Jul 6, 2022criminal-lawhearsay-exceptionsdying-declarationres-gestaemurderevidence

Dying Declarations vs Res Gestae: Hearsay Exceptions in Philippine Murder Cases

The Supreme Court clarifies when a victim's dying words are admissible—as a dying declaration or as res gestae—in a murder conviction.


In a 2022 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the murder conviction of two men for the stabbing death of a security guard in Antipolo City. The case is instructive for criminal law practitioners and students alike because it clarifies a frequently confused point of evidence: when a dying victim's statement identifying an assailant may be admitted in court, and under which hearsay exception. The Court also took the opportunity to distinguish treachery from abuse of superior strength, and to correct the damages awarded.

The Facts of the Case

On the evening of January 2, 2005, Felix Sabasan was chased and stabbed multiple times outside his home. A neighbor, Lucena Abayon, witnessed the attack. She saw two men—later identified as Mark Anthony Yulo and Mark Ryan Bueno—chase Felix, with Bueno holding him while Yulo stabbed him. A third unidentified man was also involved.

When Felix's father, Nehemias, reached his son, he asked who had stabbed him. Felix answered, "Tata Manukan and Nonoy"—names the father recognized as Yulo and Bueno. Felix was brought to a hospital but died while receiving treatment. A blood-stained ice pick was recovered from Yulo upon arrest.

The Issue: Which Hearsay Exception Applies?

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals admitted Felix's statement to his father as a dying declaration, an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The Supreme Court, however, corrected this classification.

For a statement to qualify as a dying declaration, the declarant must have a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death at the moment the statement is made. The Court found no evidence that Felix had abandoned all hope of survival when he named his attackers. He only expressed fear that he would die later, while on the way to the hospital. The statement was therefore not a dying declaration.

Admissible as Res Gestae

The Court held that Felix's statement was nonetheless admissible as part of res gestae, governed by Section 42, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Res gestae covers statements made while a startling occurrence is taking place, or immediately before or after it, provided three elements are present: (1) the principal act is a startling occurrence; (2) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence and its immediate attending circumstances.

All three elements were satisfied. The stabbing was a startling event. Felix identified his attackers moments after the attack, with no time to fabricate. And the statement directly concerned the incident. The Court emphasized that the crucial factor is the contemporaneity of the statement with the startling event—not the declarant's awareness of impending death.

Other Evidence and the Finding of Conspiracy

The Court also gave weight to Abayon's eyewitness testimony and to the testimony of Cristy Cardinal, to whom Yulo had admitted the stabbing—an admission against interest. Even though Bueno only held the victim's arms, the Court found him equally liable as a co-conspirator. Conspiracy may be inferred from concerted action; the act of one is the act of all.

Treachery vs. Abuse of Superior Strength

The Court disagreed with the lower courts' finding of treachery. Because Felix was initially able to run from his attackers and only fell by accident, the attack was not shown to be deliberately adopted to ensure its execution without risk to the offenders. However, the Court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength: three men coordinated to overwhelm an unarmed victim, with two holding him while the third inflicted 11 stab wounds.

Damages Corrected

The Court modified the damages, reducing civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages from P100,000.00 each to P75,000.00 each. The higher amounts apply only when the penalty is death reduced to reclusion perpetua under Republic Act No. 9346. Here, the penalty was reclusion perpetua only. The awards for actual damages (P107,600.00) and loss of earning capacity (P1,872,000.00) were upheld, all subject to 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment.

Practical Takeaways

  • A dying declaration requires proof that the declarant spoke with a fixed belief in imminent death at the very moment of the statement. Without that, the statement may still be admissible as res gestae if made spontaneously during or immediately after a startling occurrence.
  • Res gestae focuses on contemporaneity and spontaneity, not the declarant's state of mind about death.
  • A co-accused who merely holds the victim while another stabs can be convicted as a principal by conspiracy.
  • Treachery requires a deliberate, sudden attack; if the victim had a chance to flee and merely tripped, the qualifying circumstance may be abuse of superior strength instead.
  • Damages in murder cases vary depending on the penalty actually imposed; P75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages applies when the penalty is reclusion perpetua without the death penalty reduction.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.

Dying Declarations vs Res Gestae: Hearsay Exceptions in Philippine Murder Cases · Ablola, Saribong & Gueco