Mar 9, 2021eminent domainfranchiseelectricity distributionexpropriationpublic usejust compensation

Navigating Eminent Domain and Franchise Rights: The Battle Over Electricity Distribution in Iloilo City

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of expropriation provisions in R.A. 11212, allowing MORE Power to acquire PECO's distribution system in Iloilo City.


The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, has settled a significant legal dispute over the fate of Iloilo City's electricity distribution system. In More Electric and Power Corporation v. Panay Electric Company, Inc. (G.R. No. 248061, March 9, 2021), the Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 10 and 17 of Republic Act No. 11212, which granted MORE Electric and Power Corporation (MORE) the right to expropriate the distribution assets of Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO). The ruling clarifies how the power of eminent domain operates when a legislative franchise expires and a new franchisee takes over.

Background of the Case

PECO had held a legislative franchise to operate the electric distribution system in Iloilo City since 1922. That franchise expired on January 18, 2019, and Congress did not renew it. Instead, on July 23, 2018, Congress enacted R.A. No. 11212, granting MORE a franchise to establish, operate, and maintain an electric power distribution system in the same city.

Because MORE had not yet built its own system, Section 17 of R.A. No. 11212 allowed PECO to continue operating the existing distribution system during an interim period. However, the same provision expressly stated that this interim arrangement would not prevent MORE from acquiring the system through eminent domain.

PECO challenged the constitutionality of Sections 10 and 17 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, arguing that these provisions violated its rights to due process and equal protection. The RTC ruled in PECO's favor, declaring the provisions void. MORE and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Issue Before the Court

The central question was whether Sections 10 and 17 of R.A. No. 11212—which authorized MORE to expropriate PECO's distribution system—violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

The Supreme Court's Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC and declared the challenged provisions constitutional. In denying PECO's motion for reconsideration, the Court addressed several key arguments.

A franchise is a privilege, not a right. The Court emphasized that a legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by Congress, not a right that any entity may demand. Under Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, franchises for public utilities are granted subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. Since PECO's franchise had expired and was not renewed, Congress had the plenary power to award the franchise to MORE.

Eminent domain may be delegated to private entities. PECO argued that only the government could exercise eminent domain. The Court rejected this restrictive view, holding that Congress may delegate the power of eminent domain to private enterprises performing public services. Being a private corporation authorized to operate a public utility, MORE validly received this delegated authority.

The requisites for valid expropriation were satisfied. The Court enumerated the five requisites for a valid exercise of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply with due process.

On the element of genuine necessity, the Court noted that when the Legislature exercises the power, the question of necessity is essentially for Congress to decide. The Court found that the expropriation served the public purpose of ensuring uninterrupted electricity supply during the transition from PECO to MORE—a matter of public interest and security.

On the element of public use, the Court explained that the term has evolved to mean "public interest," "public benefit," and "public convenience." Electricity distribution undoubtedly affects public welfare. The Court also noted that property already devoted to public use can still be expropriated when done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to a delegate.

No violation of equal protection. The Court rejected PECO's claim that it was "singled out" and that MORE received undue benefits. Other distribution utilities' franchises contain similar eminent domain provisions, including Cotabato Electric Cooperative, Cotabato Light and Power Company, and Angeles Electric Corporation. Any incidental benefit to MORE did not override the paramount public interest in uninterrupted electricity supply.

Practical Takeaways

  • A franchise is not a vested right. When a legislative franchise expires, the holder cannot demand renewal. Congress has broad discretion to award the franchise to another entity.
  • Private utilities can exercise eminent domain. Congress may delegate the power of eminent domain to private enterprises performing public services, not just to government entities.
  • Property already devoted to public use can still be expropriated. This is permitted when done directly by the legislature or under a specific grant of authority to a delegate.
  • Public use has a broad meaning. The concept now encompasses public interest, public benefit, and public convenience, not just literal use by the public.
  • Just compensation remains a safeguard. Even where expropriation is allowed, the property owner is entitled to just compensation, to be determined in proper expropriation proceedings.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.