1998 Republic Act No. (RA) 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998." For its part, the Court promulgated Circular No. 38-98 on August 11, 1998 for the purpose of implementing the provisions of RA 8493. The provisions of the Circular were adopted in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[66]

The right to speedy disposition of the accused's case is explained in Caballes v. CA,[67] thus:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

xxxx

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the [possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.[68]

The right to speedy disposition of one's case, similar to the right to speedy trial, may be waived. The Court in Nepomuceno v. The Secretary of National Defense[69] observed that the right to speedy trial as any other constitutionally or statutory conferred right, except when otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. Therefore, it must be asserted.[70] The assertion of such right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the accused is being deprived thereof such that the failure to claim the right will make it difficult to prove that there was a denial of a speedy trial.[71] The accused's failure to timely question the delay would be an implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Also, his silence may amount to laches.[72]

To recall, the Affidavit-Complaint which triggered the filing of the Information in the first petition was filed by Santiago on April 27, 1999 before the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. Macasaet filed his Counter-Affidavit on May 24, 1999. On the other hand, the Affidavit-Complaint that triggered the filing of the Information in the third petition was filed by Ynares on March 16, 1999. Macasaet filed his Counter-Affidavit on April 12, 1999. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal dismissed without prejudice the complaints on September 28, 2007, or more than eight years from the filing of the complaints. On January 29, 2008, the DOJ issued Summons requiring accused to appear before the said office in relation to the complaints for libel. On July 9, 2008, the DOJ issued a Consolidated Resolution finding probable cause for both. On August 21, 2008, two separate Informations for libel were filed against the accused. One was docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-263272 and raffled to RTC Manila, Br. 36. And the other was docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-263273 and raffled to RTC Manila, Br. 37.

In the first criminal case, the accused were arraigned on October 6, 2008 and they filed their motion to dismiss grounded on their right to speedy disposition of their case on October 7, 2008 while in the second criminal case, they filed their motion to dismiss based on same ground on November 26, 2008.

Given such backdrop, in both the CA[73] January 2011 Decision (assailed in the third petition) and the CA[74] February 2011 Decision (assailed in the first petition), the CA uniformly applied the principle of laches or implied acquiescence in construing the silence of the accused or their inaction to object to the delay and/or failure to seasonably raise the right to speedy disposition of their cases as waiver thereof.

The CA invoked Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,[75] which cited the Court's ruling in Guerrero v. CA,[76] in justifying that the failure of the accused to seasonably raise the right to speedy trial precludes them from relying on the alleged violation of such right as a ground to dismiss the case and that by not asserting such right at the earliest possible opportunity they are deemed to have slept on their right. The CA likewise relied on Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,[77] cited in Valencia, as its justification in construing the silence of the accused and the absence of any signs or overt acts of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their cases in the nine years from the filing of the complaint to the filing of the Information and their arraignment as waiver of their right, and their inaction on and lack of objection to the delay can be perceived as implied acquiescence by them.

The Court disagrees with the CA. The CA failed to consider the other factors that must be present before the right to speedy case determination may be considered to have been waived. The CA did not consider the length of delay and the reason for the delay. The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. In these cases, it must be recalled that in a Consolidated Review Resolution dated September 28, 2007 of the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor, the complaints filed by Ynares and Santiago were dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction by reason of improper venue.[78] It took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor more than eight years from the filing of the complaints to dismiss without prejudice the complaints. The issue on venue in libel cases is neither a novel nor difficult one. The more than eight years it took the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine issue is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said "that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice."[79]

Furthermore, the silence of the accused during such period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of waiver of their right to speedy determination of their cases. That the accused could have filed a motion for early resolution of their cases is immaterial. The more than eight years delay the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor incurred before issuing his resolution of the complaints is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice and such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner.

All told, the CA erroneously denied the accused's petitions questioning the denial by the RTC Manila, Br. 36 and Br. 37 of their motions to dismiss based on their right to speedy disposition of their cases.

Since the dismissal of the complaints against the accused is warranted because of the violation of their right to speedy disposition of their cases, the Court's finding that the second petition has merit is rendered superfluous. The dismissal of the Information for libel by the CA in the second petition is maintained but on a different ground — the denial of the right of the accused to speedy disposition of their case. Thus, the second petition is denied on that ground.

