Mar 17, 2003legal ethicsdisbarmentlawyerscourt ordersgovernment service

Disguised Employment and the Lawyer's Duty to Obey Court Orders

When a consultancy is really employment, a lawyer cannot use it to evade a court's disqualification order. The Supreme Court explains why.


The Supreme Court has long held that lawyers must obey court orders without question. But what happens when a lawyer tries to work around a disqualification order by accepting what appears to be a consultancy contract? In Brion v. Brillantes (A.C. No. 5305, March 17, 2003), the Court made clear that the substance of a lawyer's work—not the label of the contract—determines whether that lawyer has violated a lawful order.

The Facts of the Case

The case began with a prior disciplinary action against Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., a former judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. In that earlier case, Atienza v. Judge Brillantes (A.M. No. MTJ-92-706), the Court found him guilty of gross immorality and appearance of impropriety. He was dismissed from the service and perpetually disqualified from reappointment to any government position, including posts in government-owned or controlled corporations.

Despite this clear prohibition, Brillantes later accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Presidential Decree No. 198. He was also designated as the sixth member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water District. When the consultancy agreement expired, it was renewed as a

The complainant, Marciano Brion, Jr., argued that Brillantes had willfully violated the Court's order. He pointed to evidence that Brillantes performed duties far beyond those of an adviser: he issued written instructions to LWUA employees, supervised staff, sat on sensitive committees like the Prequalification, Bids, and Awards Committee and the Build-Operate-Transfer Committee, received honoraria, and even obtained a Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.

The Issue

The central question was whether Brillantes, by accepting the consultancy and performing these duties, had violated the Court's earlier order of perpetual disqualification from government service.

The Court's Ruling

The Court ruled against Brillantes. It found that his consultancy was a mere sham designed to circumvent the disqualification order.

Brillantes argued that under Civil Service Commission, Series of 1993, consultancy services are not considered government services and need not be submitted for approval. But the Court noted that the very same memorandum circular provides that consultancy duties are mainly advisory in nature. Brillantes' actual work was anything but advisory.

The Court observed that an adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over employees, issue written instructions, or sit on vital committees. Brillantes did all of these things. Most telling was his receipt of the Productivity Incentive Bonus, which LWUA's Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, limited to "officials" and "employees" of the agency. This proved that, for all practical purposes, Brillantes was a contractual employee of LWUA, not a mere consultant.

The Court emphasized that a consultant hired on a contractual basis is different from a contractual employee. By performing the duties of a contractual employee while calling himself a consultant, Brillantes transgressed both the letter and spirit of the Court's earlier decree.

The Lawyer's Duty

The Court reminded lawyers of their primary duty under the Attorney's Oath: to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. This duty, at its minimum, requires obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Brillantes' disobedience could not be hidden behind a consultancy contract. His conduct was an open defiance of the Court's authority and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.

The Court also noted that Brillantes was no ordinary lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight years, he was fully aware of the standards of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. His attempt to "get away" with the indiscretion was inexcusable.

For violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct, the Court suspended Brillantes from the practice of law for one year and fined him ten thousand pesos.

Practical Takeaways

  • Labels do not control. Courts look at the substance of a lawyer's work, not the title of the contract. A "consultancy" that involves supervisory powers, committee memberships, and employee benefits will be treated as employment.
  • Court orders are absolute. A lawyer cannot use contractual arrangements to evade a disqualification order from the Court. Attempts to do so will be met with severe disciplinary action.
  • Beware of "advisory" roles. If a lawyer's duties go beyond giving advice—such as supervising staff, signing instructions, or sitting on decision-making committees—the arrangement may be deemed employment.
  • Government agencies cannot shield lawyers. Even if an agency like LWUA enters into a consultancy contract, the lawyer remains accountable to the Court for obeying its orders.
  • Prior discipline raises the stakes. A lawyer who has already been sanctioned is held to a higher standard. Attempts to circumvent an earlier order will be treated as an aggravating circumstance.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.