Warrant of Arrest Stands: Court Power Prevails Over DOJ Review
Supreme Court rules a judge's exclusive power to issue warrants of arrest cannot be suspended by a pending DOJ petition for review.
The Supreme Court has settled an important question in Philippine criminal procedure: when an accused files a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) questioning a prosecutor's finding of probable cause, may the trial court suspend the implementation of a warrant of arrest already issued? In Viudez v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 152889, June 5, 2009), the Court answered no, reaffirming that the power to determine probable cause for purposes of arrest belongs exclusively to the judge.
The Case: Murder Charges and a Warrant of Arrest
Enrique Viudez II was charged with murder for the fatal shooting of Mayor Honorato Galvez and his driver in Bulacan in June 2000. After a preliminary investigation, the provincial prosecutor found probable cause and filed two Informations for murder with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos. The RTC issued warrants of arrest on the same day.
Viudez then filed a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest. He relied on Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular No. 70, which, as described in the Supreme Court's decision, directs the appellant and the trial prosecutor to ensure that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. Viudez had filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, and he argued that the circular required the trial court to hold everything in abeyance—including the enforcement of the warrant.
The RTC denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Viudez elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Issue: Can a DOJ Circular Suspend a Warrant?
The sole question was whether a pending petition for review before the Secretary of Justice—concerning a finding of probable cause—suspends the proceedings in the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest.
The Ruling: The Judge's Power Is Exclusive
The Supreme Court denied Viudez's petition. The Court drew a clear distinction between two kinds of probable cause:
- Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest – determined by the judge, based on the Information and supporting evidence. This is a judicial function.
- Probable cause for holding the accused for trial – determined by the investigating prosecutor during preliminary investigation. This is an executive function.
Because the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the exclusive prerogative of the judge, the Court ruled that its implementation cannot be deferred pending a DOJ petition for review. To do so would encroach on the judge's exclusive power.
The Court also examined the exact wording of DOJ Circular No. 70. The provision directs the appellant and the trial prosecutor to see to it that proceedings are held in abeyance. It does not command the court to suspend proceedings. The circular gives the parties latitude in choosing a remedy, but the court's discretion remains unhindered. (Note: The exact statutory text of Section 9 of DOJ Circular No. 70 is not reproduced in the library's copy of the decision; the description above is based on the Court's own summary of the provision.)
What the Prior Cases Actually Said
Viudez cited several cases—Marcelo, Roberts, Ledesma, Dimatulac, and Solar Team Entertainment—arguing that they supported suspension of the warrant's implementation. The Court clarified that these cases dealt with a different matter: whether arraignment may be deferred pending DOJ review. None of them ruled that the implementation or enforcement of a warrant of arrest should also be suspended.
In Roberts, the Court had directed the deferment of the issuance of warrants of arrest, but the circumstances were different. There, the judge's denial of the motion to suspend proceedings was based on a flawed reason—that following the Secretary of Justice's opinion would undermine the court's independence. What the Court disapproved was the reasoning, not the denial itself.
Practical Takeaways
- A judge, not a prosecutor, decides whether to issue a warrant of arrest. Once an Information is filed, the judge independently evaluates probable cause for arrest.
- A pending DOJ petition for review does not automatically suspend court proceedings. DOJ Circular No. 70 directs the parties to ask the court for a suspension, but the court decides whether to grant it.
- Deferring arraignment is different from deferring a warrant's implementation. Courts may hold arraignment in abeyance pending DOJ review, but this does not extend to suspending an arrest warrant.
- The proper remedy against a warrant is a motion to quash. An accused who questions the validity or regularity of a warrant should challenge it directly, not seek suspension under a DOJ circular.
- The court remains in control of the case after an Information is filed. Any disposition—dismissal, conviction, or acquittal—rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.
This article is general information and not legal advice. For your situation, ask ASG Legal AI or book a consultation.