Cyber Libel Prescription: One Year from Discovery, Not Publication
Supreme Court clarifies cyber libel prescribes in one year from discovery by the offended party, not from publication, and settles unsigned resolution doctrine.
The Supreme Court has settled two important questions for anyone facing or considering a cyber libel complaint: how long does the government have to file charges, and when does that clock start running? In Causing v. People (G.R. No. 258524, April 8, 2026), the Court En Banc denied motions for reconsideration and affirmed that cyber libel prescribes in one year from discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents—not from the date the defamatory post was published. The ruling also clarifies that unsigned resolutions of the Court do not create binding legal doctrines.
The Case Before the Court
Petitioner Berteni Cataluña Causing faced two criminal complaints for cyber libel filed by Representative Ferdinand Ledesma Hernandez. Causing moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the charges had already prescribed because the allegedly defamatory posts were published online more than a year before the complaints were filed.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court explained that prescription is a factual matter that must be proven with evidence. Causing had based his claim only on the date of publication and had not attached any evidence to show when the offended party actually discovered the posts. He could still raise the prescription defense during trial.
The Issue: When Does the One-Year Period Start?
Causing argued that the prescriptive period should run from the date of publication, not discovery. He pointed out that online posts reach a wider audience than traditional print media, and that reckoning from discovery could allow charges to be filed years after publication.
The Court rejected this argument. Under the Revised Penal Code, libel prescribes in one year from discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Since Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act (Republic Act No. 10175) does not create a new crime but merely recognizes the computer system as another means of committing libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, the same prescriptive period applies.
Why Cyber Libel Is Not a New Crime
The Office of the Solicitor General argued that cyber libel should prescribe in 15 years because it carries a heavier penalty than ordinary libel. The Court disagreed.
The Court emphasized that libel is defined in the Revised Penal Code's provisions on defamation, not merely in the provision listing the means of committing it. Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code lists the means of committing libel, such as writing, printing, radio, or similar means. Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act simply adds the use of a computer system to that list. The penalty is raised by one degree under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, but the crime remains the same offense of libel.
The Court also noted that the one-year prescriptive period for libel has always been shorter than the periods for other crimes carrying similar penalties. This reflects a deliberate legislative policy, dating back to Republic Act No. 4661, to protect press freedom and align the prescriptive period with the one-year period for civil defamation actions under the Civil Code.
Unsigned Resolutions Are Not Doctrinal
The OSG also relied on an unsigned Resolution in Tolentino v. People to argue for a 15-year prescriptive period. The Court took this opportunity to settle conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
Under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, only doctrines laid down in decisions or signed resolutions may be modified or reversed by the Court En Banc. Unsigned resolutions, which do not show the concurrence of the members who deliberated and voted, are binding only on the parties to that case. They are not published and cannot be considered doctrinal or a source of stare decisis against non-parties.
The Court expressly re-affirmed the rulings in Denila v. Republic and RMFPU Holdings, Inc. v. Forbes Park Association, Inc., holding that unsigned resolutions are not doctrinal. They may serve as persuasive guides in similar cases, but they do not bind third persons.
Practical Takeaways
- The one-year prescriptive period for cyber libel runs from discovery, not from the date of publication. This means a complaint may still be timely filed even if the post was published more than a year earlier, as long as the offended party, authorities, or their agents discovered it within one year of the filing.
- Evidence matters in prescription defenses. A motion to quash based on prescription must be supported by evidence showing when the offended party discovered the defamatory material. Mere allegations based on the publication date will not suffice.
- Cyber libel is not a separate crime. It is libel under the Revised Penal Code committed through a computer system. The heavier penalty under the Cybercrime Prevention Act does not change the applicable prescriptive period.
- Unsigned Supreme Court resolutions are not binding precedents. Only decisions and signed resolutions create doctrines that bind courts and the public. Unsigned resolutions apply only to the parties in that case.
- The defense of prescription can still be raised during trial. A denial of a motion to quash does not prevent the accused from presenting evidence of prescription in a full-blown trial.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.