Rape Conviction Upheld Despite Vague Date in Information: People v. Cantomayor
The Supreme Court upheld a father's rape conviction even though the information alleged only "on or about the year 1990," clarifying when the date of the crime really matters.
In People v. Cantomayor (G.R. No. 145522, December 5, 2002), the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a father for raping his nine-year-old daughter — even though the criminal information alleged only that the crime happened "on or about the year 1990." The case answers a question that arises often in sexual abuse prosecutions: how precise must the date of the offense be before the accused can be convicted?
The facts of the case
The victim, Liezl Cantomayor, was born on July 5, 1981. In 1990, she was nine years old and living with her family in Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. She testified that her father, Zosimo Cantomayor, raped her many times that year — touching her breasts and inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but said nothing because he threatened to harm her. When she sought her mother's help, her mother merely advised her to kick the accused the next time he tried to assault her.
The abuse came to light years later. In October 1995, a relative learned of what had happened and took Liezl away from the family home. In 1998, after her father shot her brother, Liezl returned to the province and filed a parricide case. Shortly after, her younger sister revealed that she too had been raped; the two sisters then filed separate rape complaints. The sister's case was dismissed because she could no longer be located.
The charge and the defense
The information charged the accused with rape committed "on or about the year 1990" at Sitio Sumbang, Barangay Iba, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon, in violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty.
At trial, the accused denied the rape but admitted that Liezl lived in his house in 1990. He claimed that in 1984 he worked in Cabanglasan while his family stayed in Cotabato, and that the family only joined him in 1988. He suggested that Liezl filed the charge out of anger, believing he had intentionally shot her brother.
The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordering him to pay P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. He appealed on a single ground: that the information's failure to state the exact date of the crime deprived him of a full opportunity to defend himself.
Why the vague date did not void the conviction
The accused relied on People v. Ladrillo (320 SCRA 61 [1999]), where a rape conviction was reversed under an information alleging the crime happened "on or about the year 1992." In that case, the evidence showed the accused was living elsewhere in 1992 and had never been to the place alleged, making the charge impossible.
The Supreme Court distinguished Ladrillo. The time of the crime matters only when it creates serious doubt about whether the rape happened at all, or about the sufficiency of the evidence — that is, when the accuracy of the complainant's story practically hinges on the date. In Cantomayor, the defense was plain denial, and the accused himself admitted that he and Liezl lived in the same house in 1990. The truth of the charge therefore turned not on the date but on Liezl's credibility.
The Court also noted that the acquittal in Ladrillo rested primarily on the finding that the complainant's testimony was untruthful, not merely on the defective allegation of date. Liezl's testimony, by contrast, was found convincing.
The Court added that the date of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime, because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time of the rape has no substantial bearing on its commission. It is enough that the information states the crime was committed at a time as near as possible to its actual commission. The Court cited People v. Espejon (G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002), where convictions were upheld under informations alleging rape "sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto" and "sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto."
Penalty and damages
Because the crime was committed in 1990, the Court applied Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed reclusion perpetua. The higher penalties for incestuous rape introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 8353 took effect on December 13, 1993 and October 22, 1997, respectively, and could not be applied retroactively against the accused. The awards of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages were sustained, as these are automatically granted once the fact of rape is established.
Practical takeaways
- An information need not state the exact date of a rape. It is sufficient to allege a time as near as possible to the actual commission, because the date is not a material element of the crime.
- The date becomes decisive only when it raises serious doubt about whether the crime occurred or about the sufficiency of the evidence — for example, where the accused could not have been at the alleged place at the alleged time.
- A bare denial by the accused does not defeat a charge where the complainant's testimony is credible and the accused's own admissions place him with the victim at the relevant time.
- Penalties in force at the time of the crime apply. Later statutes increasing the penalty cannot be applied retroactively to the accused's disadvantage.
- Civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded as a matter of course once rape is established.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.
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