Squatting Decriminalized: The Extinction of Civil Liability Following the Repeal of Anti-Squatting Law

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The Supreme Court recently acquitted a man convicted of illegally occupying forest land, clarifying an important principle in Philippine criminal law: even for offenses classified as malum prohibitum (wrong because prohibited by law), the prosecution must still prove that the accused voluntarily committed the prohibited act. The case of Isican v. People (G.R. No. 266431, January 29, 2026) underscores that the State's burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is never diminished, regardless of the nature of the offense.

The Case

Pedro Isican was charged with violating Section 78 of Presidential Decree No. 705, the Revised Forestry Code, for allegedly entering, occupying, and clearing a portion of the Puguis Community Forest in La Trinidad, Benguet. The Information alleged that Isican and several co-accused, without any lawful permit, constructed a tree house and installed a water tank on the property.

The prosecution presented forest protection officers who testified to finding clearing activities and structures on the site. Isican, however, claimed he acted only as attorney-in-fact for the heirs of Evaristo Tiotioen, whose titled property allegedly overlapped with the forest reserve. He maintained he did not personally occupy the area but was merely protecting the plants and improvements introduced by the heirs.

The Municipal Trial Court convicted Isican but acquitted his co-accused. The trial court held that criminal intent is immaterial in special-law offenses. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the conviction.

The Issue

The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Isican's conviction despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted Isican. While the Court agreed that a violation of Section 78 of PD 705 is malum prohibitum, it emphasized that this classification does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove every element of the offense.

Intent to Commit the Act vs. Criminal Intent

The Court distinguished between two concepts: intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act. For crimes mala in se (wrong in themselves), the prosecution must prove criminal intent. For crimes mala prohibita, however, what matters is volition—the conscious and voluntary performance of the prohibited act.

Citing Valenzona v. People, the Court explained that "for acts that are mala prohibita, the intent to perpetrate the prohibited act under the special law must nevertheless be shown." In other words, while the accused need not know that the act is illegal, the prosecution must still prove that the accused freely and consciously performed the act itself.

Why the Prosecution Failed

The Court identified three critical gaps in the prosecution's evidence:

First, the prosecution failed to dispel the reasonable possibility that Isican merely acted on behalf of the heirs of Tiotioen. A judicial affidavit from one of the heirs confirmed that Isican was their attorney-in-fact and that the improvements lay within their titled property.

Second, no witness saw Isican personally install the structures. The trial court had attempted to fill this gap by relying on supposed admissions in Isican's counter-affidavit, but the prosecution never formally offered this document as evidence.

Third, the prosecution could not establish with certainty that the site was within the Puguis Communal Forest. A licensed surveyor for the defense flagged overlaps between the Republic's title and several private titles, and the parties' technical disagreement meant no joint relocation survey was ever completed.

Practical Takeaways

• The classification of an offense as malum prohibitum does not lower the prosecution's burden of proof. The State must still prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily performed the prohibited act.

• For offenses under special laws like the Revised Forestry Code, the prosecution must show that the accused had the intent to perpetrate the act—not merely that the act occurred on the accused's property or in the accused's presence.

• Acting as a representative or attorney-in-fact for another person may raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused personally committed the prohibited act.

• When the location of the alleged offense is disputed, the prosecution must present clear evidence—such as a joint survey report—to establish that the site falls within the protected area.

• Courts cannot rely on unoffered documents or equivocal statements to fill evidentiary gaps in criminal cases.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.