Can a Spouse Convicted of Adultery Still Share in Conjugal Property? The Maquilan Ruling

In Maquilan v. Maquilan (G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007), the Supreme Court settled a question that troubles many separating spouses: does a conviction for adultery automatically strip the guilty spouse of his or her share in the conjugal partnership of gains? The Court answered no—but with important conditions. The ruling also clarified when a voluntary separation of property between spouses is valid, even while an annulment case is pending.

The Facts of the Case

Virgilio Maquilan discovered that his wife, Dita, was having an affair. He filed an adultery case against her and her paramour. Both were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from one year and eight months to three years and six months.

Later, Dita filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During pre-trial, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement that partially divided their conjugal properties. Among other things, they agreed to set aside P500,000 for their child, divide the remaining bank deposit equally, and allocate specific properties—like the store, bodega, motorcycles, and passenger jeep—between them. The house and lot were given to their common child.

The trial court approved the agreement. Virgilio later tried to repudiate it, arguing that his lawyer did not explain its effects and that Dita, being convicted of adultery, should not be allowed to share in the conjugal property. The Court of Appeals upheld the agreement, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

The Issue: Does Adultery Disqualify a Spouse from Sharing?

Virgilio argued that Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code should apply. These provisions forfeit the share of a guilty spouse in certain situations—Article 43(2) covers a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, and Article 63 covers the effects of a decree of legal separation.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Neither provision applied. Article 43 deals with a marriage terminated by the reappearance of an absent spouse, not an adultery case. Article 63 applies only after a court has issued a decree of legal separation—and Virgilio never filed for legal separation. Since the annulment petition was still pending, it was premature to invoke these provisions.

The Court also noted that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction. Under Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code, civil interdiction deprives a person of the right to manage and dispose of property. But the penalty for adultery under Article 333 is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which does not include civil interdiction as an accessory penalty.

The Compromise Agreement Was a Valid Voluntary Separation

The Court held that the compromise agreement was a valid voluntary separation of property under Article 143 of the Family Code. This provision allows spouses to separate their property voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The agreement was judicially approved, so it stood.

The Court also rejected the argument that the absence of the prosecutor or Solicitor General voided the proceedings. While their appearance is mandatory in annulment and legal separation cases to prevent collusion, the compromise agreement did not touch on the merits of the nullity case. It merely divided properties, so there was no risk of collusion that their presence was meant to prevent.

Finally, the Court held that Virgilio could not repudiate the agreement by claiming his lawyer was negligent. The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Exceptions exist only for gross negligence that deprives a client of due process—and none was shown here.

Practical Takeaways

• Adultery alone does not forfeit a spouse's share in conjugal property. Forfeiture under the Family Code applies only in specific situations, such as a decree of legal separation or a marriage contracted in bad faith.
• Voluntary separation of property is allowed under Article 143 of the Family Code, even while an annulment case is pending, as long as it is judicially approved.
• A compromise agreement dividing property is not void merely because one spouse was convicted of adultery. It is not among the matters that cannot be compromised under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
• The rights of creditors are protected. Even a valid voluntary separation is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership and other persons with pecuniary interest under Article 136 of the Family Code.
• The negligence of a lawyer generally binds the client. A party cannot easily repudiate a settlement by claiming poor legal advice, unless the negligence was gross and deprived the client of due process.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.