JETTI PETROLEUM, INC. VS. MS. EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, in her capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Bataan, ENGR. RICARDO C. HERRERA, in his capacity as Provincial Assessor of the Province of Bataan, and ATTY. EFREN C. LIZARDO, in his capacity as Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Bataan,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY En Bane JETTI PETROLEUM, INC., CTA EB NO. 2093 Petitioner, (CTA Case No. AC 211) -versus- Present : DEL ROSARIO, P.J., CASTANEDA, JR., UY, FAB ON-VI C T O R I NO , R I NG P IS-L I BAN, MANAH AN, BACORRO-VILLENA, and MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, JJ MS. EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, in Promulgated : her capacity as Provincial Treasurer of JUL1lt 2020 the Province ofBataan, ENGR. RICARDO C. HERRERA, in his <JF- ........, - o?.' lf�Jj?~ . capacity as Provincial Assessor of the Province ofBataan, and ATTY. EFREN C. LIZARDO, in his capacity as Provincia l Legal Officer of the Province ofBataan, Respondents. X ----------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- X D EC I S IO N MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, J.: The Case Before the Court En Bane is a Petition for R eview ("Petition") with Application for Cease a nd Desist Order ("CDO"), a nd Status Quo Ante Order (" SQO" ) ("Application for CDO and SQ0") 1 fi led last 18 July 4' 20 192 with respondents' Comment to the Petition for Review ("Comment") fi led on 29 August 20 19;3 and Consigna tion of Tender (Re: See Petition, Records, Vol. I, pp. 97- 102. See Petition, Records, Vol. I, pp. 23- 110. See Comment, Records, Vol. I, pp. 459-472.

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No_ 211 l Page 2 of25 ("Comment") filed on 29 August 20 19;3 and Consignation of Tender (Re: Redemption Payment Under Protest) ("Consignation") with Urgent Motion to Resolve Application for CDO/SQO ("Urgent Motion to Resolve CDO/SQO") and/or for Early Resolution on the Main ("Motion for Early Resolution") filed last 2 January 2019.4 The Motionfor J~arly Resolution is hereby GRANTED. The Parties Petitioner .JETTI PETROLElJM, INC. is a domestic corporation with office address at Jetti Business Center Pres. Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, CBPI-A, Pasay City. 5 It is alleged to be engaged in the blending, storage, marketing, and distribution of petroleum products and was issued by the Board oflnvestments a Certificate of Registration granting, among others, an exemption from real property tax on production equipment or machinery from I March 2014 to 28 February 20 19(' Respondents MS. EMERLINDA S. TALENT(), ENGR. RICARDO C. HERRERA, and ATTY. EFREN C. LIZARD() arc being sued in their official capacities as Provincial Treasurer, Provincial Assessor and Provincial Legal Officer, respectively, of the Province ofBataan, and may be served with notices and processes at the Bataan Provincial Capitol Compound, Balanga City, Bataan.7 The Facts On I I October 2012, the Department of Trade and Industry ("DTI"), and the Board of Investment ("1301") issued petitioner a Certificate of Registration No. 2012-218 ("COR") ccrti lying it as an "Industry Participant with New Investments for the Construction of North I"uzon Storage Terminal in Mariveles, Bataan with 10 Retail Stations."x With the COR arc the Specific Terms and Conditions enumerating petitioner's incentives which include Real Property Tax ("RPT') exemption on its production equipment or machincry. 9 On 6 September 2016, petitioner received a Notice of Assessment from the Municipal Assessor of Marivclcs, Bataan f(Jr property with PIN 0 18-07- ~ See Comment, Records, Vol. I. pp. 459-472. Records. Vol. I. See Petilion; Records. Vol. I. p. 26. 6 See RTC-Balanga Resolution dated 7 August 2018: ;\nne:x --Q'" of the Petition: Records, Vol. I. p. 202. See Petition; Records. Vol. 1, pp. 26-27. See COR, Annex "I)" of the Petition. Records. Vol. 1. p. IJ9 9 See Section 7 (g) of the Specil!c �rcrms and Conditi1Jns, /\nne.,--[�� ufthL' Petition. Records. Vol. 1, p. 145.

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No. 21 I ) 011-006-068-200 J.ll1 Subsequently, on 9 January 20 I7, herein respondent Provincial Treasurer of Bataan, Ms. 1:mcrlinda S. Talcnto, issued a Notice of Realty Tax Delinquency demanding payment of Php54,240,000.00 covering RPT due from petitioner's machineries and equipment for taxable years ("TY") 2016-201 7, inclusive or penalties. I I On 30 March 20 I7, respondent Ms. Talento issued petitioner a Final Notice of Realty Tax Delinquency in the amount ofPhp57, 120,000.00 for the same machineries and equipment forTY 2016-201 7, inclusive 0 r penalties and interest as 0 f 30 Apri I 20 I 7. I2 In a Letter dated 22 May 2017, petitioner requested respondents to cease and desist from assessing and collecting RPT against its machineries and equipment. In the said Letter, petitioner insisted on its RPT exemption based on Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8479 ("RA 8479") or the National Deregulation Act. 13 On 22 September 2017, petitioner received a copy of respondents' Letter dated 18 July 2017 denying petitioner's Letter dated 22 May 2017 claiming that since petitioner's machineries and equipment arc being used solely for storage purposes, the same arc not covered by Section 9 of RA 8479. 14 On 7 October 2017, petitioner filed a Letter dated 28 September 2017 requesting respondents to reconsider their position in the I.cttcr dated 18 July 2017. 15 On 7 May 2018, petitioner received respondents' Letter dated 16 March 2018 denying its Letter dated 28 September 2017. 16 On 5 July 2018, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules or Court before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")-Balanga allegedly to challenge respondents' authority to assess and collect RPT against petitioner "by interpreting that storage is not encompassed by the exemption under Section 9, R.A. No. 8479." 171\-- 10 See Notice of Assessment. Anne., ��F'" of the Petition. Records, Vol. !. p. 147. II See Petition, Records, Vol. L p. .19: See Notice of Realty Tax Delinquency, Annex "'G'' of the Petition, Records, Vol. I. p. 148. " See Petition, Records. Vol. I. p. 29: See Final Notice of Realty lax Delinquency. Annex ""H" of the Petition, Records. Vol. I. p. 1<19. --r� See Petition, Records. Vol. L p. ?.9~ See Letter dated 22 May 20! 7. Annex of the Petition, 13 Records, Vol. I, pp. 151-155. --r See Petition. Records, Vol. I. pp. 29-_10: See Letter dared 18 July 2017. Anne:-.: of the Petition, " Records, Vol. I. pp. 156-1 W 15 See Petition. Records. Vol. I, p. .10: See Letter dated ?.X Septe111ber 20 17, Annex "'K" oft he Petition, Records, Vol. I, pp. 158-159. 16 See Petition, Records. Vol. l, pp. J0-31: Sec Letter dated 16 March 20 IS, Annex "'L'" ofthe Petition, Records, Vol. I, pp. 160-161. ll See Petition, Records. Vol. I, p. J I: See Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. Anne:-.: "M'' of the Petition, Records, Vol. I. pp. 162-179.

