When a Prosecutor Files an Information Without the City Prosecutor’s Approval

The Supreme Court has long required that a criminal information—the formal charge against an accused—be filed only with the prior written authority or approval of the proper prosecuting officer. A recent decision clarifies what happens when that authority is missing: the information is defective, and the court never acquires jurisdiction over the case.

In Maximo v. Villapando (G.R. Nos. 214925 and 214965, April 26, 2017), the Court addressed whether an information for perjury filed by an Assistant City Prosecutor, without proof of prior written authority from the City Prosecutor, could stand. The ruling reinforces a strict procedural rule that protects the accused from being tried under a defective charge.

The Case: A Perjury Charge Stemming From a Condominium Dispute

The dispute began when Francisco Villapando, Jr., the assignee of a condominium unit, filed a criminal complaint against directors of the developer for violations of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree (P.D. No. 957). The complaint was dismissed.

In response, two of the directors filed their own complaints for perjury against Villapando, alleging he made false statements in his complaint-affidavit when he claimed they were officers of the developer at the time a deed of sale was executed. The investigating prosecutors found probable cause for perjury, and an information was filed against Villapando.

Villapando moved to quash the information, arguing that the prosecutor who filed it had no authority to do so because the information did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor, as required by Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The Issue: Was the Information Validly Filed?

The central question was whether the information was defective because it was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor.

The information contained a certification stating that its filing was with the prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor. The private complainants argued that this certification, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, was enough.

The Supreme Court disagreed.

The Ruling: Prior Written Authority Is Mandatory

The Court held that Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is clear: no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor, chief state prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

The Court noted that it had previously rejected similarly-worded certifications in People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo. In those cases, the informations were still found defective because the officers filing them either lacked authority or failed to show they obtained prior written authority from an authorized officer.

The certification alone was not enough. There must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was given by the city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information. While the Court has recognized that a city prosecutor may validly delegate this authority—for example, through an office order designating review prosecutors—the delegation must be proven.

In this case, the Court found no proof of such valid delegation. The Office Order allegedly granting the authority was not presented in the record. The Court refused to apply the presumption of regularity in favor of the prosecutors, because the mandatory requirement of the rules was not shown to have been complied with.

A Jurisdictional Defect That Cannot Be Cured

The Court emphasized that the defect is jurisdictional. Citing People v. Garfin, it held that the filing of an information by an officer without the requisite authority constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity that cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent.

Because the information was defective, the court never acquired jurisdiction over the case. There was no point in compelling the accused to undergo trial under a defective information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.

The Court also rejected the argument that the City Prosecutor's later denial of a motion for reconsideration effectively affirmed the validity of the information. The original defect could not be cured retroactively.

The Remedy: Certiorari Was Proper

The private complainants also argued that Villapando should have proceeded to trial instead of filing a petition for certiorari to question the denial of his motion to quash. The Court acknowledged the general rule that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order, and the proper remedy is to proceed to trial and raise the issue on appeal.

However, the Court recognized exceptions. Certiorari is appropriate when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.

Here, the Court found the exception applied. The METC committed an error of jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, because the information was defective for lack of prior written authority. Forcing the accused to undergo trial would expose him to injuries he sought to avoid, especially where his liberty was at stake.

Practical Takeaways

• Prior written authority is mandatory. An information filed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is defective and subject to quashal under Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
• A certification is not enough. A prosecutor's certification that the filing was with prior authority does not substitute for proof of that authority. The delegation must be demonstrated, such as through an office order.
• The defect is jurisdictional. A defective information means the court never acquires jurisdiction over the case. This cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or express consent.
• Later approval does not cure the defect. A subsequent order by the city prosecutor denying a motion for reconsideration does not retroactively validate an information filed without prior authority.
• Certiorari may be available in exceptional cases. While the denial of a motion to quash is generally an interlocutory order that must be raised on appeal, certiorari is proper when the denial constitutes grave abuse of discretion and appeal would not afford adequate relief.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.