Oct 3, 2003donation propter nuptiasold civil codeacceptance of donationprescriptionlachescivil law

Donation Propter Nuptias Under the Old Civil Code: Acceptance Not Required for Validity

Supreme Court explains why donations by reason of marriage under the Old Civil Code need no formal acceptance, and why the action to annul the title prescribed.


The Supreme Court, in Locquiao Valencia v. Locquiao (G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003), settled a decades-old family dispute over a parcel of land in Pangasinan. The case clarifies an important point of law for donations made before the New Civil Code took effect: under the Old Civil Code, a donation propter nuptias (a donation by reason of marriage) did not require the donee's acceptance to be valid. The ruling also reinforces the rules on prescription and laches for actions seeking to annul titles.

The Facts of the Case

In 1944, spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son Benito and his prospective bride, Tomasa Mara. The deed, written in Ilocano and called an Inventario Ti Sagut, covered four parcels of land, a male cow, and a one-third portion of the conjugal house. The couple married on June 4, 1944, and the marriage was inscribed on the back of the original certificate of title.

Years later, in 1970, the donation was registered, and a transfer certificate of title was issued in the names of Benito and Tomasa. In 1973, the heirs executed a Deed of Partition, which recognized that Benito and other siblings had already received their shares through prior donations. A compromise agreement in 1976 confirmed these dispositions.

In 1985, petitioners Romana and Constancia Valencia filed an action to annul the title, claiming the donation was spurious and void for lack of acceptance by the donees. They also argued that the notary had no authority and that the document did not follow the required form.

The Issue: Was Acceptance Required?

The central legal question was whether the donation propter nuptias was valid despite the absence of a formal written acceptance by the donees. The petitioners argued that under the Old Civil Code, acceptance should have been made in a public instrument.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court emphasized a fundamental distinction: donations propter nuptias are not governed by the same rules as ordinary donations, particularly regarding formal requirements.

Under Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code, acceptance was not necessary for the validity of donations by reason of marriage. The celebration of the marriage itself, combined with compliance with the prescribed form (a public instrument specifically describing the property), was enough to effectuate the donation.

The Court also noted that the New Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950, has a similar rule. Article 129 provides that express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations; implied acceptance suffices. However, since the donation was executed in 1944, the Old Civil Code applied.

The Court's Ruling on the Other Issues

The Court also addressed the authenticity of the document. The petitioners claimed the deed was falsified because the Records Management and Archives Office had no notarial record for 1944. The Court held that the absence of a notarial record does not prove the document was spurious. It only means the notary may have failed in his administrative duties, which is a ground for disciplining him, not for invalidating the transaction.

More importantly, the heirs themselves recognized the prior donations in the Deed of Partition and the Compromise Agreement. The exclusion of the subject property from those documents dispelled any doubt about the authenticity of the earlier donation.

The Court likewise found the action barred by prescription. The action for reconveyance accrued in 1944 when the deed was executed. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), such actions must be brought within ten years. The complaint, filed in 1985—more than forty years later—was clearly time-barred.

Even if the prescriptive period were reckoned from the discovery of the alleged fraud, the registration of the deed in 1970 constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The action filed in 1985 was still beyond the ten-year period.

Finally, the Court ruled that the action was barred by laches. Romana had actual knowledge of the donation as early as 1973 when she signed the Deed of Partition, yet she waited eleven more years before questioning it.

Practical Takeaways

  • Donations propter nuptias are special. They are not governed by the same rules as ordinary donations. Under the Old Civil Code, acceptance was not required for validity; under the New Civil Code, implied acceptance is sufficient.
  • The applicable law depends on when the donation was made. Only laws existing at the time of execution apply, unless a later statute expressly provides for retroactivity. The New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950.
  • Registration is constructive notice to the whole world. Once a deed is registered in the public registry, all persons are deemed to know of its contents. This starts the prescriptive period for actions to annul the title.
  • Absence of notarial records does not invalidate a document. A notary's failure to keep records is an administrative matter, not a ground to set aside the transaction.
  • Delay can be fatal. Laches bars claims when a party, with knowledge of the facts, unreasonably delays in asserting their rights, to the prejudice of the other party.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.