DECISION CTA �8 NO. 2093 (CTA AC No. 2111 Page4 of25 On 20 July 2018, petitioner received a Warrant of Levy dated 19 July 2018 from respondents. 18 On 24 August 2018, petitioner received a Resolution from RTC- Balanga dated 7 August 2018 19 dismissing the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Local Government Code ("LGC''). On 7 September 20 18, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the 7 August 2018 Resolution,"0 which was denied by the RTC-Balanga in a Resolution dated 25 October 2018 21 On 20 November 2018, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with Application for Suspension Order, Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Any Other Protective Order before the Court of Tax Appeals ("CTA '')-Second Division. 22 On 3 January 2019, respondents conducted a public auction of petitioner's facility 23 On 21 February 2019, petitioner received the CTA-Second Division's Resolution dated 18 February 2019 dismissing petitioner's Petition for Review with Application for Suspension Order, Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Any Other Protective Order for lack o f jurisdiction. 2'1 On 7 March 2019, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution dated 18 February 20 19,"; which the CTA-Second Division denied in a Resolution dated 03 June 2019 that was received by petitioner on 18 June 26 2019. "" 18 See Petition, Records, Vol. 1, p. 3 1: See Warrant of Levy. Annex .. N�� oft he Petition, Records, Vol. I. p. 180. 19 See Petition, Records, Vol. l, pp. 31-32: See Resolution dated 7 August :?O 18, Annex "Q" of the Petition, Records, Vol. I, pp. 202-20<1. 20 See Petition, Records. Vol. I. p. 32; See Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 September 2018, Annex "R" ofthe Petition, Records, Vol. I. pp. 205-214. 21 See Petition, Records, Vol. I, p. 32: See Resolution dated 2) October 2018, Annex "T' of the Petition, Records, Vol. I. pp. 222-:'2'1. )") See Petition, Records. Vol. L p. 12: See Petition for Review tiled :20 November 2018, Annex "U'' of the Petition, Records. Vol. I. pp. 225-298. D See Petition. Records, Vol. I. p. 33. 24 See Petition, Records, Vol. 1, p. 34: See Resolution dated IR February 2019, Annex ''B�l" ofthe Petition, Records. Vol. I. pp. 120-125. " See Petition, Records, Vol. I. p. 34: See Motion for Reconsideration tiled on 6 March 2019, Annex "GG" of the Petition. Records. Vol. I. pp. 372-410. 26 See Petition, Records. Vol. 1, p. 34: Sec Motion for Reconsideration tiled on 6 March 2019, Annex "B" of the Petition, Records, Vol. I. pp. 112-1 19.

Ot:CISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No.2! I l On 2 July 2019, petitioner timely moved for an extension of fifteen ( 15) days from 3 July 2019 or until 18 July 2019 to file the Petition before this Court En Bane, 27 which was granted in a Resolution dated 4 July 2019.28 Hence, the Petition. The Assigned Errors The Petition did not provide for Assigned Errors but from the arguments raised by petitioner,29 it can be derived that the issue to be resolved is WHETHER THE RTC-BALANGA AND THE CTA-SECOND DIVISION HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE. Arguments ofthe Parties In the Petition, it is alleged that both RTC-Balanga and the CTA- Second Division have jurisdiction over the present case, due to the following reasons: I. Petitioner's machineries and equipment arc exempt from real property taxes ("RPT") under Section 9 ofRA 8479, as ccrtilicd by the DTIIBOI. This DTIIBOI certification provides a factual, legal, final, and absolute exemption from RI'T for petitioner, which cannot he challenged by the local government unit ("LGU") of Bataan;311 2. As the exemption of petitioner from RI'T is factually final following the DTI/BOI certification, the only issue involved in this case is legal. In fact, petitioner is not raising an issue as to the "reasonableness" of the assessment (i.e., a question of fact) but is questioning respondents' "authority to assess and collect" the subject RPT, (i.e., a question of law). As it is merely raising a question of law, its direct resort to RTC- Balanga for prohibition and mandamus was well-founded and in accordance with recent jurisprudcncc;31 3. In the case of City ofLapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province of Bataan v. PEZA/2 the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that erroneous RPT assessments arc appealed differently from illegal RPT assessments. According to the lligh Court, if an RPT assessment is erroneous (i.e., presupposes that the taxpayer is subject to the tax but isll' " See Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Records. Vol. L pp. 1-21. 28 See Resolution dated 4 July 2019, Records. Vol. I. p. 22. 29 See Grounds for Allowance of the Petition for Review. Records. pp. 35-44. 30 See Petition. Records. Vol. I. pp. 44-49. 31 See Petition, Records. Vol. I. pp. 51-61. 3:? G.R. Nos. 184203 and 187583.26 November 2014.

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No. 21 I} disputing the correctness of the amount assessed), the proper mode would be to exhaust the administrative remedies (which include, in the following order: (a) payment under protest, (b) appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals("! BAA"), and (c) appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals ("CBAA")) before an appeal can be made to the CTA. On the other hand, if an RPT assessment is illegal (i.e., the assessment was made without authority), a taxpayer may immediately seck recourse to the courts (without paying under protest and filing an appeal with the LBAA and the CBAA).'' Similarly, in Ty v. Trampe/4 the Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer has a right to file a petition for prohibition to question the authority and power of an assessor, acting solely and independently, to prepare a schedule of market values and issue assessments based thcrcon. 35 Moreover, in Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas/6 the High Court instructed that ''prior resort to administrative action is required when among the issues raised is an allegedly erroneous assessment, like when the reasonableness of the amount is challenged, while direct court action is permitted when only the legality, power, validity or authority of the assessment itself is in question ... the exception of direct cou1i action is allowed when pure questions of law are involved"�' 37 4. The LBAA and CBAA have no authority and jurisdiction to review the propriety of exemptions under a law other than the LGC;38 5. The RTC-Balanga's reliance on the case ofNAPOCOR v. Province of Quezon39 is misplaced as it is inapplicable, viz: (a) In the said case, the claim for exemption is based on the I.CJC which respondents would have to first evaluate and appraise. In the present case, petitioner's claim for RPT exemption emanates from RA 8479 as certified by the DTI/1301, to which respondents arc conclusively bound; (b) Unlike petitioner, NAPOCOR has no cc1iification from a government agency on its claimed tax incentive or exemption; (c) NAPOCOR's claim for exemption appears to be doubtful as it must first be ascertained. On the other hand, herein petitioner's RPT exemption has the imprimatur of the BOl which is the primary agency in charge of granting tax incentives to new businesses; and (d) Unlike NAPOCOR, petitioner only raised a question of law since the !act of its RPT exemption need no longer be ascertained; 111 and ~ ]3 See Petition, Records, Vol. L PP- (J4-6) and 7_1-77. 3.J G.R. No. 117577, I December 199). 35 See Petition, Records. Vol. L pp. T2-T3. 36 G.R. No. 180110,30 May 2016. 37 See Petition, Records. Vol. I, pp. 77-79. 38 See Petition, Records, Vol. I, pp. 79-82 3'J G.R. No. 171586,25 January 2010 40 See Petition. Records. Vol. I. pp. 82-85.

