Prescription Period for Ordinance Violations: Filing the Complaint vs. the Information

In a dispute over illegally parked cars and removed wheel clamps, the Supreme Court clarified a critical procedural point: for violations of city ordinances, the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of the Information in court, not by the earlier filing of a complaint with the prosecutor's office. The case of Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Judge Lidua, Sr. (G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013) illustrates how this rule can extinguish criminal liability if the prosecution moves too slowly.

The Facts of the Case

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation operated parking spaces in Baguio City under City Ordinance 003-2000, which authorized it to clamp vehicles parked illegally. In May 2003, respondents forcibly removed clamps from two vehicles, taking the clamps with them and refusing to pay the corresponding fines and declamping fees.

Jadewell filed affidavit-complaints for robbery with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003. After preliminary investigation, the prosecutor found no probable cause for robbery but found probable cause for violation of Section 21 of the city ordinance. The corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court only on October 2, 2003—more than four months after the offense was committed.

The respondents moved to quash the Informations on the ground of prescription, arguing that under Act No. 3326, violations of municipal ordinances prescribe after two months. The trial court granted the motion, and the Regional Trial Court affirmed.

The Issue

The central question was whether the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the running of the two-month prescriptive period, or whether only the filing of the Information in court could interrupt it.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court denied Jadewell's petition, ruling that the offenses had indeed prescribed. The Court applied the doctrine established in Zaldivia v. Reyes (G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992), which governs violations of municipal and city ordinances under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

The Court reasoned that under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, in chartered cities, criminal cases for ordinance violations are commenced by the filing of an Information. The case is deemed commenced only when it is filed in court. Therefore, the running of the prescriptive period is halted on the date the case is actually filed in court, and not on any date before that.

The Court distinguished the case from People v. Pangilinan (G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012), which held that filing a complaint with the prosecutor interrupts prescription for violations of special laws. That doctrine, the Court explained, does not apply to ordinance violations governed by the Summary Procedure Rules.

The Role of Act No. 3326

Act No. 3326, as amended, is the statute that establishes the prescriptive period for violations of special laws and municipal ordinances. It provides that violations penalized by municipal ordinances prescribe after two months. The period begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation and is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.

The Court clarified that the "proceedings" referred to in Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings—the filing of the Information in court—not administrative or preliminary investigation proceedings before the prosecutor.

Practical Takeaways

• For ordinance violations, the clock is short. Under Act No. 3326, violations of municipal or city ordinances prescribe after two months from the date of commission or discovery.
• Filing a complaint with the prosecutor does not stop the clock. For offenses covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of the Information in court interrupts the prescriptive period.
• Prosecutors must act quickly. The failure of the prosecutor to file the Information within the prescriptive period, even if the complaint was filed seasonably, can result in the dismissal of the case.
• The rule differs for special laws. Under People v. Pangilinan, filing a complaint with the prosecutor may interrupt prescription for violations of special laws, but this doctrine does not extend to ordinance violations.
• Prescription is a substantive right. Courts cannot interpret procedural rules in a way that diminishes, increases, or modifies substantive rights, including the right to invoke prescription.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.