Voluntary Submission Curing Jurisdictional Defects Through Affirmative Relief

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The Supreme Court has long held that a court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant through proper service of summons. But what happens when the defendant appears in court without valid summons and asks for something in return? In Tujan-Militante v. Nustad (G.R. No. 209518, June 19, 2017), the Court clarified that seeking affirmative relief—not just objecting to jurisdiction—constitutes voluntary submission to the court's authority.

The Case

Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad, represented by Atty. Marguerite Therese Lucila, filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, seeking to compel petitioner Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante to surrender the owner's duplicate copies of four Transfer Certificates of Title issued in Nustad's name.

Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person because she did not receive summons. She also claimed the RTC's order appeared to be a decision on the merits.

The RTC denied the motion. Tujan-Militante then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, this time adding new arguments: that the Power of Attorney (POA) executed by Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila was void, that Nustad—a Norwegian national—could not own land in the Philippines, and that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority should be impleaded. She also prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

When the RTC denied her reconsideration, Tujan-Militante went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via certiorari. The CA acknowledged the jurisdictional defect over her person but ruled it was cured by her filing of the Motion for Reconsideration, which sought affirmative reliefs.

The Issue

Did Tujan-Militante's Motion for Reconsideration, which prayed for affirmative reliefs, constitute voluntary submission to the RTC's jurisdiction, thereby curing the defective service of summons?

The Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's ruling.

Under Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a defendant's voluntary appearance in an action is equivalent to service of summons. The Court explained that while a motion to dismiss that raises lack of jurisdiction over the person does not constitute voluntary appearance, the same cannot be said when the motion seeks affirmative relief.

Here, Tujan-Militante's Motion for Reconsideration went beyond merely challenging jurisdiction. She asked the court to implead the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land Registration Authority, and prayed for damages and attorney's fees. By invoking the court's authority to grant these reliefs, she voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction.

The Court applied the established principle that a party cannot invoke a court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief and then, after obtaining or failing to obtain that relief, turn around and question the same jurisdiction. This principle is rooted in the doctrine of estoppel and prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions in litigation.

On the Power of Attorney

The Court also addressed Tujan-Militante's attack on the POA. She argued that under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a POA notarized abroad must be accompanied by a certification from a Philippine consular official.

The Court disagreed, citing Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro (G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008). The certification requirement under Section 24 applies only to documents enumerated in Section 19(a), Rule 132—the written official acts or records of sovereign authority, official bodies, tribunals, and public officers. Notarial documents fall under Section 19(b) and are not covered by the certification requirement.

What matters, the Court said, is that Nustad certified before a commissioned officer authorized to administer oaths that she was appointing Atty. Lucila as her attorney-in-fact. A notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, which can only be overcome by clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence.

On the Collateral Attack on Titles

Finally, the Court rejected Tujan-Militante's argument that the titles in Nustad's name were invalid due to her foreign citizenship. This constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title. The question of whether an alien is qualified to acquire land can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

Practical Takeaways

• Seeking affirmative relief waives jurisdictional objections. A defendant who asks a court for something—damages, injunctions, or other remedies—cannot later claim the court had no jurisdiction over them, even if summons was defective.
• Motion to dismiss vs. motion for reconsideration. A motion to dismiss limited to raising lack of jurisdiction over the person is safe. But a subsequent motion that adds prayers for affirmative relief changes the picture entirely.
• Foreign notarized documents. A POA notarized abroad does not automatically require a consular certification under Section 24, Rule 132. That requirement applies only to official records of public officers under Section 19(a).
• Presumption of regularity. Notarized documents are presumed valid. To challenge one, a party must present clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence.
• Collateral attacks on titles are barred. Questions about a landowner's qualifications to hold title cannot be raised as a side issue in an unrelated case.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.