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (C !"A AC Nu_ ::I I) Pagt: 7 of25 6. The CTA-Second Division has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the RTC-Ba/anga 's dismissal of petitioner's local tax case pursuant to Section 7 (a) (3/1 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended ("RA lJ 25 ''). The CTA-Second Division's jurisdictional dismissal based on Section 7 (a) (5/2 l~f RA 1125 is improper.'13 In their Comment, respondents allege that the courts a quo properly issued a dismissal based on lack ofjurisdiction: 1. While petitioner anchors the validity of its direct resort to the RTC- Ba/anga by asserting that its claim for exemption is a challenge to respondent's authority to assess, and not merely a contest against the reasonability of the assessment made, petitioner's action shows that what it is contesting is actually the correctness of the assessment made upon it. "To seck or challenge the non-granting by an LOU of a tax exemption is inconsistent with challenging the LGU's power to assess. Clearly, what petitioner is seeking from respondents is an acknowledgment of its supposed examination, and therefore implicitly recognized respondents' authority to make the questioned assessment." This is in accordance with NAPOCOR v. Province of Quezon; 44 2. In unequivocal terms, Sections 226 in relation to Section 252 ofthe LGC provide that jurisdiction over contested assessments are granted to the LBAA and not to the regular courts, leading to the only conclusion of the validity of the dismissal a quo; ~5 3. Petitioner's reliance with 7)1 v. Trampe is misplaced. In said case, the High Court took cogni/.ance of the petition because there were no questions of fact requiring initial resolution by the proper administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial tribunal. Whereas, in the present case, a question of fact exists whether or not the property of petitioner is exempted li�0111 real property tax. The issue necessitates a factual resolution (i.e., evidence must be submitted to the LGU to justify RI'T exemption). Petitioner's claim for R.P'Ir 41 Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.- The CTA shall exercise: "a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to rcvievv� b) appeal. <:~s herein provided: XXX XXX XXX "3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction:" 42 Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.- The CTA shall exercise: "a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeaL as herein provided: XXX XXX XXX "5. Decisions of the Central Board of !\ssess111ent Appea Is in the n.ercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and ta.\ation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;" 4:1 See Petition. Records, Vol. I. pp. 8(,-9 1. " See Comment, Records. Vol. 1. pr. il(l0-4(l 1. 45 See Comment, Records. Vol. 1. rp. 467-463.

DECISION CTA �8 NO. 2093 (CT.!\ AC No 2! l l exemption is hinged upon a BOI certification; the application of which is a question of fact. In Olivares v. Marquez, 46 the High Court tempered Ty v. Trampe by stating that petitions fix certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus arc not applicable when the correctness of the assessment, which arc questions of f~1ct, arc put in issue; '17 and 4. City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province of Bataan v. PEZA is equally not applicable considering that petitioner in said case, PEZA, is a government instrumentality which by itself is not subject to tax, unlike herein petitioner. Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas in fact strengthens respondent's position considering that the claims of exemption of therein petitioner were dismissed by the court on the same basis that RTC- Balanga dismissed the present case. �IB In its Reply (Re: Respondent's Comment dated 29 August 2019) filed on 10 October 2019, 19 petitioner reiterated its position that the RTC-Balanga and CTA-Second Division have jurisdiction over the present case by re- pleading its arguments from the Petition. The Ruling ofthe Court En Bane Following a studied review o{ the arguments, we DENY the Petition and the corresponding Applicationj(Jr CD() and SQO. The Court in Division, indeed, has no jurisdiction over the Petitionfor Reviewjiled therein. The manner bv which an RPT assessment is contested depends on whether a question o((act exists. Jurisprudence provides two ways to contest an RPT assessment. The method to be chosen depends on what is being contested by the taxpayer. If the taxpayer assails the "reasonableness" of the amount involved in the RPT assessment, the proper recourse would he to lirst pay the assailed RPT assessment and protest the same with the local treasurer and/or assessor, as the case may be, within thitiy (30) days from payment. in accordance with Section 252 ofthe LGC. 50 The local treasurer and/or assessor shall have sixtyo/ 46 G.R. No. 155591. 22 September 21)(1,1. 47 See Comment. Records, Vol. 1, pp. -�16_-,-�166. " See Comment, Records. Vol. L pp. ,166-,1()7. 49 Records. Vol. I. 50 Section 252. Poymenl Under Protest. - (a) No protest shall be entertained unle::..s lhc taxpayer first pays theta;.;. There shall he annotated on the tax receipts the vvords "paid under protest". The protest in writing must be filed within thirty (30) days from rayment of the tax to the provincial. city treasurer or municipal treasurer_ in the case

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No_ 211 J (60) days from receipt within which to decide the protest. Should the decision of the local treasurer and/or assessor be unl~worable, the taxpayer may appeal, within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, to the LBAA, in accordance with Section 226 of the LGCY If the decision of the LBAA remains unfavorable, the taxpayer may, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision, appeal to the CBAA, in accordance with Section 229 (c) of the LGC. 52 Thereafter, if the decision of the CBAA is still unfavorable, the taxpayer may file an appeal with the CTA En Bane, in accordance with Section 7 (a) (5) 53 of RA 1125, in relation to Section 2 (e), Rule 454 of the Revised Rules of the CTA ("RRCTA ").Under this method, administrative remedies arc required to be exhausted prior to an appeal to the CTA because the issue of "reasonableness" of an RPT assessment involves questions of J'act which the local treasurer and/or assessor, LBAA, and CBAA arc specifically competent to adjudicate on. The f-' case of Camp John Hay Development Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals/; is instructive, to wit: of a municipality within Metropolitan Manila Area. \Vho shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt. (b) The tax or a portion thereof paid under protest shall be held in trust by the treasurer concerned. (c) In the event that the protest is finally decided in favor of the taxpayer, the amount or portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as t<~x credit against his existing or future tax liability. (d) In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the :;ixt~y' day period prescribed in subparagraph (a), the taxpayer may avail n!'the remedies as provided tOr in Chapter 3, Title II, Book II of this Code. 5I Section 226. Local Board r4Assessmenf Appeals. -Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may. within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the provincial or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose. together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal. " Section 229. Act fun hy the Local Board of /lsses.mwnl Appeals. - XXX XXX XXX (c) The secretary of the Board shall furnish the owner of the property or the person having legal interest therein and the provincial or city assessor with a copy of the decision of the Board. In case the provincial or city assessor concurs in the revision or the assessment, it shall be his duty to notify the owner of the prope1iy or the person having legal interest therein of such fact using the form or prescribed for the purpose. The owner the property or the person having legal interest therein or the assessor who is not satisfied vvith the decision of the Board, 111ay, within thirty (30) days after receipt oft he decision of said 8onrd. appeal to the Central Boilrd of Assessment Appeals. as herein provided. The decision of the Central Hoard shall be linal and executory. 53 Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.- The CT!\shall exercise: "a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to revie\\' by appeal. as herein provided: XXX XXX XXX "5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals:" 54 RULE4 JURISDICTION OF THF COUR1 XXX XXX XXX SEC. 2. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court en bane. - The Court en bane shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following: XXX XXX XXX (e) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals: 55 G.R. No. 169234, 2 October 20 I}

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No. 21! l Page 10 or2.5 "Section 252 of RA No. 7160. also known as the LGC of 1991, categorically provides: SEC. 252. Payment Under Protest. - (a) No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays theta.\.. There shall be annotated on theta.\ receipts the words 'paid under protest.' The protest in v.rriting must be filed \Vithin thirty (30) days hom payment of theta.\ to the provincial, city treasurer or municipal treasurer. in the case of a municipality within Metropolitan Manila Area. who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from receipt. (b) The tax or a pmtion thereof paid under protest shall be held in trust by the treasurer concerned. (c) In the event that the protest is finally decided in t3vor of the taxpayer. the amount or portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the protestant, or applied as tax credit against his existing or future tax liability. (d) In the event that the protest is denied or upon the lapse of the sixty-day period prescribed in subparagraph (a), the tax payer may avail of the remedies as provided for in Chapter 3. Title Two, Book II of this Code. Relevant thereto. the remedies referred to under Chapter 3, Title Two, Book II of RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991 are those provided for under Sections 226 to 231. Signitlcant provisions pertaining to the procedural and substantive aspects of appeal before the LBAA and CBAA. including its effect on the payment of real property taxes, follow: SEC. 226. Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial. city or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may. within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by tiling a petition under oath in the tOrm prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such atlidavits or documents submitted in support of the appe<~l. SEC. 229. Action b) the Local l~oard of Assessn1ent Appeals. (a)The Hoard shall decide the appeal within one hundred twenty ( 120) days from the date of receipt of such appeal. The Board, after hearing, shall render its decision based on substantial evidence or such relevant evidence on record as a reasonable mind might accept a.s adequate to support the conclusion. (b) In the exercist: of its appellate jurisdiction, th~ Board shall have the powers to summon witnesses. administer oaths, conduct ocular inspection, take depositions, and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. The proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts without necessarily adhering to technical mles applicable in judicial proceedings. (c) �rhe secretary of the Hoard shall furnish the O\\-ner of the property or the per::-.on having legal interest therein and the provincial or city assessor with a copy of the decision of the Board. In case the provi11Cial or city assessor concurs in the revision or the assess111ent, it shall he his duty to notify the mvner of the property or the pcr~on having legal interest therein or of such fact using the ftohrempeprrseosncrhiabveidngfolre~tahleinpteurrepsotsteh. erTehine ~ the property or owner

