When Customary Law Claims Cannot Stop a Final Ejectment Judgment
Supreme Court clarifies when IPRA claims of indigenous status can and cannot block execution of a final unlawful detainer judgment.
The Supreme Court recently reminded litigants that invoking indigenous peoples' customary laws cannot be used as a last-minute tactic to evade a final and executory judgment. In Spouses Sending v. Co Uy (G.R. No. 271354, February 19, 2026), the Court dismissed a petition for mandamus filed by spouses who claimed—only during execution proceedings—that their alleged membership in an indigenous cultural community (ICC) stripped the regular courts of jurisdiction over their ejectment case.
The decision is a significant clarification of how the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) interacts with the rules on finality of judgments, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, and the proper remedy for questioning a court's jurisdiction.
The Case Background
The dispute began in 2014 when Kristoffer Co Uy filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Spouses Elvin and Jocelyn Sending. Co Uy claimed ownership of a parcel of land in Liloan and Consolacion, Cebu, and alleged that the spouses occupied the property only by his tolerance.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) ruled in Co Uy's favor, ordering the spouses to vacate. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both affirmed, with modifications to the damages awarded. The CA decision became final and executory on November 11, 2021.
It was only during the execution proceedings—years after the case began—that the spouses first claimed to be members of the Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe. They argued that under the IPRA, customary laws should govern disputes involving ICCs, and that the MCTC lacked jurisdiction over the case.
The Rule on Hierarchy of Courts
The Supreme Court first noted that the spouses filed their petition for mandamus directly with the Court, bypassing the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, litigants must file petitions for extraordinary writs with the lower courts first.
The Court explained that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is "frowned upon" because the Court is a court of last resort. Litigants seeking a relaxation of this rule must present strong and compelling reasons. The spouses offered none.
Mandamus Requires a Ministerial Duty
Even setting aside the procedural lapse, the Court held that mandamus was not the proper remedy. A writ of mandamus compels a public officer to perform a ministerial duty—one that is clear and definite, involving no exercise of discretion or judgment.
The spouses asked the Court to compel the MCTC judge to resolve their motion to dismiss and to reverse the 2016 decision. But resolving motions, interpreting laws, and determining jurisdiction are inherently discretionary judicial functions. Mandamus cannot direct a judge how to rule.
The Court cited Hipos, Sr. v. Bay: while mandamus may compel a judge to act on a pending motion, it cannot compel a particular outcome. Here, the judge had already resolved the motion against the spouses. The proper remedy would have been certiorari, not mandamus.
The Limits of IPRA Jurisdiction
The Court also clarified the scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction under the IPRA. Citing Unduran v. Aberasturi, the Court explained that the NCIP has jurisdiction only over disputes between parties belonging to the same ICC. When one party is a non-ICC member, subjecting that party to customary laws would violate fair play and due process.
In this case, nothing showed that Co Uy belonged to the same tribe as the spouses. Jurisdiction therefore properly remained with the regular courts.
The Claim of Indigenous Status Was Doubtful
The Court found the spouses' invocation of indigenous status to be a "mere subterfuge" to evade execution. They never raised their alleged ICC membership during the barangay conciliation or the years of court proceedings. They submitted to the jurisdiction of the regular courts without protest.
Worse, the NCIP had issued an Advisory stating that the Lumad KKK-Alimaong Higaonon Tribe was "NOT one of the indigenous cultural communities duly validated and recognized by the NCIP." Bare allegations of indigenous status, without substantiating the tribe's customs, political structures, and institutions, will not suffice.
Practical Takeaways
- Final judgments are immutable. A decision that has become final and executory can only be set aside in extraordinary circumstances, such as a clear showing that the court lacked jurisdiction.
- Raise jurisdictional objections early. Parties who belatedly raise objections—especially after an adverse final judgment—risk having their claims viewed as dilatory tactics.
- Know the limits of IPRA. The NCIP's jurisdiction under the IPRA applies only when both parties belong to the same ICC. Disputes involving non-ICC parties belong to the regular courts.
- Mandamus has narrow limits. A writ of mandamus can compel a judge to act on a pending motion, but it cannot dictate how the judge should rule. To challenge an adverse ruling, certiorari is the proper remedy.
- Respect the hierarchy of courts. Petitions for extraordinary writs should generally be filed with the RTC or the Court of Appeals first, not directly with the Supreme Court.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.