When Does Prescription of Penalties Begin? The Doctrine of Evasion of Sentence

The prescription of penalties is a legal concept that extinguishes a convict's criminal liability after a certain period. But when does that period start? The Supreme Court addressed this in Pangan v. Gatbalite (G.R. No. 141718, January 21, 2005), ruling that prescription only begins when a convict escapes while actually serving imprisonment, not when a convict simply avoids arrest.

The Facts of the Case

Benjamin Pangan was convicted of simple seduction and sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, the trial court scheduled promulgation of the decision on August 9, 1991. Pangan failed to appear, and the court issued an order of arrest against him.

For nearly nine years, Pangan evaded arrest. He was finally apprehended on January 20, 2000. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that his detention was illegal because his penalty had already prescribed under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Issue Presented

The core question was whether the prescriptive period for penalties begins to run when a convict fails to appear and avoids arrest, or only when a convict escapes while already serving imprisonment.

The Supreme Court's Ruling

The Court denied Pangan's petition, holding that prescription of penalties does not run in favor of a convict who was never placed in confinement. The period begins only when the convict escapes during the term of imprisonment.

The Court relied on two prior decisions. In Tanega v. Masakayan (125 Phil 966), the Court ruled that for prescription to commence, the culprit must escape during the term of imprisonment. The Court reasoned that Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping "during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." Since the convict in Tanega was never confined, prescription never ran.

Similarly, in Del Castillo v. Torrecampo (394 SCRA 221), the Court reiterated that a convict who was never brought to prison cannot claim prescription. The Court noted that one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

Why the Ruling Matters

The Court emphasized that the phrase "evade the service of sentence" in Article 93 must be read together with Article 157. Evasion presupposes an escape from an ongoing deprivation of liberty. A convict who simply avoids arrest—no matter how long—has not "evaded service of sentence" in the legal sense.

The Court also rejected the argument that this interpretation imposes a condition not stated in the law. Instead, it found this reading consistent with settled jurisprudence and the plain text of the Revised Penal Code.

Notably, the Court ordered Pangan's immediate release because he had already fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor by the time of the ruling.

Practical Takeaways

• Prescription of penalties under Article 93 RPC only begins when a convict escapes while serving imprisonment, not when a convict avoids arrest.
• A convict who is never confined cannot claim that the penalty has prescribed, regardless of how many years pass.
• Article 157 RPC defines evasion of service of sentence as escaping during the term of imprisonment, which is the controlling interpretation for Article 93.
• Habeas corpus petitions based on prescription will fail if the convict was never placed in confinement and did not escape from custody.
• Fugitives do not benefit from the passage of time; prescription does not run in their favor while they remain at large.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.