DECISION CTA EB NO. 209J {CTA AC Nu_ 211) Page I l of25 or the assessor w�ho Is not satisfied vvith the decision of the Board may. within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision of said Board, appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, as here in provided. The decision of the Central Board shall be final and executory. SEC. 231. Effect of Appeal on the Payment of Real Property Tax. --Appeal on assess111ents of real property made under the provisions of this Code shall, in no case. suspend the collection of the corresponding realty ta:-.es on the property involved as assessed by the provincial or city~ assessor. without prejudice to subseqLlent adjustment depending upon the final outcome of the appeal. The above-quoted provisions of RA No. 71 (,0 or the I.GC of 1991 clearly sets forth the administrative remedies available to a taxpayer or real property owner who does not agree with the assessment of the real property tax sought to be collected. The language of the law is clear. No interpretation is needed. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that if a statute is clear, plain and free ti�om ambiguity. it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. !'rom the words of a statute there should be no departure. To begin with, Section 252 emphatically directs that the taxpayer/real property nwncr questioning the assessment should first pay the tax due before his protest can be entertained. As a matter of fact, the words "paid under protest" shall be annotated on theta~ receipts. Consequently, only after such payment has been made by the taxpayer may he file a protest in writing (within thirty (30) days from said payment of tax) to the provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, who shall decide the protest within sixty (60) days from its receipt. In no case is the local treasurer nbliged to entertain the protest unless the tax due has been paid. Secondly, within the period prescribed by law, any owner or person having legal interest in the property not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city, or municipal :1ssessor in the assessment of his property m:ty file an appeal with the LBAA of the province or city concerned, as provided in Section 226 of RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991. Thereafter, within thirty (30) days from receipt, he may elevate, hy filing a nntice of appeal, the adverse decision nf the LBAA with the CBAA, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all appeals from the decisions, orders, and resolutions of the I,ocal Boards involving contested assessments of real properties, claims for tax refund and/or tax credits, or overpayments of taxes. Signilicantly. in Dr. Olivares v. Mayor Marque;. this Court had the occasion to extensively discuss the subject provisions of RA No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991. in rdation to the impropriety of the direct y � recourse bel(we the courts on issue of the correctness of assessment of real estate taxes. The pertinent articulations fiJI low:

lli:CISION CT A EB NO. 2093 (C rA AC No. 211 l Page 12 of25 'x x x A perusal of the petition before the KTC plainly' shO\'iS that what is actually being assailed is the correctness of the assessments made by the local assessor of Parailaque on petitioners' properties. The allegations in the said petition purportedly questioning the assessor's <Iuthority to assess a11d collect the taxes \vere obviously made in order to justify' the filing of the petition with the RTC. In beL there i':i nothing in the said pctitil)ll that supports their claim regarding the assessor's alleged lack of authority. What petitioners raise are the following: (I) some of the ta~es be in~ collected have alrcad;~ prescribed and may no longer be: collected as provided in Section 194 of the Local Ciovernment Code of 1991: (:2) some propt�rties have been doubl)� taxed/assessed; (3) some properties being taxed are no longer e.\istent: ('I )some properties are exempt ti�onl taxation as they are being used exclusively for educational purposes; and (5) some errors are made in the assessment and collection of taxes due on petitioners' properties, and that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in making the 'improper, e:-.:ccssive and unlawful the collection of taxes against the petitioner<;.� Moreover. tht'Sl' argunH'nls t�ssentially involn: questions of fad. llcncc1 tht� petition should have been brought, at the very first instance, to the LBAA. Under the doctrine of primac_l' of <1dministrative remedies, an error in the assessment must be administratively pursued to the exl'lusion of ordinary courts whose decisions would be void for lack of jurisdiction. But an appeal shall not suspend the collection or the tax assessed without prejudice to a later ad_justment pending the outt'OIIll' of the appeal. Even assuming that the asscssor 1s authority is indeed an issue 1 it must bt� pointed out that in order for the court a quo to resolve the petition, the issues oftlw correctness of the tax assessment and l'ollel�tinn must also necessaril_\ be dealt with. \. .\ \.X In the present t�ase, the authorit_v of the ;.~ssessor is not being questioned. l)cspitt� petitioners' protestations, the petition filed before the court a quo prim<lrily involves the correctness of the assessments~ which are questions of fact that are not allowed in a petition for t�ertior�al"i, prohibition and mandamus. The court a quo is therefore precluded from entertaining the petition~ and it appropriately dismissed the petition."~ (Emphasis Ours) On the other hand, the cases ol' Ty v. Trampe and City t~l Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province of Bataan v. PEZA provide another option for appealing RPT assessments. This option, however, is solely limited to illegal RPT assessments, where the legality and authority or the assessment is questioned. Under this option. a taxpayer may directly resort to the regular courts (i.e., RTC) to question an Rl'T assessment. Should the regular courts fi. decide against the taxpayer, the latter may !ilc an appeal with the CTA j

OECISIO!'i CTA LB NO. 2093 (l'TA Al' No 211 l Page 13 of2:'i Division, in accordance with Section 7 (a) (3)-'6 of' RA 1125, in relation to Section 3 (a) (3), Rule 457 of the RRCTA. Afterwards, the taxpayer may appeal an adverse decision with the CTA l~n Bane, in accordance with Section 2 (a) (2), Rule 458 ofthe RRCTA. Under this option, direct resort to the regular courts is allowed since only a question of law (i.e., no need for presentation of evidence) is involved which docs not require the expertise of the local treasurer/and or assessor, LBAA, and CBAA. City of' Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province of Bataan v. PEZA citing 1:v v. Trampe clarifies, viz: "On the other hand. an assessment is illegal i1� it was made without authority under the law. ln case of an iI\ega! assessment, the taxpayer may direct[, resort to judicial action without paying under protest the assessed tax ami liling an appeal with the Local and Central Board of Assessment Appeals. In Ty \'. Trampe. the Municipal Assessor of Pasig sent Alejandro B. Ty a notice of assessment with respect to �1y s real properties in Pasig. Without resot�ting to the administrative remedies under the Local Government Code. Ty Jilcd before the Regional Trial Cowt a petition. praying that the trial court mdlit~� the notice of assessment. In assessing the real property taxes due. the Municipal Assessor used a schedule of market values solely prepared by him. This, Ty argued. was void for being contrary to the Local Government Code requiring that the schedule of market values be jointly prepared by the provincial. city. and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila /\rca. This court ruled that the assessment was illegal I(Jr having been issued without authority of the Municipal Assessor. Reconciling provisions of the Real Property Tax Code and the l.oeal ( iovernment Code, this court held that the schedule of market values must be jointly prepared by the provincial. city. and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila /\rea.qv 56 Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.- The CTJ\. shall exercise: "a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal. as herein provided: XXX XXX XXX "3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Re~ional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise or their ori~inal or appellate jurisdiction:�� 57 RULE4 JURISDICTION OF THE COtiRT XXX XXX XXX SEC. 3. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Cot~rt in IJivisinns rhe Court in Divisions shall exerctse: (a) Exclusive original or appellate jmisdictionto review by appc<ll the following: XXX XXX XXX or (3) Decisions, resolutions or orders the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; 58 RULE4 JURISDICTION OF THE COURT XXX XXX XXX SEC. 2. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court en bane. The Court en bane shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdicti011 to review by appeal the following: (a) Decisions or resolutions on lllotiollS for n:consilh:mtion or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate juri\diction over: XXX XXX XXX (2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the c.'\crcise of their original jurisdiction;