WHEREFORE, premises considered:

(1) the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 196094 is hereby DENIED, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated October 19, 2010 and Resolution dated March 8, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113449 are MODIFIED insofar as the ground for dismissal of the Information for libel in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37 is concerned;

(2) the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 196720 is hereby GRANTED, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 10, 2011 and Resolution dated April 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 110224 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37 is DISMISSED; and

(3) the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 197324 is hereby GRANTED, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 26, 2011 and Resolution dated June 16, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 110010 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No. 08-263272 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,* Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

* Amado "Jake" Macasaet passed away on January 7, 2018. See 'They don 7 make publishers like Jake Macasaet anymore,' by Ellen Tordesillas, January 9, 2018, < http://www.malaya.com.ph/business-news/business/'they-don't-make-publishers-jake-macasaet-anymore' > (last visited on March 5, 2018).

** Per Resolution dated October 14, 2013, the case was considered closed and terminated as to accused Joy P. Delos Reyes, who died on May 3, 2013 per Notice of Death dated June 17, 2013, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The October 14, 2013 Resolution became final and executory on December 13, 2013; rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 284-289, 301-302.

* Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 9-28, excluding Annexes; rollo (G.R. No. 196720), pp. 3-37, excluding Annexes; rollo (G.R. No. 197324), pp. 3-38, excluding Annexes.

[2] Id. at 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring.

[3] Special Fifteenth Division.

[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 65-70. Issued by Presiding Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig.

[5] Id. at 219-220.

[6] Id. at 41-43.

[7] Special Thirteenth Division.

[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 196720), pp. 39-52. Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

[9] Id. at 109-112. Issued by Presiding Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig.

[10] Id. at 122.

[11] Id. at 54-56.

[12] Fourth Division.

[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 197324), pp. 40-52. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

[14] Id. at 96-97. Issued by Judge Emma S. Young.

[15] Id. at 110-112.

[16] Id. at 54-55.

[17] Department of Justice (DOJ) Consolidated Resolution dated July 9, 2008, rollo (G.R. No. 196720), p. 75.

[18] DOJ Consolidated Resolution, id. at 74-84.

[19] Records (Vol. I), pp. 1-3, 104-105.

[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 288-289.

[21] Id. at 284-286.

[22] Id. at 301-302.

[23] 'They don't make publishers like Jake Macasaet anymore,' by Ellen Tordesillas, January 9, 2018, < http://wvvw.malaya.com.ph/business-news/business/'they-don't-make-publishers-iake-macasaet-anymore' > (last visited on March 5, 2018).

[24] The Information was filed on August 21, 2008 (rollo [G.R. No. 196094], pp. 44-46) not July 9, 2008, which is the date of the DOJ Consolidated Resolution.

[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 196720), pp. 40-44.

[26] Id. at 51.

[27] Id. at 311-324.

[28] Former Special Thirteenth Division.

[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 196720), pp. 54-56.

[30] Id. at 458-475.

[31] Id. at 519-545.

[32] Id. at 554-570.

[33] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 47-64.

[34] Id. at 65-70.

[35] Id. at 70.

[36] Id. at 71-77.

[37] Id. at 219-220.

[38] Id. at 78-103, excluding annexes.

[39] Id. at 106-119.

[40] Id. at 39-40.

[41] Id. at 121-126.

[42] Special Former Special Fifteenth Division.

[43] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 41-43.

[44] Id. at 135-167, exclusive of Annexes.

[45] Rollo (G.R. No. 197324), pp. 41-44.

[46] Id. at 52.

[47] Id. at 385-397.

[48] Id. at 54-55.

[49] Id. at 429-464, exclusive of Annex.

[50] Id. at 479-497.

[51] Id. at 515-535.

[52] Delos Reyes is no longer a party by reason of his death.

[53] 178 Phil. 574 (1979).

[54] Id. at 579-580.

[55] Id. at 580.

[56] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), pp. 35-36.

[57] 634 Phil. 348 (2010).

[58] Id. at 362.

[59] Rollo (G.R. No. 196094), p. 44; records (Vol. I), p. 1.

[60] Id. at 36.

[61] Supra note 57, at 362.

[62] See Annex "A" of Macasaet's Counter-Affidavit, rollo (G.R. No. 196720), p. 67.

[63] Rollo (G.R. No. 196720), p. 75; Records (Vol. I), p. 5.

[64] Records (Vol. I), pp. 69-72.

[65] Id. at 71.

[66] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 119.

[67] 492 Phil. 410 (2005).

[68] Id. at 428-430, citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 917-919 (2004).

[69] 195 Phil. 467 (1981).

[70] Id. at 473.

[71] Sps. Uy v. Adriano, 536 Phil. 475, 504 (2006); citation omitted.

[72] Id. at 505. See also Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 932 (2001).

[73] Fourth Division.

[74] Special Thirteenth Division.

[75] 510 Phil. 70, 88(2005).

[76] 327 Phil. 496 (1996).

[77] Supra note 72.

[78] Records (Vol. I), p. 71.

[79] Caballes v. CA, supra note 67, at 430.