Prescription of Penalties: Imprisonment Must Begin Before Evasion Can Trigger Prescriptive Period

The Supreme Court has long held that the prescription of penalties—the time limit within which the State must enforce a sentence—does not favor a convict who has never been imprisoned. In Pangan v. Gatbalite (G.R. No. 141718, January 21, 2005), the Court clarified that the prescriptive period for a penalty of imprisonment begins to run only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of imprisonment. A person who remains at large from the start, never having been confined, cannot claim that the penalty has prescribed.

The Case: A Convict Who Never Served a Day

Benjamin Pangan was convicted of simple seduction and sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor. His conviction was affirmed on appeal on October 24, 1988. When the case was called for promulgation on August 9, 1991, Pangan failed to appear. The court ordered the arrest of the petitioner, but he remained at large for nearly nine years. He was finally apprehended on January 20, 2000.

Pangan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his detention was illegal because his penalty had already prescribed. Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date the culprit should evade the service of sentence. Pangan claimed that the five-year prescriptive period for his penalty began on August 9, 1991, when the judgment was promulgated in absentia and the arrest order was issued.

The Issue: When Does Prescription Begin?

The sole legal question was the interpretation of the phrase "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence" in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code. Pangan argued that the prescriptive period should run from the moment the judgment became final and the convict successfully evaded arrest. He contended that the ruling in Infante v. Warden (92 Phil. 310) imposed a condition not stated in the law—that the convict must first serve part of the sentence before escaping.

The Ruling: No Imprisonment, No Evasion, No Prescription

The Supreme Court rejected Pangan's argument and affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition. The Court ruled that the prescription of penalties under Article 93 applies only to those convicted by final judgment who are actually serving a sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty. The prescriptive period begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of imprisonment.

The Court relied on Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping "during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." Since Pangan never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest, he never evaded service of sentence by escaping. Therefore, the period of prescription never began to run.

The Court cited Tanega v. Masakayan (125 Phil. 966) and Del Castillo v. Torrecampo (394 SCRA 221) as controlling precedents. In both cases, the Court held that a convict who was never placed in confinement cannot claim prescription of penalty. As the Court emphasized in Del Castillo, "one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom."

The Rationale: No Reward for Fugitives

The Court was explicit about the policy behind the rule: a convict who chooses to become a fugitive should not be rewarded with the extinguishment of criminal liability. The State's failure to arrest a convict does not prejudice its right to enforce the sentence. The prescriptive period is designed to penalize the State's inaction in pursuing a convict who has escaped from custody—not to benefit one who has never been within the State's control.

Practical Takeaways

• Prescription of penalties is not a statute of limitations for arrest. The period under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins only when a convict escapes during actual imprisonment, not when a convict simply remains at large.
• A convict who never serves any time cannot claim prescription. The prescriptive period never starts to run if the convict was never placed in confinement.
• Article 157 defines evasion. Evasion of service of sentence under Article 93 must be read together with Article 157, which requires an escape during the term of imprisonment.
• A final judgment and an arrest order are not enough. The issuance of a warrant of arrest does not trigger the prescriptive period; actual confinement followed by escape is required.
• Fugitives gain no advantage from delay. The longer a convict evades arrest without having been imprisoned, the longer the State retains the right to enforce the sentence.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.