Fencing in the Philippines: Knowledge and Presumptions Under the Anti-Fencing Law

The crime of fencing — dealing in stolen goods — is often easier to allege than to prove. Under the Anti-Fencing Law (Presidential Decree No. 1612), the prosecution must show that the accused knew, or should have known, that the items they bought or received were the proceeds of theft or robbery. The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra (G.R. No. 118590) clarifies how that knowledge is established, how the law’s presumption works, and when a prosecutor’s dismissal of a fencing complaint stands.

The Facts of the Case

D.M. Consunji, Inc. discovered that its employees had been stealing marine plywood from its warehouse in Cainta, Rizal for nearly a year. The pilfered materials, valued at no less than ₱6.5 million, were allegedly sold to hardware stores in Cubao, Quezon City — MC Industrial Sales, owned by Eduardo Ching, and Seato Trading Company, owned by spouses Anthony and Cecilia Say.

Acting on search warrants, authorities seized three pieces of phenolic plywood from Ching’s premises and 615 pieces from the Says’ store. The company identified the seized items as stolen from its warehouse. The National Bureau of Investigation filed complaints against the private respondents for violation of P.D. 1612.

The investigating prosecutor, however, dismissed the complaints. He found that the buyers had no reason to suspect the plywood was stolen: they purchased from registered businesses, received proper receipts and sales invoices, and the goods appeared new and unsold. The Department of Justice upheld the dismissal. D.M. Consunji then went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.

The Elements of Fencing

The Court, citing Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, restated the four elements of fencing:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused — not a principal or accomplice in that crime — buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes of, or in any manner deals in, any article derived from the proceeds of the crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the article was derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft; and
4. The accused acted with intent to gain.

In this case, the first two elements were clearly present: qualified theft had occurred, and the plywood was found in the respondents’ premises. The decisive question was the third element — did the buyers know, or should they have known, that the plywood was stolen?

Knowledge and the Presumption in Section 5

The Court explained what “knows” and “should have known” mean. A person “knows” a fact if he is aware of its existence with certitude and clarity, or is aware of a high probability of its existence. “Should have known” means a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would have ascertained the fact in the performance of a duty.

Section 5 of P.D. 1612 provides that mere possession of goods that were the subject of robbery or theft is prima facie evidence of fencing. This presumption is reasonable, the Court said, because no other natural or logical inference arises from possession of stolen property.

But the presumption is rebuttable. In Dizon-Pamintuan, the accused failed to rebut it because she could not present her supplier or show that the supplier was licensed. In this case, the respondents succeeded: they presented sales receipts covering their purchases. Ching bought from agents of Paramount Industrial, a known hardware store in Caloocan. The Says bought from MC Industrial Sales, a registered and licensed establishment. The receipts, while not an absolute defense, were proof that the transactions were above-board.

Why the Prosecutor’s Dismissal Stood

The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the prosecutor should have applied only a “probable cause” standard. The prosecutor did apply that standard — and found the evidence insufficient. The receipts and the legitimate nature of the sellers gave the buyers no reason to suspect the goods were stolen. Absent other evidence, the presumption of innocence remained.

The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. No such abuse existed here. The prosecutor had substantial basis for the dismissal.

Mandamus Was Not Available

The petitioner also sought to compel the prosecutor to file the information through mandamus. The Court reiterated that the decision to prosecute is a prerogative of the fiscal, who exercises sound discretion. Mandamus lies only to compel a ministerial duty, not to control discretion. The prosecutor was not convinced he had the evidence to convict, and the Court would not force him to file a case he could not prove.

Practical Takeaways

• Fencing requires knowledge. A buyer of stolen goods is guilty only if he knew or should have known the goods were stolen. Honest, reasonable purchases from legitimate businesses are a defense.
• Possession creates a presumption, not a conviction. Mere possession of stolen items is prima facie evidence of fencing, but it can be overcome by credible proof of a legitimate transaction.
• Keep your receipts. Sales invoices and receipts from registered sellers are powerful evidence that a purchase was made in good faith. They can rebut the statutory presumption.
• Prosecutors have wide discretion. A fiscal’s decision to dismiss a complaint will not be overturned unless it amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Mandamus cannot compel a prosecutor to file a case he believes he cannot prove.
• Preliminary investigation protects the innocent. It shields persons from the expense and embarrassment of trial when evidence is weak.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.