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No. 211) Page 14 of25 As to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. this court held that Ty did not err in directly resorting to judicial action. According to this court. payment under protest is required only 'where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed.� As to appeals bcl(>re the l.ocal and Central Board of Assessment Appeals. they arc �fruitltt! only where questions of fact are involved.� Ty raised the issue of the legality of the notice of assessment, an issue that did not go into the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Neither did the issue involve a question of fact. Ty raised a question oflaw and, therd(>re. need not resort to the administrative remedies provided under the Local Government Code."'" RPT exemption arising (rom availment o( incentives provided under a law is a question o((act. Petitioner insists that its direct resort to RTC-Balanga was well- founded considering that only questions or law (i.e .. whether the LGU of Bataan had authority to issue the RPT assessment against petitioner) were raised. Petitioner hinges this contention on the fact that its RPT exemption is allegedly already legal, final, and absolute due to a cct1ification issued by the DTIIBOI,60 which certification, according to petitioner, is paramount and controlling61 as the DTl!BOI is the orticc primarily in charge of overseeing investments. This is misplaced. In Tongohan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Atty. Francisco Escano, Jr., 62 the lligh Court had a chance to distinguish a "question of law" with a "question or fact". as follows: "In Republic of' the Philippines r. Muluhunon. this Court distinguished a question of Ia" from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law. the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invitesQ, a review of the evidence presented. the question posed is one of fact. j 59 G.R. Nos. 184203 and I87583. 26 Nove111ber 201 -L 60 See Annex A or the Petition. Records. Vol. 1. P- I I I. 61 See Petition, Records. Vol. l, p. 56. 62 G.R. No. 190994,7 September 2011.

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CTA i\C No. 2. I 1l Page 15 of25 Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact." Contrary to petitioner's contention that the issues raised in the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with RTC-Balanga were limited to questions of law, petitioner's !irst argument therein addresses the issue of whether its Mariveles Facility was a blending and storage facility, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9367, Bil~fitels Act of 2006, or purely a storage facility. 63 Logically, this issue can only be resolved by presenting evidence thereon; thus a question of fact Above this apparent spcci lie !actual issue is the present case's general and overall question or !act, that is, whether petitioner is RPT exempt under Section 9 of RA 84 79. In the case of NAPOCOR v. Province of Quezon, 64 the High Court ruled that claiming exemption fi�om RPT raises a question as to the correctness of an assessment, thus, it involves a question or fact which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, viz: "The cases of Ty and Olivarez must be placed in their proper perspective. The petitioner in Ty v. Trampe questioned bcl(>re the trial court the increased real estate taxes imposed by and being collected in Pasig City effective hom the year 1994, premised on the legal question of whether or not Presidential Decree No. 921 (PD 921) was repealed by the LGC. PD 921 required that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein; while Section 212 of the LGC stated that the schedule shall be prepared by the provinciaL city or municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the ditTerent classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the Sanggunian concerned. The private respondents assailed Ty's act of 1lling a prohibition petition before the trial court contending that Ty should have availed lirst the administrative remedies provided in the LGC particularly Sections 252 (on payment under protest before the local treasurer) and 226 (on appeals to the l.BAA). The Court. through former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, declared that Ty correctly t1led a petition i(H� prohibition before the trial court against the assailed act of the city assessor and treasurer. The administrative protest proceedings provided in Section 252 and 226 will not apply. The protest contemplated under Section 252 is Aj required where there is a question as to the reasonableness or correctness ofthe amount assessed. Hence. ifa taxpayer disputes the'(' (;J See Annex "M'' of the Petition. Records, VoL 1, pp. 169-170. 64 G.R. No. 171586, 25 January 20 I0.

DECISION CTA LB NO 20QJ (lTA M.' No. 1! li Page 16 of25 reasonableness of an increase in a real propetiy tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. Ty however was questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently. to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These were not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase. Moreover, Ty V\'as raising a legal question that is properly cognizable h) the trial court: no issues or lact were involved. ln enumerating the po\\cr of the UlAA. Section 229 declares that 'the proceedings or the flomd shall be conducted solely lor the purpose of ascertaining the racts x x x. � Appeals to the LBAA (under Section 226) are thcretore fruitful on!: where questions of fact are involved. Olivarez v. Marquez. on the other hand, involved a petition tor certiorari, mandamus. and prohibition questioning the assessment and levy made by the City of Paranaquc. Olivarez was seeking the annnlm~nt of his realty tax delinquency assessment. Marquez assailed Olivarez� failure to tirst exhaust administrative remedies, particularly the requirement of payment under protest. Olivarez replied that his petition was I\ led to question the assessor's authority to assess and collect realty taxes and thercl(>re. as held in Ty v. Trampe, the exhaustion of administrative remedies \\as not required. The Court however did not agree with OlivarcL�s argument. lt ti.Jtll1d that there was nothing in his petition that supported his claim regarding the assessor's alleged lack or authority. What Olivarez raised were the following grounds: '(I) some or the taxes being collected have already prescribed and may no longer be collected as provided in Section I94 ofthe Local Government Code of 1991: (2) some properties have been doubly taxed/assessed: (3) some properties being taxed are no longer existent: (4) some properties are exempt from taxation as they m�e being used exclusively for educational purposes: and (5) some errors are made in the assessment and collection ol' taxes due on petitioners� properties. and that respondents committed grave abuse or discretion in making the improper. excessive and unlawful the collection ol� taxes against the petitioner.� The Oli1 are; petitiun lib! hcl(>rc the trial court primarily involved the correctness of the asscss1ncnts. which is a question of fact that is not allowed in a petition tor certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. lienee. we declared that the petition should have been brought. at the very lirst instance. to the LflAA. not the trial court. Like Olivarez. Napocor. by claiming exemption from realty taxation, is simply raising a question of the correctness of the assessment. A claim for tax exemption, whether full or partial, does not question the authority of local assessor to assess real property tax. This may be interred trom Section 206 which states that: SEC 206. Prooflli'I-:.'\Cillption oi'Rcal Prupcn: li�onl I a>-<ltion. - Fvery person b: or for \\hnm re<ll property i'i tkclarecL who shall c!ai111 ta;.. t''\C!liption for such prop~rl) under this Title shall file with the pn.lVIIJcial. city or IJJUllicipal a.':>Sl'ssor within thirty (30) days frolll the date oftlw declaration of IT<:tl propertyn sufficient doculllelll<lr) evidence in support of such claimT1

