Prescription of Offenses Under Special Laws: Absence From the Philippines Does Not Suspend the Period

The Supreme Court's 2006 ruling in Romualdez v. Marcelo (G.R. Nos. 165510-33) settled an important question in Philippine criminal procedure: does an accused's absence from the country suspend the prescriptive period for offenses penalized under special laws? The Court answered no, clarifying that the rules on prescription for special laws differ from those under the Revised Penal Code.

The case involved Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, who was charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities during his tenure as Ambassador and Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The charges covered two periods: 1963-1966 and 1967-1985.

The Procedural Background

The case had a complex history. Informations were originally filed against Romualdez in 1989, but the Sandiganbayan dismissed them in 2004 after the Supreme Court ruled in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan that the informations were void because they were filed by an unauthorized party—the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), which had no jurisdiction over the offenses.

The Ombudsman subsequently conducted a new preliminary investigation and filed fresh informations. Romualdez moved to dismiss, arguing that the offenses had already prescribed.

The Issue

The central question was whether the prescriptive period for offenses under RA No. 3019 continued to run while Romualdez was abroad. He had been absent from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000.

The Ombudsman and the PCGG argued that his absence should toll the running of the prescriptive period, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court held that for offenses penalized under special laws, the applicable law on prescription is Act No. 3326, not the Revised Penal Code.

Act No. 3326 provides that prescription begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or from discovery if the violation was not known at the time. The period is interrupted only when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. Notably, the law is silent on whether an accused's absence from the Philippines affects the running of the period.

The Court applied the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of one thing excludes all others. Since Act No. 3326 explicitly provides for interruption only upon the institution of proceedings, the legislature did not intend absence from the Philippines to suspend the period.

Why the Revised Penal Code Did Not Apply

The Court distinguished Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, which makes the Code suppletory to special laws. While the Revised Penal Code may supplement special laws when they are silent on a matter, the Court found that Act No. 3326 is itself a special law governing prescription for all offenses penalized under special acts. It is not a penal law that defines offenses, but a statute that establishes prescriptive periods.

Even assuming both laws applied, the Court noted that Act No. 3326 would prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special laws, while the Revised Penal Code applies only suppletorily and only when the special law does not provide otherwise.

The Interruption of Prescription

The Court also addressed whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 and the filing of informations with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period.

The Court ruled that these filings did not interrupt prescription because they were void. The PCGG had no jurisdiction over the offenses, and the informations filed by the PCGG were declared invalid in the earlier Romualdez case. In contemplation of the law, no valid proceedings existed that could have suspended the prescriptive periods.

The Court emphasized that only proceedings filed with the appropriate body can interrupt prescription. The complaint was filed with the wrong body, so it could not toll the period.

The Computation of Prescription

Applying these rules, the Court computed the prescriptive periods. For offenses committed before March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period was 10 years. For offenses committed after that date (when RA No. 3019 was amended to extend the period to 15 years), the period was 15 years.

The prescriptive period began to run on May 8, 1987—the date the complaint was filed with the PCGG, which the Court treated as the date of discovery. Since the period was never interrupted, the 10-year prescription for the earlier offenses lapsed on May 8, 1997, and the 15-year prescription for the later offenses lapsed on May 8, 2002.

When the Ombudsman initiated the preliminary investigation on March 3, 2004, the offenses had already prescribed. The Court ordered the dismissal of all criminal cases against Romualdez.

Practical Takeaways

• For offenses under special laws, the prescriptive period is governed by Act No. 3326, not the Revised Penal Code. The absence of the accused from the Philippines does not suspend the running of the period.
• Prescription is interrupted only when proceedings are instituted against the accused before the appropriate body or office. Filing a complaint with the wrong agency will not toll the period.
• The prescriptive period for RA No. 3019 offenses is 10 years for violations committed before March 16, 1982, and 15 years for violations committed after that date.
• The period begins to run from the day of the commission of the violation, or from discovery if the violation was not known at the time.
• Prescription is a ground to quash a criminal information before the accused enters a plea, and it may be raised even if no trial has commenced.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.