Jan 26, 2016moral turpitudeelectoral disqualificationomnibus election codelibelpublic office eligibilitycertificate of candidacy

Moral Turpitude and Electoral Disqualification: Defining the Boundaries of Public Office Eligibility

The Supreme Court rules that libel is a crime involving moral turpitude, disqualifying a convicted candidate from public office under the Omnibus Election Code.


The Supreme Court's 2016 ruling in Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal settled a significant question in Philippine election law: whether a conviction for libel disqualifies a person from running for public office. The Court held that libel is a crime involving moral turpitude, and a candidate convicted of it is ineligible to hold office for five years from service of sentence. The decision also clarified the consequences of filing a certificate of candidacy while disqualified.

The Facts of the Case

Philip A. Pichay was convicted by final judgment in 2008 of four counts of libel under the Revised Penal Code. The conviction stemmed from defamatory articles published by a newspaper where Pichay served as president. He was sentenced to pay a fine of P6,000 for each count and P1,000,000 in moral damages. He paid these amounts on 17 February 2011.

On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the House of Representatives. He won the 13 May 2013 elections. Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado, a rival candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), arguing that Pichay was disqualified because libel involves moral turpitude and the five-year disqualification period had not yet lapsed.

The HRET dismissed the petition, ruling that the circumstances of Pichay's conviction did not show moral turpitude. Ty-Delgado elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

The Issue

The central issue was whether Pichay's conviction for libel disqualified him from holding public office under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which bars any person sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude from being a candidate or holding any office.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the HRET and declared Pichay ineligible. The Court defined moral turpitude as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general." While not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, crimes mala in se generally do, and libel is one such crime.

The Court noted that libel requires malice, which is its essence. In Pichay's case, the prior conviction in Tulfo v. People found that he published defamatory articles with reckless disregard of whether they were false. This showed actual malice and an intention to do unjustifiable harm.

Pichay argued that as merely the publisher, not the author, his participation was different. The Court rejected this, citing the Revised Penal Code provision that holds the publisher responsible for defamation to the same extent as the author. The Court reasoned that the law does not distinguish between the liability of the author and the publisher, so neither should the Court. The crime of libel would not even be consummated without the publisher's participation.

The Court also rejected the argument that the imposition of a fine instead of imprisonment meant the crime did not involve moral turpitude. The penalty does not determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude.

The Five-Year Disqualification Period

Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, the disqualification is removed after five years from service of sentence. Since Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, his disqualification period ended only on 16 February 2016. When he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012, he was still disqualified.

Because Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy, the Court applied Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. A certificate of candidacy containing false material representations is void ab initio. Consequently, Pichay was never a valid candidate, and all votes cast for him were considered stray votes. Ty-Delgado, as the qualified candidate with the highest number of valid votes, was declared the winner.

Practical Takeaways

  • Libel is a disqualifying crime. A final conviction for libel bars a person from running for or holding public office because it involves moral turpitude.
  • The five-year period runs from service of sentence. For fines, this is the date of payment. Filing a certificate of candidacy within this period is a false material representation.
  • Publisher liability is equal to author liability. Being the publisher of defamatory material does not lessen criminal responsibility for libel.
  • A void certificate of candidacy means stray votes. If a candidate's certificate is void ab initio, votes cast for that candidate do not count, and the qualified candidate with the highest valid votes wins.
  • Election tribunals are not immune from review. The Supreme Court may reverse an electoral tribunal's decision if it commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.