I>ECISIOJ\ CTA LB NO. 2093 (C r/\ /\C No. ] I I 1 Page 17 of2S including_ corporate charters. title or owner-.;hip. articles of incorporation. bylaws. contracts. affidavits. certi!ications and mortgage deeds. and similar documents If the required evidence is not submitted within the period herein prescribed. the property shall be listed as ta.,able in the assessment rolL However, if the property sha! \ be proven to be tax exempt. the same shall be dropped hon1 the assessment roll. IC~mphasi~ provided J By providing that real property not declared and proved as tax- exempt shall he included in the assessment roll. the above-quoted provision implies that the local assessor has the authority to assess the property for realty taxes. and any subsequent claim for exemption shall be a\\uwed onh when sufllcienl proof has been adduced supporting the claim. Since Napocor was simply questioning the correctness of the assessment. it should have first complied \Vith Section 252. particularly the requirement of payment under protest Napocor"s failure to prove that this requirement has been complied with thus renders its administrative protest under Section 226 of the LCJC without any effect. No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer lirst pays the tax. It was an ill-advised move t(x Napocor to directly tile an appeal with the LBAA under Section 226 without Jlrst paying the tax as required under Section 252. Sections 252 and 22(> provide successive administrative remedies to a taxpayer who questions the correctness of an assessment. Section 226. in declaring that �an; owner or person having legal interest in the properly who is not satislied with the action of the provinciaL city. or municipal assessor in the assessment of his propertv may x x x appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals x .x x." should be read in conjunction with Section 252 (d). which st<ttcs that �in the event that the protest is denied x x x. the taxpayer ma; avail oft he IT\1\L'dies as provided for in Chapter 3. Title IL Flook II of the LGC [Chapter 3 refers to Assessment Appeals. which includes Sectiuns 226 to 231 [. The 'action� referred to in Section 226 (in relation to a protest of real property tax assessment) thus refers to the local assessor's act of denying the protest tiled pursuant to Section 2'12. Without the action ofthe local assessor. the appellate authority of the \.ElAA cannot be invoked. Napoeor�s action hd[Jrc the L\lAA \Vas thus prematurely filed." (Emphasis Ours) Moreover, in the case ol� Camp John Hay Development Corporation v. CBAA, et al./'5 the Supreme Court declared that a claim I(Jr lax exemption merely raises a question or the "reasonahleness" or "correctness" or the assessment, in which case, compliance with prior exhaustion or administrative remedies under the LGC is required. Clearly, by insisting that it is RPT exempt under Section 9 ofRA 8479, r as certified by the DTIIBOI, petitioner is actually disputing the (Jv "reasonableness" or "correctness" orthe assessment. Consequently, petitioner 65 See Note 30.

DECISION CTA �8 NO. 2093 (CTA i\(' No. 2 I t l Page 18 of25 should have initially paid under protest the RPT assessment; lilcd a protest with the local treasurer and/or assessor; lilcd an appeal with the LBAA; and filed an appeal with the CBAA, prior to filing a petition for review with this Court En Bane. Petitioner's failure to exhaust these administrative remedies puts an end to the current Petition. Petitioner argues that NAPOCOR v. Province of Quezon is inapplicable to its circumstanccs;1'r, and that City r~f'Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province ofBataan v. PEZA, and 7)1 v. Trampe arc controlling to the present Petition. This is baseless. These cases arc consistent with each other and do not show a change of the Supreme Court's stance. While both NAPOCOR v. Province of Quezon and City ofLapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province r~f'Battwn v. PEZA concerned a claim for RPT exemption, the source of such claim differed in each case. In Napocor v. Province r~l Quezon, r.? N/\I'OCOR is claiming RPT exemption under Section 234 (c) and (e) of the LGC;r.o~ while in Ci~~� r~l Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province of' Bataan v. PEZA, "~ 1'1-:1./\ is claiming Rl'T exemption under Presidential Decree No. 66 ("PD 66"/0 and Republic Act No. 7916 ("RA 7916''). 71 Section 234 of the LGC merely provides a criterion of what real properties arc exempt fi�om RPT. It docs not spcci lically name or point to specific persons and entities who and which will be RPT exempt. To avail of the RPT exemption under Section 234 rJf'the LGC, a taxpayer must lirst prove its entitlement to its application. As such, N/\POCOR in Napocor v. Province of Quezon had to provide evidence showing that its real properties qualify as RPT exempt under Section 234 rJf' the LGC, a question of fact necessitating the expertise of the local treasurer and/or assessor, LB/\1\, and CBAA.~ 6,,6, See Petition, Records, VoL I. pp. R~-g)_ G.R. Nos. 184.203 and 1R758.\. ::!<1 November ~0 Id. 68 Section 234. Exemptions from Real l'n)pt'l�t~ I dX. Till~ fullowin~�- <HT exempted from payment of the real property tax: XXX XXX X.\X (c) All machineries and equipment that <lrc actual!:�. directly, and exclusive\-" used by local water districts and government-owned or -controlled corporations cn).'.a).'.ed in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power; XXX XXX XX:'\ (e) Machinery and equip111ent used for pollution coiJtrol and envirnnlllental protection .. blJ G.R. Nos. 184203 and 1S758.), ~(~ Novelllbcr ~()\il. 70 Section 21. l'/on-pnlfil ( 'huroc/er r!flhe .i.uthori!_l"." L\-clllJlflonjru/11 lin-es. The Authority shall be non-profit and shall devote and u:-.e all its returns tt�om ih e<1pital investment. ns well as excess revenues from its operations, for the development improvement and maintenance and other related expenditures of the Authority lo pny its indebtedness and oblig<1tions and in furtherance and or effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section I this Decree. In consonance therewith, the Authority is hereby declared e:-.empt: XXX XXX XXX (b) From all income taxes, franchise tilXO:'-'. realty ta:-.:es and all otllcl kinds ofta\es and licenses to be paid to the National Govt'nllnent_ it:; pmvincc-". cities. lllllllicipalitics <Hld uther government agencies and instrumenta \it ics 7( Section II, K.A 7916 provides:� l'lle L'\i:--otin~'- 1-.\]lllrt l"'roccsslll~'- bm~.: Authorit: (LPZA)creatcd under Presidential Decree No. ()(J '>h;dl t:volve into tile flf-:Z/\ in accordance\\ ith the guidelines and regulations set forth in an executive order is~ued for this purpose ..

OE('ISION CTA EB NO. 209J (CTA AC Nu. 211} Page 19of25 On the other hand, PD 66 spccilically named the JJ>ZA as exempt from RPT. Considering that the EPZA evolved to the PEZA under RA 7916, it was a matter for the High Court in City ofLapu-Lapu v. PEZA and Province of Bataan v. PEZA to simply interpret whether the LPZA's RPT exemption under PD 66 equally extended to the PI:ZA, a mere question of law without need to present any evidence. Thus, direct rcs01i to the regular courts was proper. Similarly, in Ty v. Trampe, as already discussed above, only a pure question oflaw was raised. As such, the I ligh Court validated the direct resort to the regular courts. In said case, the entire Schedule or Values was contested as void because it was solely prepared by the local assessor therein; hence, any RPT assessment arising therefrom was similarly invalid. The resolution of this issue was dependent on whether Presidential Decree No. 921 was repealed by the LGC, a question or law that needed no evidence to be presented. In the case before us, pclllloncr is claiming RPT exemption under Section 9 of RA 8479. The said law docs not spccilically name petitioner as RPT exempt but only provides a criterion on what entities may avail of the tax exemption, to wit: '"Section 9. Incentives t<.>r New Investments. To the extent applicable. persons with new investments as determined by the DOE and registered vvith the HOI in relining. storage. marketing and distribution of petroleum products. shall be extended the same incentives granted to SOl-registered enterprises engaged in a preferred area of investments pursuant to Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the �omnibus Investments Code of !987". Such incentives shall include: (l) Income tax holiday: (2) Additional deduction for labor expenses: (3) Minimum tax and duty of three percent (3'Yo) and value-added tax (VAT) on imported capital equipment: (4) Tax credit on domestic capital equipment: (5) Exemption ti-om contractor's tax: (6) Unrestricted use of consigned equipment: (7) Exemption t'rom the real property tax on production equipment or machineries: (8) Exemption !1-om taxes and duties on imported spare parts: and ~

