Reelection Does Not Condon Prior Misconduct When Removal Is Already Final

The Supreme Court has long held that a public official's reelection may condone misconduct committed during a prior term. But that protection disappears when the official has already been validly removed from office before the next election. In Reyes v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996), the Court clarified that a final administrative removal disqualifies a candidate from running again—even if voters later cast their ballots for that person. The decision also reaffirmed that a second-place finisher cannot be proclaimed winner simply because the winning candidate was disqualified.

The Case: A Mayor Removed, Then Reelected

Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. In October 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, alleging grave misconduct including extortion from market stall holders and misappropriation of public funds. On February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found him guilty and ordered his removal from office.

Reyes, however, refused to receive the decision. His counsel also declined service. When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan attempted to serve the decision personally and by registered mail, Reyes and his lawyer repeatedly refused to accept it. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, Reyes filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the May 8, 1995 elections. Despite a pending disqualification case filed by a registered voter, Reyes was voted for and later proclaimed the winner.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualified Reyes under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which disqualifies those removed from office as a result of an administrative case from running for any elective local position. Reyes challenged the disqualification, arguing that the administrative decision was not yet final and that his reelection should condone any prior misconduct.

Issue: Was the Removal Final Before the Election?

The Court ruled that the removal was indeed final. Under the Rules of Court, service of judgments may be made personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery—including leaving a copy at the party's office or residence. Here, service was completed when the decision was served on Reyes's counsel on March 3, 1995. Even though the counsel refused to accept it, the refusal was attributed to Reyes himself.

Service by registered mail was also deemed completed five days after the last notice. The Court emphasized that a party cannot evade the effects of a decision by simply refusing to receive it. Reyes's failure to appeal to the Office of the President within 30 days, as required by the Local Government Code, meant the decision became final and executory on April 2, 1995—before the May 8 elections.

The Court also rejected Reyes's argument that his pending certiorari petition with the Regional Trial Court prevented the administrative decision from becoming final. A temporary restraining order had expired after 20 days, and no preliminary injunction was issued. An original action for certiorari does not interrupt the course of the principal action unless a restraining order or injunction is in effect.

The Condonation Doctrine Does Not Apply

Reyes invoked the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, which held that reelection condones prior misconduct. The Court distinguished that case. In Aguinaldo, the official was not removed before the expiration of his term, and the decision against him had not yet become final. Here, Reyes was validly removed before the election, and the removal was final.

The Court noted that Aguinaldo was decided before the relevant disqualification provision of the Local Government Code took effect. That provision now expressly disqualifies any person removed from office due to an administrative case. The condonation doctrine cannot override a statutory disqualification that has already attached.

The Second-Placer Rule

The Court also dismissed the petition of Julius Garcia, who obtained the second-highest number of votes. Garcia argued that Reyes's disqualification should entitle him to proclamation as mayor. The Court rejected this, citing settled jurisprudence: a candidate who obtains the second-highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner if the winning candidate is disqualified. To assume the second placer would have received the disqualified candidate's votes would substitute the Court's judgment for the mind of the voter. The votes cast for Reyes were presumed cast in the belief that he was qualified; the subsequent finding of disqualification cannot retroactively invalidate those votes.

Practical Takeaways

• Refusing service does not delay finality. A party cannot evade an adverse decision by refusing to accept it. Service is deemed completed when a copy is delivered or when the party's refusal is attributable to his own conduct.
• Reelection does not cure a final removal. The condonation doctrine applies only when removal was not yet final before the election. Once a removal order becomes final, the Local Government Code automatically disqualifies the official from running.
• Certiorari does not stop the clock. Filing a petition for certiorari does not interrupt the running of the period to appeal an administrative decision unless a court issues a restraining order or preliminary injunction.
• Second placer cannot be proclaimed winner. If a winning candidate is disqualified, the votes cast for that candidate are not transferred to the runner-up.
• Timing matters in disqualification cases. COMELEC may continue disqualification proceedings even after the election and may suspend proclamation when evidence of guilt is strong.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.