Jul 15, 2015bigamyrevised penal codefamily codecriminal lawaccomplice liabilitymarriage

Bigamy and the Second Spouse: Liability as an Accomplice Under Philippine Law

When can a second spouse be held liable for bigamy in the Philippines? The Supreme Court clarifies the rules on accomplice liability and marriage validity.


The Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Santiago v. People clarifies a critical question in Philippine criminal law: when a person marries someone who is already married, can that second spouse be prosecuted for bigamy? The answer depends on knowledge and participation, and the case also addresses what happens when the second marriage itself was solemnized without a valid marriage license. This ruling provides important guidance for anyone facing similar circumstances and for practitioners navigating the intersection of family law and criminal liability.

The Facts of the Case

Leonila Santiago married Nicanor Santos on July 29, 1997. At the time, Santos was already married to Estela Galang, a union that had subsisted since 1974. Santiago was charged with bigamy under the Revised Penal Code, along with Santos, who later died during the pendency of the case.

Santiago raised two main defenses. First, she claimed she did not know Santos was already married. Second, she argued that her marriage to Santos was void because it was celebrated without a marriage license, and therefore could not be the basis for a bigamy conviction. The marriage certificate, however, indicated that the union was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts certain couples from the marriage license requirement.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Santiago of bigamy as a principal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Both lower courts found that Santiago knew of Santos's prior marriage and rejected her arguments about the validity of her own marriage.

The Elements of Bigamy

The Supreme Court, citing Montañez v. Cipriano, enumerated the elements of bigamy: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated upon the celebration of the second marriage.

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused, she must have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. Citing People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. and People v. Archilla, the Court explained that the second spouse's knowledge of the prior marriage constitutes indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, making her responsible as an accomplice rather than a principal.

The Ruling on Accomplice Liability

The Court affirmed Santiago's conviction but modified the penalty. While the lower courts treated her as a principal, the Supreme Court held that her proper liability was as an accomplice. The Court cited the principle that a person who knowingly consents to marry someone already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.

Since the penalty for a principal in bigamy is prision mayor (six years and one day to twelve years), the penalty for an accomplice is the next lower degree: prision correccional (six months and one day to six years). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentenced Santiago to an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum.

The Issue of the Void Marriage

The more significant aspect of the ruling concerns Santiago's argument that her marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The Court acknowledged that jurisprudence requires the second marriage to have all essential requisites for validity. However, the Court refused to allow Santiago to benefit from her own misrepresentation.

The evidence showed that Santiago and Santos had known each other for less than four years before their marriage, yet they misrepresented to the solemnizing officer that they had cohabited for at least five years, as required under Article 34 of the Family Code. The Court chastised this "deceptive scheme" and applied the principle that courts will not aid a party whose cause of action arises from illegal or fraudulent conduct.

The Court distinguished People v. De Lara, where the accused was acquitted of bigamy because the marriage license was issued one day after the wedding. In that case, there was no falsification of documents. Here, Santiago and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and Santiago later used that illicit act to seek acquittal.

Practical Takeaways

  • A second spouse who marries someone with knowledge of a prior subsisting marriage is liable as an accomplice to bigamy, not as a principal.
  • The penalty for an accomplice in bigamy is prision correccional, imposed in its medium period absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
  • A marriage celebrated without a marriage license may be void, but a party who fraudulently misrepresented compliance with the license exemption cannot use that voidness as a defense in a criminal prosecution.
  • Courts will not aid a litigant whose defense is rooted in her own illegal or fraudulent acts.
  • The validity of a second marriage can be raised as a defense in a bigamy prosecution, but it must be substantiated with credible evidence.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.