DECISION CTA EB NO. 2093 (CIA AC No 21 II Page 20 of25 (9) Such other applicable incentives under Article 39 of Executive Order No. 226. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the said incentives may he availed by persons with new investments for a period of live (5) years \'rom registration with the BOI: Provided, however, That in the storage. marketing and distribution of petroleum products. only the investments of new industry participants shall be entitled to incentives provided in the said Code. As used herein, "marketing of petroleum products" shall include the establishment of gasoline stations. For this purpose. the industry shall be included in the annual Investment Priorities Plan (IPP): Provided. That nothing in herein contained shall preclude qualitied persons or entities as provided under the �omnibus Investments Code' from applying from or continue enjoying incentives and bene tits under the said Code.'' Consequently, petitioner still needs to adduce evidence to prove that it is covered by the application of this provision. A mere interpretation of RA 8479 will not instantly determine petitioner's entitlement to Rl'T exemption. If petitioner is entitled to Rl'T exemption under Section 9 ol RA 8479 as it claims, petitioner should have proven this bcf'orc respondents by following Section 206 ofthe LGC, which provides: "SEC. 206. Proof of 1-:xemption of Real Property from Taxation. - Every person by or for whom real property is declared, who shall claim tax exemption f(lr such property under this Title shall tile with the provincial. city or municipal assessor within thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real property sutTicient documentary evidence in support of such claim including corporate charters. title of ownership. mtic\es of incorporation. bylaws, contracts, affidavits. ce11ilications and mortgage deeds. and similar documents. If the required evidence is not submitted within the period herein prescribed. the propc11y shall he listed as taxable in the assessment roll. However. if the property shall he proven to be tax exempt. the same shall be dropped fi�om the assessment roll." Moreover, whi lc petitioner's J)Tl/BOI ccrti fication enjoys the presumption of rcgularity, 72 and may be considered, at best, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein/' it is still not conclusive (i.e., that petitioner is RPT exempt). Respondents can contest petitioner's prima facie RPT exemption by presenting contrary evidence.~ 7' See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filminera Resources Corporation. CfA EB No. 1395, CTA Case No. 8610,23 March 2017. 73 Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: "Section 23. Puhlic ducumenfs os c1�idenn'.- Docume11ts consi-.;tin~ of entrie:-, in public records made in the performance of a duty� by a public ortic~r are primafi.Kie cvidl'IH.'e of the facts therein stated. All other public documents <.m.:: cvidctKl'. even a~ain:;t a third person. of the fact which gave rise to their execution and oft he date ofthL' li.ltll'r.�� (E111phasis. Ours)

llECISIOI\ CTA EB NO. 2093 (l'TA /\l' No_ 211 l Pagc21nf25 In fact, without presenting the IHI lBO I ccrti licution us evidence, no court is duty bound to give primo(cn�ie recognition of petitioner's alleged RPT exemption considering that neither the IHl/BOI ccrti lication nor petitioner's alleged RPT exemption Call under those enumerated in Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, 74 which courts arc mandatorily required to take judicial notice of. All told, petitioner's alleged RPT exemption under ,')'ection 9 of RA 8479, is a factual matter that is required to be belabored upon by the administrative specialists (i.e .. local treasurer and/or assessor, LBAA, and CBAA) prior to a recourse with this Cout1. As a question o( (act exists, petitioner availed o(the wrong method of appeal. Hence, the RTC-Balanga and the CTA- Second Division have no jurisdiction. As a question of !'act exists in the present case, namely, whether petitioner is RPT exempt under Section 9 ofRA 8479, petitioner incorrectly resorted to a direct action with RTC-Balanga and thcrcfi�om inappropriately appealed its decision with the C'TA-Second Division. It should have initially exhausted its administrative remedies prior to appealing with this Court 8n Bane: First, it should have p<tid the assailed RI'T assessment, and tiled a protest against it, in accordance with ,\'ection 252 o( the LGC; 75 Altcrwards, petitioner should have appealed the unf~tvorable decision on the protest to the unfavorable~ LI3AA, in accordance with Section 226 o{the LGC; 7 Then, the " " RULE 129 What Need Not Be Proved Section I. Judicial notice, when nl<llldator~. 1\ court c;llall takl' _judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence. of the existe11ce anU territorial extent ofswte~. their political history. forms of government and symbols of nationality. tlw lav. ofnatiom,_ tile admiralty� and maritime courts of the world and their seals. the political constitution and history ol'thc Philippines. the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the lmvs of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. ( l a) 75 Section 252. Paymi!nt �lnda Protest. ~ (a) No protest shall be entertained unless the ta\p<tyer first pa;. s the t;~\_ There "hall be annotated on the tax receipts the words "p<licl under protC\1" l'hc protest in \\ 1�iti1t~ tnusi be filed within thirty (30) days from payment oft he t<l.\ to the provinciaL city tn."<J<..ttrer llr lllltnicipcd tn:a~urer, in the case of a municipality within Mctropo\itatt M<ltliLt Area. \\�ho :-,hall decide the protest \vithin sixty (60) days from receipt. (b) The tax or a portion thereof paid under protc-;L sh;tll be held in trust by the treasurer concerned. (c) In the event that the pmte~t is linall)- decid~.:_'d itt [t\Or ofthL' t<t:-,pnyer. the <tlllount or portion of the tax protested shall be refunded to the prot.::-,t<lllL or applied a<; ta\ credit against his existing or future tax liability. (d) In the event that the protest i:-, (knied or ltpotl tile lapse of the -;i\t)' day period prescribed in subparagraph (a), the taxpayer may avail of the remedie-; as providvd for in Chapter], Title II, Book II of this Code. 76 Section 226. l.ocal Board uj'.,lssess/!lent .-IJJflculs. -An:: OVI'Il-:1' or person having !ega! interest in the property who is not satisfied \vith the action ui the provinciaL cit) or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may. within si.\ty (()0) days !'rolll the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment arpcal to the Board or Assessment Appeals ()r th~.:.� pruvincial or city by filing a

