Election Transparency and Citizen Access to the Automated Election System in the Philippines

The Supreme Court’s June 2023 decision in National Press Club of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections clarifies how far citizens, political parties, and media organizations can compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to open up the automated election system (AES) to public scrutiny. The case arose from petitions filed just weeks before the May 2022 national and local elections, seeking to force COMELEC to allow observers into key stages of the electoral process—from ballot printing to the configuration of SD cards and vote counting machines.

While the Court found most of the specific requests moot because the elections had already been held, it used the case to lay down important rules on election transparency, the ministerial duties of COMELEC, and the scope of the people’s constitutional right to information.

The Petitioners’ Demands

The petitioners—the National Press Club of the Philippines, Automated Election System Watch, and Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.—asked the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel COMELEC to:

• Implement digital signatures for the 2022 elections;
• Allow observers to witness ballot printing at the National Printing Office;
• Permit public scrutiny of defective ballots;
• Allow observation of SD card configuration and VCM testing;
• Open technical hubs and data centers to inspection; and
• Disclose the full transmission diagram or network architecture for election results.

The petitioners argued that these measures were necessary to ensure credible elections, citing provisions of the Automated Election System Law (Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by R.A. No. 9369) and the Omnibus Election Code.

The Court’s Ruling on Mandamus

The Court began by noting that the petition was technically moot because the 2022 elections had concluded. However, it decided to rule on the issues because they involved novel questions capable of repetition yet evading review.

For mandamus to issue, the Court explained, the petitioner must show a clear legal right to the act demanded, and the duty sought to be compelled must be ministerial—meaning it involves no exercise of discretion. Applying this standard, the Court addressed each demand.

Digital Signatures: A Discretionary Matter

The petitioners argued that Section 22 of the AES Law made it a mandatory duty for COMELEC to implement digital signatures by teachers and Board of Election Inspectors. The Court disagreed.

It noted that the digital signature requirement in the law refers to signatures on electronic election returns and certificates of canvass. Since automated elections began in 2010, the digital signatures have come from the vote counting machines themselves, not from teachers. The Court cited its earlier ruling in Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. COMELEC, which held that a machine signature may validly serve as the functional equivalent of a digital signature.

Because the choice of how to implement digital signatures involves COMELEC’s sound judgment and discretion, mandamus did not lie.

Ballot Printing: A Ministerial Duty

On the printing of ballots, the Court took a firmer stance. Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that COMELEC shall allow designated watchers to witness the printing and distribution of ballots and guard the printer’s premises.

The Court held that the word “shall” leaves COMELEC no discretion. Once a proper request is made, allowing watchers is a ministerial duty. The Court rejected COMELEC’s excuses—security concerns, potential delays, and pandemic restrictions—as insufficient reasons to disregard the law. It noted that COMELEC could have allowed a limited number of watchers or used livestreaming to comply.

However, because COMELEC eventually allowed observers and began livestreaming the printing process, the Court found this issue moot.

SD Cards and VCMs: Examination, Not Configuration

The petitioners sought access to the configuration and preparation of SD cards and VCMs at the Sta. Rosa warehouse. The Court drew a careful distinction.

Under Section 14 of the AES Law, as amended, COMELEC must allow political parties, candidates, and citizens’ arms to examine and test the equipment or devices of the AES. The Court interpreted this provision broadly to include SD cards, not just the counting machines.

However, the law does not require COMELEC to allow observation of the configuration process itself. The Court reasoned that the law’s provision of test ballots and test forms indicates that examination and testing occur after configuration, not during it. Requiring observers during configuration would be absurd, the Court said, since unconfigured equipment cannot be meaningfully tested.

The Court also noted that COMELEC is entitled to verify that individuals seeking access are bona fide political parties, candidates, or accredited citizens’ arms—a reasonable safeguard for the integrity of the process.

Transmission Diagrams: Transparency in Principle

On the petitioners’ demand for full disclosure of transmission diagrams and network architecture, the Court emphasized the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. It noted that the AES Law’s policy of “informed elections” and transparency must be read together with this constitutional guarantee.

However, the Court found that COMELEC had already disclosed substantial information—including hub locations, dispatch schedules, and walkthroughs of the transparency media server—and that the issue had become moot.

Practical Takeaways

• Ballot printing observation is a ministerial duty. COMELEC cannot refuse watchers designated by candidates, political parties, or accredited organizations once a proper request is made. Security, delay, or pandemic excuses do not override the law.
• Digital signatures are flexible. The law does not require a specific method of digital signing. Machine-generated signatures from VCMs can validly satisfy the requirement.
• Examination and testing of AES equipment is a clear right. Political parties, candidates, and citizens’ arms may examine and test VCMs and SD cards before voting starts. But this right does not extend to observing the internal configuration process.
• COMELEC may verify identities. Before allowing access, COMELEC may confirm that a person or group is genuinely a candidate, party, or accredited citizens’ arm.
• The right to information is not absolute. While election-related information is generally a matter of public concern, the right is subject to legal exemptions and the balancing of competing interests.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.