Hierarchy of Courts and Indigenous Peoples Rights: Anita Santos v. Gabaen

The Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Anita Santos v. Atty. Kissack B. Gabaen (G.R. No. 195638) clarifies important limits on how courts may be approached in disputes involving indigenous peoples' rights. The case reaffirms two fundamental rules: litigants must observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, and only parties with direct, personal interest may challenge government actions. The ruling also touches on the NCIP's jurisdiction over ancestral domain disputes and the requirement of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA).

The Dispute Over Almaciga Resin

The case began when Danny Erong, a Pala'wan Tribal Chieftain in Palawan, filed a complaint with the NCIP Regional Hearing Office against Pinagtibukan It Pala'wan, Inc. (PINPAL) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Erong alleged that PINPAL's Resource Use Permit (RUP) for collecting almaciga resin was issued without the required Certification Precondition under Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act). This provision requires government agencies to obtain certification from the NCIP that an area does not overlap with ancestral domains, or that the affected indigenous community has given its Free and Prior Informed Consent.

The NCIP issued a Cease and Desist Order against PINPAL, the DENR, and Anita Santos, who bought almaciga resin from PINPAL. Santos challenged the order before the Supreme Court, arguing that the NCIP acted without jurisdiction and that certain provisions of IPRA were unconstitutional.

The Proper Remedy and Jurisdiction of the NCIP

The Court first addressed whether Santos used the correct remedy. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari or prohibition requires that the respondent tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

The Court found that Santos had no available remedy within the NCIP because she does not belong to the indigenous cultural community involved. Citing Unduran v. Aberasturi, the Court clarified that the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples applies only when the parties belong to the same indigenous cultural community. Since Santos is not an indigenous person, she could not seek relief from the NCIP or appeal to the Court of Appeals. A Rule 65 petition was therefore the proper remedy.

The Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Despite finding the remedy proper, the Court dismissed the petition for violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Under this doctrine, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law. Litigants must first seek relief from lower courts—such as the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Courts—which share original jurisdiction over certiorari and prohibition petitions.

The Court, citing GIOS-SAMAR, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, emphasized that this doctrine is "a constitutional filtering mechanism" that keeps the Supreme Court a "court of last resort." While exceptions exist—such as genuine issues of constitutionality, transcendental importance, or cases of first impression—Santos failed to invoke any. Her bare allegation of "chaotic consequence, magnitude and extreme urgency" was insufficient to justify direct resort to the Supreme Court.

Lack of Legal Standing

The Court also ruled that Santos lacked legal standing to defend the validity of PINPAL's RUP. Citing Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, the Court defined legal standing as a party's "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."

Santos' interest as a buyer of almaciga resin was merely incidental. She was not the holder of the RUP, nor did she have authorization from PINPAL to sue on its behalf. As the Court noted, PINPAL had "the more direct and specific interest in the validity of its RUP than Santos." Her alleged exclusive dealership with PINPAL did not create a direct or personal right prejudiced by the nullity of the RUP.

Avoiding Constitutional Questions

Finally, the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 3(a) of IPRA and its implementing rules, which Santos challenged as violating the Regalian Doctrine. Citing Parcon-Song v. Parcon, the Court reiterated that courts should avoid resolving the constitutionality of a law if the case can be ruled on other grounds. Since the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds—non-observance of the hierarchy of courts and lack of standing—there was no need to reach the constitutional issue.

Practical Takeaways

• Observe the hierarchy of courts. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court is not automatic. Litigants must first file petitions with the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Courts unless a clear exception applies.
• Standing requires direct injury. A person challenging a government action must show a personal and substantial interest. Incidental or indirect interests—such as being a buyer from a permit holder—are not enough.
• NCIP jurisdiction is limited. The NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes involving indigenous peoples generally applies only when the parties belong to the same indigenous cultural community.
• Certification Precondition matters. Government agencies must secure NCIP certification or FPIC before issuing permits affecting ancestral domains, as required by Section 59 of IPRA.
• Courts avoid constitutional questions when possible. If a case can be resolved on other grounds, courts will not rule on the constitutionality of a law.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.