IJECISION CTA tB NO. 2093 (CTI\ AC Nn 2! I) decision of the LBAA should have been appealed to the CBAA, in accordance with Section 229 (c) of the LGC; 77 1-'inally, the unfavorable CBAA decision should have been appealed by petitioner with this Court /,�n Bane, in accordance with Section 7 (a) (5}'8 l>{ RA 1125, in relation to Section 2 (e), Rule 4 79ofthe RRCTA. As petitioner's direct rcsm1 to the RTC-Balanga and the subsequent appeal of its decision to the CTA- Second Division for relief from respondent's RPTasscssmcnt and collection ct'l'orts arc not in accordance with law, the RTC-Balanga and the CTA- Second Division appropriately ruled that they have no jurisdiction over the present case. WHEREFORI~, the instant Petition l(>r Review, and its corresponding Application for Cease and Desist Orde��. and Status Quo Ante Order; and Consignation of Tender (Rc: Redemption Payment Under Protest) ("Consignation") with Urgent Motion to Resolve Application for Cease and Desist Order/Status Quo Ante Order tiled by petitioner, .JETTI PETROLEUM, INC., arc hereby I>ENIEil li.>r lack ol' merit. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated 3 June 2019 and I~ February 2019 promulgated by the Court in Division arc hereby AFFIRM ED.4J petition under oath in the form prescribed !Or the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or document::. submitted in suppmtofthe appeal. 77 Section :2:29. Ac.:tion hr the LU('(/1 nuard of :I.\'St'SS!i/<'111 �lfJpeu/s_- XXX XXX ?\XX (c) The secretary of the Hoard "hall fumi:-,h tit,� (l\\'lter of the pro1wn: or the per~on having legal interest therein and the provincial or cit: a-.;~essor with a copy of the dccisiott of the Board. In case the provincial or city assessor concurs in the rc\ i-;iott or the asses'--tltl'llL it shaH be his duty to notify the owner of the property or the person havin!-'- legal int~.:?rest thc!�l�in of such l~1ct using the form prescribed for the purpose. The ovvnt..T of the prupcrty ur the person having legal interest therein or or the assessor who is not satisfied with the decision the Board. llli:-t). \Vithin thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision of said Board. appeal \(l the Ccntr<d Board of Assessment Appeals, as herein provided. The decision of the Central Board shall he 1\nal and c.,ecutot"). 78 Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.- The CTA shall c:-.:ercise� "a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to reviC\\ by appeaL as herein provided: XXX XXX AX.\. "5. Decisions of the Centra I Board of /\sscsstncnt Appeals in the exere isc of its appe !late jurisdiction over cases involving the asscsslllcnt and ta.\ation of real proper!) originally decided by the provincial or city board o!'asscs.o,ment appeab: .. " RULE4 JURISDICTION OF THE COUR 1 XXX XXX XXX SEC. 2. Cases within the juri~dictio11 of tlw Cnllrt en batlc. Till' Court en bane shall exercise exclusive appellatejurisdictiun to r.:vicH b_, appeal thl' foll(lWing. XXX XX.\. X.\..\. (e) Decisions oft he Central noard ur ;\SO,l"'',lllCilt Appe<Jb (CBAA) in the C\Crci-..c of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involvini-!- the <tSSL'SSI\lL'Ill and ta.\ation of n:<d propert_> originally decided by� the provincial or city board ofassl:'ssllll'llt <lppeak

DECISION CTA Ell NO. 2093 (CIA AC No. 211) Page 23 or25 SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: Presiding Justice ~�cc.a~��F~/~� .Jl'JANITO C. CASTANEDA!, .JR. Associate Justicc of~ate (Joins the Dissenting Opinion Justice Ma. Belen M Ringpis- Liban) ERLINDA (>. lJY Associate. J usticc ' ~- ~ - ' '-...._ (With Dissenting Opinion) MA. BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice ' .ltlstfce Ma. Belen M Ringpis- ct::~ss,j1te (Joins the Dissenting Uban) CATHERINE T. MANAHAN Associate Justice

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IH:CISION CTA LB NO. 2093 (CTA AC No. 211) Pagt: 25 of25 CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article Vlll. Section 13 ol the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation be fixe the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. Presiding Justicet

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY ENBANC JETTI PETROLEUM INC., CTA EB NO. 2093 Petitioner, (CTA AC No. 211) -versus- Present: Del Rosario, P.J. , Castaneda, Jr., Uy, Fabon-Victorino, Ringpis-Liban, M a n ahan, B acorro-Villena, and Modesto-San Pedro, ]] M S. EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, Promulgated: in her capacity as Provincial Treasurer JUL .j 4 2020 o f the Province of Bataan, ENGR. RICARDO C. HERRERA, in his ~ol ~~/"". capacity as Provincial i\ssessor o f the Province o fB ataan, and ATTY. EFREN C. LIZARDO, in his capacity as Provincial Legal Officer of the Province o f Bataan, Res po n de n ts. X-------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------X DISSENTING OPINION RINGPIS-LIBAN, J.: \Vith due respect, I respectfully regis ter my dissen t. I believe that the RTC-Balanga and the CTA-Second DiviJion have jurisdiction over the instant case. The Petition flied before the RTC-Balanga was to challenge the authority of the responden ts in assessing and collecting Real Property Tax (RP'f) against petitioner by interpreting that the storage is no t encompassed by the exemption under Section 9, of Republic Act No. 8479, otherwise known as "An Ad Deregulating t!Je DownJtream Oil InduJtry, andfor Other PmpoJeJ." T he issue in this case is not the reasonableness o f the assessment issued by the respond ents but the respond ents' power to review petitioner's ~

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB No. 2093 (CTA AC No. 211) national DTI/BOI RPT exemption pursuant to the Oil Deregulation Law. Thus, the question whether the Oil Deregulation Law, a special law, or the Local Government Code (LGC), a general law, should prevail is a pure question of law. The RTC-Balanga's reliance on the case of NAPOCOR vs. Province of Quezon1 is misplaced. NAPOCOR's claim for exemption was based on the LGC itself, such that NAPOCOR's claim would have to be first evaluated and approved by the Local Government Unit (LGU). On the other hand, petitioner's claim for tax exemption is not based on the LGC but on R.A. No. 8479. Since NAPOCOR's claim is based on the LGC, NAPOCOR must prior register with the LGU for the issuance of the requisite LGU Certification for the LGU based exemption. NAPOCOR had no certification from a separate national government agency nor under a special law to support its claimed tax incentive or exemption. As regards herein petitioner, the latter had sufficiently shown its entitlement to the RPT exemption by presenting its DTI/BOI tax incentive certification exempting it from the RPT starting March 2014 until February 2019 in accordance with Section 9 of R.A. No. 8479. By claiming exemption based on the LGC itself, NAPOCOR's claim certainly had to be ascertained, evaluated and approved by the LGU. NAPOCOR raised factual issues of fact that the LGU had to properly consider and evaluate. On the other hand, petitioner challenges the illegal jurisdiction of the LGU to still tax, even if petitioner has a national DTI/BOI RPT exemption. The power and authority of the LGU to still assess and collect the subject RPT in spite of petitioner's tax incentive certification raised a pure question of law. In the case of Villamor, Jr. vs. Umale," the Supreme Court held that: "There is a question of law "when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain [set] of facts." The test is "whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence." Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is "doubt... as to the truth or falsehood of facts." The question must involve the examination of probative value of the evidence presented." The LGU, whose power stems from the LGC, must confme itself within the 1991 LGC. Thus, it has no jurisdiction over taxation and exemption matters beyond the LGC or those granted by special laws. I agree with the petitioner that it can directly resort to the lower court (RTC-Ba!anga), and need not undergo administrative proceedings before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) and Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) to challenge respondents' RPT assessment in relation to its DTI/BOI RPT exemption for its blending and storage equipment. The cases /Y 1 G.R. No. 171586, 25 January 2010. 2 744 Phil. 31 (2014)

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB No. 2093 (CTA AC No. 211} of TJ vs. Trampe3 and City ofLapulapu vs. PEZA and Province ofBataan vs. PEZA4 as cited by petitioner fully support direct resort to courts where a taxpayer challenges the very authority, power and jurisdiction of an LGU to impose, assess and collect taxes. Accordingly, there can be no other remedy than a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the respondents that undoubtedly falls under the jurisdiction of the lower court. In my opmion, this Court should assume jurisdiction over the instant Petition. I therefore vote to ASSUME JURISDICTION over the Petition for Review and REVERSE or SET ASIDE the assailed Resolutions of the CTA- Second Division. 0!::-<. ~ _, "' MA. BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice 3 G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995. 4 G.R. Nos. 184203 and 187583, November 26, 2014.