QUADFOODS CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY THIRD DIVISION QUADFOODS CORPORATION, CTA Case No. 10419 Petitioner, Members: -versus- MANAHAN, Chairperson, REYES-FAJARDO, and ANGELES, JJ. COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated: INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. nFC 0 6 ?fl24 X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~- - =-- - f._l _L:._ jfl:~ : - - - X R ES OL U TION MANAHAN, J.: For resolution of the Court is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial filed on July 12, 2024, with respondent's Comment and Opposition (Re: Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial d ated 12 July 2024) filed on August 12, 2024. In the subject motion, petitioner asserts th at the Court has jurisdiction over the instant case, as it falls under the "other matters" jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) , provided under Section 7(a)(2) of Republic Act (RA) No . 1125, as amended, in relation to Section 3 (a)(2), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, as amended. Petitioner specifically points out that it is questioning the validity of the Warrant of Distraint and/ or Levy (WDL) allegedly because it did not receive a Formal Letter of Demand/Final Assessment Notice (FLD /FAN) from respondent. Considering tha t the judicial action was filed within thirty (3 0) d ays from the WDL, p etitioner argues th at the Petition was timely filed . Finally, p etitioner argues tha t , considering that the Motion for Reconsideration formed p art of r espondent's docket that was~

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 104 19 collectively marked as Exhibit "R-14", the same is tantamount to a judicial admission. In his Comment and Opposition, respondent counters that petitioner's motion for reconsideration is not based on newly discovered evidence. Thus, the instant case does not merit a new trial. After careful evaluation, the Court finds petitioner 's arguments untenable. Petitioner clearly represented that a certain Mr. Ronel Marasigan was its agent. Therefore, it is estopped from denying his authority to receive the notices sent by respondent Prefatorily, the Court will address petitioner's assertion that it did not receive the assessment notices sent by respondent because it was m er ely received by one of its staff, a certain Mr. Ronel Marasigan. Petitioner's own Ex hibits "P-8" 1 "P- 9a"n' 2d ""PP--1107""''310"Pre-a1d1i"l'y4 "P-12"'5 "P-13"'6 "P-14"'7 "P-15"'8 "P-' 6"9 1 reveal that it filed its various tax returns through a certain Mr. Ronel Marasigan on behalf of Mr. Cristopher G. Belisario . In other words, petitioner 's own pieces of evidence show tha t on numerous occasions, petitioner transact ed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) through its staff, Mr. Ronel Marasigan. Thus, the Court finds it unusual for p etition er to insist that it did not receive the subject assessment notices, which I Docket, Vol. 1, p . 447. 2 Docket, Vol. 1, p . 449. 3 Docket, Vol. 1, p. 45 1. 4 Docket, Vol. 1, p . 452. s Doc ket, Vol. 1, p. 453. 6 Dock e t , Vol. 1, p. 454. 7 Docket , Vol. 1, p. 455. s Dock et, Vol. 1, p. 456. 9 Docket, Vol. 1, p. 457. 10 Docket, Vol. 1, p . 458. ~

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 10419 assessment notices were received by no other than the same Mr. Ronel Marasigan. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Ronel Marasigan is an authorized agent of petitioner who has the authority to file documents with the BIR on behalf of petitioner, as well as receive documents emanating from respondent. Consequently, petitioner is estopped from denying receipt of the assessment notices, when the same were received by the same person who files relevant documents with the BIR. The instant case falls under "disputed assessment" disguised as "other matters" to fall under the jurisdiction ofthe CTA With respect to petitioner's assertion that the case falls under "other matters" jurisdiction of the CTA, the Court finds the same unmeritorious. Based on petitioner's admission, it received the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) on January 28, 2019. 11 On the other hand, records reveal that the FDDA was received by petitioner , through Mr. Ronel Marasigan, on January 29, 2019. 12 After receipt of the FDDA, petitioner failed to present any proof that may be considered by the Court to show that the assessment has not yet become final, executory, and demandable. As a necessary consequence, respondent is well within its right to pursue summary collection proceedings against petitioner. As such, the Court finds no error when it ruled that: "In the instant case, records show that th e FDDA was received by petitioner, through Marasigan, on January 29, 2019. 13 Meanwhile, petitioner a lleges that it received the FDDA on January 28, 2019.14 Counting thirty (30) days fro m the said dates, petitioner had until February 27, 2019 or February 28, 2019, within which to file the appeal before the Court. Unfortunately, the instant Petition was belatedly filed 11 Facts, Petition for Review, par. 14, Docket, Vol. I, p. 12. 12 Exhibit "R-13", BIR Records , pp. 311-313. 13 See Note 13. 14 Facts, Petition for Review, par. 14, Docket, Vol. I, p. 12. ~

