Usurpation of Official Functions: When Suspension Does Not Stop Official Acts

The Supreme Court has long held that a public officer under suspension is barred from exercising the functions of the office. But what happens when the suspended official continues to act as if nothing changed? In Legaspi v. People (G.R. No. 241986, August 22, 2022), the Court affirmed the conviction of a municipal mayor who, while under a six-month suspension, solemnized 37 marriages and issued a mayor's permit. The case clarifies the scope of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of official functions and settles the evidentiary rules on public documents.

The Facts of the Case

Feliciano Palad Legaspi, Sr. was the elected Municipal Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan from 2007 to 2013. After he reassigned the Municipal Budget Officer, an administrative complaint for oppression or grave abuse of authority was filed against him. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found him liable and imposed a penalty of suspension of six months and one day.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued an order implementing the suspension effective December 12, 2012. The order was served at the municipal hall, where the Municipal Human Resource Management Officer received it on Legaspi's behalf. The Vice Mayor was sworn in as acting mayor.

Despite the suspension, Legaspi continued to perform mayoral functions. From December 14, 2012 to May 10, 2013, he solemnized 37 marriages. He also issued a mayor's permit to a corporation on February 22, 2013. These acts led to 38 separate criminal charges for usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Issue Before the Court

The central question was whether Legaspi was guilty of 38 counts of usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code. Legaspi raised several defenses: the documentary evidence against him were mere photocopies, the service of the suspension order was defective, and his signatures may have been forged.

The Ruling: Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan's conviction. Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code punishes two offenses: usurpation of authority and usurpation of official functions. The second offense is committed when a person, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to a public officer without being lawfully entitled to do so.

The Court identified four elements: (1) the offender may be a private person or public officer; (2) the offender performs an act pertaining to a public officer; (3) the act is done under pretense of official function; and (4) the offender is not legally entitled to perform the act.

All elements were present. The acts involved powers conferred on municipal mayors under Republic Act No. 7160, including solemnizing marriages and issuing permits. Legaspi performed these acts while under suspension, giving the appearance of lawful authority when he was actually precluded from exercising his functions. The marriage certificates bore his signature and designation as municipal mayor, and the marriages were solemnized at the Office of the Municipal Mayor.

Evidentiary Rules on Public Documents

The Court also addressed the admissibility of the documentary evidence. Marriage certificates and mayor's permits are public documents. Under the Civil Code, entries in the civil register are public documents and constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Under the Rules of Court, public documents do not require the authentication imposed on private documents, but their contents must still be proved through official publications or attested copies from the officer having legal custody.

The Court held that the certified true copies of the marriage certificates from the Philippine Statistics Authority and the Local Civil Registrar were admissible without the testimony of the custodians. The certified photocopy of the mayor's permit was likewise admissible, as there is no substantial distinction between a certified photocopy and a certified true copy when the proper officer certifies that it is a faithful reproduction of the original.

Service of the Suspension Order Was Valid

The Court rejected Legaspi's claim that he was not properly served with the suspension order. The service was made by leaving the order at his office with a person having charge thereof, which is a valid mode of personal service under the Rules of Court. The Court also noted that Legaspi was estopped from challenging the service because he had previously acknowledged in a pleading that he received the order directing him to cease and desist from exercising his powers as mayor.

The Defense of Forgery Failed

The Court found that Legaspi's claim of forgery was unsupported by evidence. Allegations of forgery must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. Legaspi merely claimed he did not recall signing the documents, which was insufficient to overcome the prosecution's evidence.

Practical Takeaways

• Suspension means a complete cessation of official functions. A suspended public officer is barred from exercising the powers of the office, and any act performed during the suspension period can result in criminal liability for usurpation of official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Public documents are strong evidence. Marriage certificates, permits, and other public records are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Certified true copies from the officer having legal custody are admissible even without the testimony of the custodian.

• Service of orders at the office is valid. Leaving a copy of a suspension order at the public officer's office with a person having charge thereof constitutes valid personal service under the Rules of Court.

• Forgery must be proven, not merely alleged. A self-serving claim that signatures may have been forged is insufficient. The party alleging forgery must present clear and convincing evidence.

• The threefold rule applies to multiple sentences. When a person is convicted of multiple offenses, the total sentence cannot exceed three times the length of the most severe penalty imposed, subject to the maximum of forty years.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.