Jun 19, 2017customs lawabandonmenttariff and customs codebureau of customsdue noticeimportation

Customs Law: Abandonment of Goods Requires Due Notice Despite Importer's Delay

Supreme Court rules that ipso facto abandonment of imported goods under the Tariff and Customs Code requires due notice, absent fraud.


The Supreme Court has clarified that the government cannot declare imported goods abandoned under the Tariff and Customs Code without first giving the importer due notice, even if the importer delayed in filing its import entry. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs (G.R. No. 195876, June 19, 2017), the Court denied the government's motion for reconsideration and affirmed that the doctrine of ipso facto abandonment cannot apply where the required notice was served only after the one-year prescriptive period for liquidation had already lapsed.

The Facts of the Case

Pilipinas Shell filed its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD) and paid import duties of P11,231,081 on May 23, 1996, for a shipment of crude oil. More than four years later, on July 27, 2000, the Commissioner of Customs sent a demand letter asserting that the company had failed to file its entry within the 30-day period required by law and that the shipment was therefore deemed abandoned and owned by the government.

The Commissioner sought to recover the dutiable value of the oil, relying on the earlier case of Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (583 Phil. 706 [2008]), where the Court had applied the abandonment doctrine against an importer found guilty of fraud.

The Issue

The central question was whether the government could declare Pilipinas Shell's importation abandoned without having given due notice, and whether the one-year prescriptive period under Section 1603 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) barred the government's claim.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Pilipinas Shell, holding that the government's claim had no basis. The Court distinguished the case from Chevron, noting a crucial difference: in Chevron, fraud was established against the importer, while in this case, no such finding existed.

No fraud, no exception to notice requirement. The Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that Pilipinas Shell deliberately delayed filing its IEIRD to avail of a reduced tariff rate under the Oil Deregulation Law (RA 8180). The alleged evidence of fraud—a February 2, 2011 memorandum—was never formally offered as evidence before the Court of Tax Appeals. Citing Heirs of Pasag v. Sps. Parocha (G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007), the Court emphasized that documents not formally offered in evidence cannot be given any evidentiary weight. Without competent proof, the allegation of fraud was mere conjecture.

Due notice is a statutory requirement. Section 1801(b) of the TCC provides that an imported article is deemed abandoned when the importer, "after due notice," fails to file an entry within 30 days from discharge of the last package. The Court stressed that failure to file the entry is not the only requirement—the law categorically requires that this failure be preceded by due notice demanding compliance.

In this case, the notice was served four years after Pilipinas Shell had already filed its IEIRD and paid the duties. By that time, the one-year prescriptive period under Section 1603 had elapsed, making the liquidation final and conclusive. The government could no longer demand payment, and consequently, the abandonment doctrine under Section 1801(b) failed to operate.

Customs Memorandum Order 15-94 confirms the rule. The Court also cited CMO 15-94, the Revised Guidelines on Abandonment in force at the time, which required the posting of an "URGENT NOTICE TO FILE ENTRY" at the Bulletin Board seven days before the lapse of the 30-day period. The Court noted that this implementing rule, which is entitled to great weight, cannot be excused unless fraud is established.

Why This Matters

This ruling is significant for importers and customs practitioners. It confirms that the government cannot rely on the Chevron doctrine to bypass the due notice requirement in ordinary cases. The presence of fraud is a key element that distinguishes Chevron from cases where the importer simply delayed in filing its entry. Without fraud, the government must strictly comply with the statutory notice requirements before it can declare goods abandoned.

Practical Takeaways

  • Due notice is mandatory. The Bureau of Customs must serve the required notice before declaring goods abandoned under Section 1801(b) of the TCC. Failure to do so defeats the abandonment claim.
  • Fraud changes the analysis. The Chevron exception applies only where fraud is proven with competent evidence. Unsubstantiated allegations or documents not formally offered in evidence will not suffice.
  • The one-year prescriptive period matters. Under Section 1603 of the TCC, liquidation becomes final and conclusive after one year from final payment of duties, absent fraud. The government cannot revive a barred claim by recharacterizing it as an abandonment case.
  • Keep records of formal offers. Importers should ensure that all documents they rely on are formally offered in evidence in any proceeding. Documents merely identified or marked as exhibits carry no evidentiary weight.
  • Act promptly on demand letters. Even where the government's claim appears time-barred, importers should respond formally and preserve their rights.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.