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 10419 on December 9, 202 0 , or more th an a year after th e period to file the appeal h ad a lread y la p sed." 15 Thus , petitioner's failure to timely assert its remedies, i.e., file an administrative appeal before respondent or an appeal with the CTA, cannot b e rewarded by the Court, by assuming jurisdiction under the "other matters" provision. Otherwise, the "other matters" jurisdiction of the Court may be unwittingly used as an afterthought for appeals barred by prescription or as a channel for extending the statutory p eriods of lost appeals. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no merit to petitioner's assertion. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration may not be considered as evidence Finally , petitioner argues that the Motion for Reconsideration should be considered as a judicial admission because it formed part of respondent's docket that was collectively marked as Exhibit "R-14". Petitioner's argument is bereft of merit. As explained in the assailed Decision, the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Jerry Ocier,16 is informative. Thus: "Under Section 8 of Re public Act (R. A.) No. 11 25, the CTA is categor ically described as a court of r ecord. As such , it sh a ll h ave t h e p ower to promulgate rules a nd r egulation s for the conduct of its business, a nd as m ay be n eed ed , for the uniformity of decision s within its jur isdiction . Moreover , a s ca ses filed befor e it a re litigated d e n ovo, pa rty- litigants s h a ll prove every minute aspect of their cases. Thus, n o eviden tiary value can be give n th e pieces of eviden ce s ubmitt ed by t h e BIR, a s the rules on documen tary evidence r equire th a t these docume n ts must be fo rma lly offe red b efore the CTA. Pe rtinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Eviden ce which read s: 1s Decision , Docket, Vol. 2, p. 1022. 16 G.R. No. 192023, November 21,20 18. <it'll ~

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 104 19 Page 5 of6 SEC. 34. Offer of eviden ce . - The court shall con sider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified . Although in a lon g line of cases, we have relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence n ot formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court, we exercised ext rem e caution in a pplying the exceptions to the rule, as pronounced in Vda. de Ofi.ate v. Court ofAppeals, thus: From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, th e mere fact that a pa r ticular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not m ean that it h as already been offered as part of the evidence of a pa rty. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385, 388-389 (1990)], we had the occasion to ma ke a di stinction between identification of documentary eviden ce and its formal offer as a n exhibit. We said th at th e first is d on e in the course of the trial a nd is accompanied by the m a rking of the evidence as a n exhibit while th e second is done only when the party rests its case and not before . A p a rty, t h erefore, m ay opt to for mally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advan ce his cause or not to do so at a ll. In t h e event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not auth orized by the Rules to consider the same. However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403 (1989)] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 484 (1980)], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, secon d , the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. The evidence may, therefore, be admitted provided the fo llowing requirem en ts are present: (1) the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; a nd (2) the sa me must h ave been incorporated in the records of the case. Being a n exception, the same m ay only be applied when there is strict complia n ce wit h the r equisites mentioned above; oth erwise, the general rule in Section 3 4 of Rule 132 of th e Rules of Court should prevail." The doctrinal ruling in Ocier categorically states that evidence not formally offered may b e admitted and considered by the court, provided that the following requisites are present: (1) the same must have been duly identified by testimony~

RESOLUTION CTACaseNo. 10419 duly recorded; and (2) the same must be incorporated in the records of the case. Here, while it appears from the case records that the subject Motion for Reconsideration forms part of respondent's Exhibit "R-14", there was no showing that the same was duly identified by testimony duly recorded. As such, the Court has no reason to admit or consider the same. To end, petitioner failed to present arguments that warrant the Court to deviate from its earlier ruling. Hence, the d enial of the instant Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial is in order. FOR THESE REASONS, the instant Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial is DENIED, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ~~7-~ CATHERINE T. MANAHAN Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ~~ r.~ - F~ (I reiterate my Dissenting Opinion) MARIAN IVY F. REYES-FAJARDO Associate Justice HENRY f . -ANGELES Associate Justice