Attorney-in-Fact Can Sign Forum Shopping Cert; Ejectment Rules Explained

In Monasterio-Pe v. Tong (G.R. No. 151369, March 23, 2011), the Supreme Court settled two practical questions that often arise in ejectment cases: may an attorney-in-fact sign the certification against forum shopping on behalf of the owner, and when does the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case begin to run? The ruling clarifies these points and reinforces the distinction between actions for ejectment and those questioning ownership.

Background of the Case

Jose Juan Tong, through his attorney-in-fact Jose Y. Ong, filed an ejectment complaint against Anita Monasterio-Pe and the Spouses Tan before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Tong claimed he was the registered owner of the lots and that the petitioners occupied the house on the property merely by his tolerance, without any lease contract or payment of rent. After a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 went unheeded, Tong filed the ejectment suit on March 29, 2000.

The petitioners countered that Tong was not the true owner, that an earlier case involving ownership of the same property was pending before the Court of Appeals, and that the certification against forum shopping was defective because it was signed by the attorney-in-fact and not by Tong personally. The MTCC ruled in favor of Tong, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed. The petitioners then appealed directly to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Wrong Mode of Appeal

The Court first noted that the petitioners raised purely factual issues, such as whether the question of physical possession was already included in an earlier case and whether barangay conciliation was properly complied with. Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. Moreover, the RTC had acted in its appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. The proper remedy should have been a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42. On this ground alone, the petition was denied.

Attorney-in-Fact and the Certification Against Forum Shopping

The petitioners argued that the certification against forum shopping must be signed personally by the principal, not by the attorney-in-fact. The Court disagreed. While Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court generally requires the plaintiff or principal party to sign the certification, the rationale is that only the principal has actual knowledge of whether similar actions are pending. This rationale does not apply when the attorney-in-fact himself instituted the action. Since Ong, as attorney-in-fact, had authority to file and actually filed the complaint, he was considered a party to the ejectment suit. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly includes the representative of the owner as one of the parties authorized to institute ejectment proceedings. Thus, the attorney-in-fact may validly sign the certification.

No Forum Shopping and No Splitting of Cause of Action

The petitioners also claimed that the ejectment case was barred because an earlier case (Civil Case No. 20181) involving the same property was pending, and that the issue of physical possession was already included there. The Court noted that the earlier case, which sought nullification of contracts and reconveyance, was eventually dismissed on the ground of res judicata and had become final. The Court observed that the issue of ejectment was never raised in that case. Therefore, the respondent was not barred from filing the ejectment action, and there was no forum shopping or splitting of a cause of action.

Unlawful Detainer and the One-Year Period

The petitioners argued that the respondent should have filed an accion publiciana instead of an unlawful detainer case because the one-year period had lapsed. The Court explained that under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, an unlawful detainer case must be filed within one year from the unlawful withholding of possession. Where possession is by mere tolerance, the possession becomes unlawful only upon demand to vacate. Here, the demand was made on December 1, 1999, and the complaint was filed on March 29, 2000—well within the one-year period.

Delivery Through a Public Instrument

The petitioners also claimed that the respondent had no cause of action because the property was never delivered to him under the contract of sale. The Court cited Article 1498 of the Civil Code, which states that when a sale is made through a public instrument, its execution is equivalent to delivery of the thing sold, unless the contrary appears. Since the petitioners failed to prove any intention not to deliver, the execution of the deed of sale was tantamount to delivery. Their continued possession was merely by tolerance.

Practical Takeaways

• An attorney-in-fact who is authorized to file an ejectment case may sign the certification against forum shopping on behalf of the principal. This is a valid and substantial compliance with the Rules of Court.
• The one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case runs from the date of demand to vacate, not from the start of the occupant's possession. Possession by tolerance becomes unlawful only upon demand.
• A direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 is not available for errors of fact or when the RTC acted in its appellate jurisdiction. The proper remedy is a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42.
• The pendency of an ownership case does not automatically bar an ejectment case, unless the issue of possession was already raised and resolved in the earlier case.
• Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, execution of a deed of sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the property, unless the contrary is clearly shown.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.