Jun 5, 2017ombudsmanprobable causeanti-graftsection 3era 3019public officers

When Can Courts Interfere With Ombudsman Probable Cause Findings

The Supreme Court explains the limits of judicial review over Ombudsman probable cause findings in anti-graft cases against public officers.


The Office of the Ombudsman holds broad constitutional power to investigate and prosecute public officials. But what happens when a public officer believes the Ombudsman got it wrong? In Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017), the Supreme Court laid down clear limits on when courts may step in and review the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause.

The case is a useful guide for public officers facing graft charges and for private citizens who want to understand how the anti-graft system works.

The Facts: A Firecracker Permit and a Fire

In November 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur passed Municipal Ordinance No. 357, prohibiting the storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up of firecrackers within the premises of Buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market.

Despite this prohibition, then-Mayor Edwin Granada Reyes approved a permit on December 14, 2009, allowing vendors to sell firecrackers at the public market from December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010.

On December 27, 2009, a fire broke out at the Bansalan Public Market, causing extensive damage and destroying fire hydrants of the Bansalan Water District. A private complainant later filed a case before the Ombudsman, questioning the mayor's issuance of the permit in violation of the ordinance.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Reyes, along with the Permits and Licensing Officer, the Chief of Police, and the Fire Marshall, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Issue: When Can Courts Review Ombudsman Findings?

Reyes went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. He claimed there was no probable cause because there was no bad faith, no unwarranted benefit given to the vendors, and no gross inexcusable negligence. He also argued that his right to due process was violated because he was not furnished a copy of a co-respondent's counter-affidavit that the Ombudsman allegedly relied upon.

The sole issue for the Court's resolution was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining that probable cause existed against Reyes.

The Ruling: Courts Generally Do Not Interfere

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman's resolution.

The Court reiterated the general rule: courts do not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate to determine probable cause. This rule is based on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Ombudsman.

The determination of probable cause is an executive function that requires probing into whether facts and circumstances exist that would excite belief, in a reasonable mind, that the person charged was guilty of the crime. Because the Ombudsman is in a better position to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence, the Court defers to its judgment.

For a court to interfere, the petitioner must show that the Ombudsman acted in a capricious or whimsical manner amounting to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law. Mere disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough.

Applying the Rule to the Case

The Court found that the Ombudsman properly performed its duty. The elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were present: Reyes and his co-respondents were public officers, the issuance of the permit gave unwarranted benefit to the firecracker vendors, and the act was tainted with bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

The Ombudsman had explained that "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support, and "advantage" means a more favorable or improved position. The permit was issued in clear violation of a municipal ordinance and the Fire Code, giving vendors the benefit of selling firecrackers despite an existing prohibition.

The Ombudsman also sufficiently explained the finding of bad faith. The respondents were well aware of the ordinance prohibiting firecracker sales. The Fire Marshall had even informed the mayor of the lack of safety requirements and objected to the permit. Despite this, the permit was still approved.

Whether bad faith actually existed was a matter of evidence, best threshed out during trial, not in a petition for certiorari.

No Violation of Due Process

The Court also rejected Reyes's due process argument. During preliminary investigation, a respondent has the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant. However, there is no law or rule requiring the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of co-respondents.

Citing Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court explained that the affidavits to be furnished to a respondent are those of the complainant and the complainant's supporting witnesses, not those of co-respondents.

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. Reyes was able to file his counter-affidavit and respond to the complaint. That was sufficient.

Practical Takeaways

  • Courts rarely second-guess the Ombudsman. To overturn a probable cause finding, a public officer must show grave abuse of discretion amounting to a virtual refusal to perform a duty, not just a disagreement with the findings.

  • Probable cause is a low threshold. It requires only a reasonable belief of guilt, not clear and convincing evidence. It implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.

  • Preliminary investigation is not a trial. Respondents do not enjoy the full due process rights available during trial, such as confrontation and cross-examination.

  • Co-respondents' affidavits need not be furnished. During preliminary investigation, a respondent only has the right to examine the complainant's evidence, not the counter-affidavits of co-respondents.

  • Public officers must know local ordinances. Issuing permits in violation of existing ordinances, especially where safety requirements are unmet, can expose officials to criminal liability under the Anti-Graft law.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.