[ G.R. No. L-12686. October 24, 1963 ]

[ G.R. No. L-12686. October 24, 1963 ]

[ G.R. No. L-12686. October 24, 1963 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. KAMLON HADJI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu

for different crimes in various cases, to wit; in Criminal

Case No. 1162 for rebellion; in Criminal Case No. 1162-A

to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple injuries; and in Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh

Kaddam et al., for kidnapping with murder and attempted

murder.

The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly

whereafter the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Wherefore, in Crim. Case No. 1162, the Court hereby sentences

the accused Kamlon, leader of the sedition, to an indeterminate

imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day

of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and eight

(8) months of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a fine of

P10,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency

and to pay the proportionate costs.

"Each of the accused, Adjudi Asarani and Amsajen Jamah is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, and in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.

"Each and everyone of the accused Jumla Abdukarim, Abduljalim

Adin, Ullih Urong Angkang Adjad, Angkang Illama, Sahidula

Ajad, Ibbing Janah, Kakari Damboa, Akbara Abduhasman, Hatib

Hala Amsajen, Hatib Jar on alias Baito Haron, Awah Kamsa;

Waliul Adjudi; Jaujali Gadjali; Suhalili Jamli; Sinihag Salihan;

Sarahan Ibba; is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate of two (2)

years, four (4) months imprisonment and one (1) day of prision

correccional as minimum to four (4) years nine (9) months and

ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of

P3,000.00 and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding

subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed one-third

of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.

"Each and everyone of the accused Amsah Laih, Jundai Halisan,

Taraman Adil, Kahiral Dastan, Boyongan Sabiban, Sakkam Hussin,

Baybayan Asao, Abdurahman Sahol, Palicta Dugong and Kaligogan

Ladjalawan is hereby acquitted of the charges against him with the

proportionate, costs de oficio. Their immediate release from custody

is hereby ordered.

"Crim. Cases No. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 are hereby ordered

dismissed with costs de oficio. The release from custody of all the

accused in these cases, except those who are charged or convicted

in another case, is hereby ordered.

"In Crim. Case No. 1353, the Court hereby sentences the accused

Kamlon to the death penalty for the kidnapping of Jamalul Ailing

and Hatib Ajibon complexed with the murder of Jamalul Ailing;

to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3,000.00,

without imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs."

The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No.

1353 for which the accused, Kamlon, was found guilty and

sentenced to the death penalty. A co-accused in this case,

Ulluh, was still at large at the time the lower court

rendered its judgment.

In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however,

it must be stated that the trial judge recommended the

commutation of the penalty imposed to life imprisonment.

The trial judge based his recommendation upon his finding

that the defendant agreed to surrender principally because

he was made to believe by the authorities "that he would

be paroled." In the words of the decision of the lower

court, "if the Constabulary officers concerned did not promise any condition to Kamlon for his surrender, said

officers deliberately misled the negotiator Arolas Tulawie

and Kamlon into believing that Kamlon's parole would be

respected or be enforced after all outlaws had surrendered. In one word, the officers concerned dealt with

Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon in double talk. They were

not frank."

The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction

upon the following factual findings:

One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein defendant, together with two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they suspected were responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The search ended when the defendant and his companions chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul in the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening to kill unless Ajibun and Ailing went with them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that time, Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his captives the reason for their abduction, and, although Ajibun and Ailing disavowed any knowledge or responsibility for the disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their protestations of innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.

Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Ailing were detained overnight. The following day, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the

afternoon, they were brought to the market place and, in a

store, they were made to sit on chairs, one beside the other.

On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to

the roof by Ulluh. Thus seated and with their hands tied

to the roof, Kamlon leveled his automatic carbine at Jamalul Ailing and fired, killing him instantly. Kamlon then

ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead man whereupon

Ulluh, with a barong or native bolo, did as he was bidden.

Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed

head to his vinta by the shore and paddled out far into

the sea. When he returned, he no longer had with him his

gruesome load.

Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from

the fate he imposed on Jamalul Alling. Instead, Ajibun

was conducted back to Kamlon's house where he was "tried" by Kamlon for his alleged participation in the

disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must

have caused Kamlon to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at

its end, he was merely told to raise the sum of P105.00 as

fine and thereafter he was set free.

The account of Alling's murder as above established by

the trial court was denied, disavowed and disputed by the

defendant. He offered an entirely different version of the killing. According to Kamlon, the deceased was shot to

death, not by him, but by some relatives of a woman who,

on that occasion, Jamalul Ailing and Hatib Ajibun were

attempting to abduct.

The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Ailing

was sought to be established by two sisters, Bariha Imam

Habilul and Muhayla Imam Habilul, who testified that

one day they went to take a bath at a watering place some

100 brazas from where they were living. While washing

their clothes at the same place and gathering water in

bamboo tubes, Bariha suddenly heard Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better run away. I am being embraced and held

by Ajibun and Jamalul." Muhayla made the outcry because Jamalul and Ajibun who emerged from the nearby

bushes suddenly took hold of the hands of Muhayla and

pulled her towards the eastern part of the place, a sitio

called Buhangin Mahaba. Upon hearing the scream of

Muhayla, Bariha ran away but was able to see Ajibun

and Jamalul holding the hands of Muhayla.

Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who

came to her succor were her uncle, Adu, and some other

men-folk of the village, Biteng, Tanji and Uttung, who

forthwith armed themselves with guns and went after

Ajibun and Jamalul.

Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun

tried to force Muhayla into a vinta. Ajibun went inside

the vinta and pulled the hands of Muhayla as Jamalul

pushed her into the craft in an effort to place her on

board. Muhayla, however, succeeded in frustrating their

efforts by pushing the vinta, and while being engaged in

this struggle, she heard her uncle Adu yell: "Muhayla,

duck." Muhayla ducked by dropping herself on the sea,

face downwards, and as her body hit the shallow water,

she heard bursts of gunfire coming from the place where

Adu had given out his order.

After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The

burst of fire hit Jamalul who fell on the water almost

falling on Muhayla. Ajibun was fired upon, but he was

able to paddle himself away out to the sea.

We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting

the version accepted by the trial court. While the defendant had indeed insisted that the prosecution version

was false and untrue, he has failed to demonstrate to this

Tribunal exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence

such fallacy and untruth obtain. This case has resolved

itself into a question of who among the witnesses at the

trial were telling the truth. We can hardly hold ourselves

in a better position to answer that than the trial judge

who had his five physical senses to aid him reach the

fair, correct and just conclusion. While We have merely

the records to guide Us by, the trial judge saw the witnesses, heard them speak, watched them move. He was,

therefore, in the far advantageous position of being able

to discriminate more competently than Us the prevaricators

among the witnesses from those who testified the truth.

Consequently, as the evidence on record sufficiently attest

to the findings of the lower court, We shall not disturb the

same.

The defendants contend that the length of time which

intervened between the actual commission of the crime

charged and the filing of the same in the trial court—a

period of 21 months—attests to the unreliability of the

prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who

testified for the government did actually witness the defendant commit the murder, they would have forthwith

reported the incident to the authorities and this case would

have been filed sooner. It is vigorously impressed on Us

that the delay betrays the truthfulness of the case for

the prosecution.

We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last

point raised. Although it is true that undue delay in the prosecution of criminal actions speaks of the suspicious

veracity of the state's claim, the same observation cannot

be made where the delay or inaction, long though it may

be, was imposed on the government by causes over which

it has no control. In the premises and as explained by the

Solicitor General's Office, "the incident took place 15

days before the last military operations against Kamlon. People in the area affected were in the grip of fear and

felt no other concern than for their personal safety. The

witnesses could have preferred to remain in silence of

what they knew against Kamlon in the hope, however,

that with the military operations about to be set afoot,

retributive justice would catch up with Kamlon and his

henchmen that they might perish in the battle."

The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers

to the view of the defendant that, by the doctrine enunciated in the cases of People vs. Hernandez, et al., 52 Off.

Gaz., 5506 and People vs. Geronimo 53 Off. Gaz., No. 1,

p. 68, "the trial court erred in convicting herein accused

for kidnapping with murder in spite of the fact that said

acts of violence were committed in furtherance of sedition

and therefore absorbed in this latter crime."

There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow

this Court to uphold the defendant's claim that acts of

violence like murder and kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez and Geronimo,

supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that

legal proposition since those two cases involved the crime

of rebellion and not sedition.

Indeed, as the Court adheres to and is guided in great

measure by the rule of stare decisis, We deem ourselves

unfree at the moment to disregard our rulings in the cases

of People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 and People vs. Umali,

96 Phil., 185. In the Cabrera case, this Court held:

"It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the

same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order;

murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed

against the existence of the State, the authority of the government,

and the general public tranquility; murder is a crime directed

against the lives of individuals. (U. S. vs. Abad (1902), 1 Phil. 437). Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.

"The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and

murder are perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they

may be connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses eo nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the information are different. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The

crimes of murder and serious physical injuries were not necessarily

included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could

not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information." (Italic supplied.)

And, in the case of People vs. Umali, supra, after rejecting the government's theory that the crime committed

was rebellion complexed with multiple murder, frustrated

murder, arson and robbery, but rather sedition and the

said common crimes, We proceeded to convict the defendants therein of the said crime of sedition and the common

crimes of murder, frustrated murder etc. The dispositive

portion of this last cited case read: "In conclusion, we

find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson,

frustrated murder and physical injuries. * * *"

Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction

allows for the treatment of the common offenses of murder as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition.

In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us that the herein defendant missed a very significant point. When We held in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were absorbed by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that reason, were consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for political ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes no allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by personal vengeance."

There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of record before this Tribunal hands down its judgment on appeal. The defendant Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case at bar, had been convicted for rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 763 of the Court of First Instance of Sulu. Soon after his conviction, however, he was extended a conditional pardon by the late President Elpidio Quirino. There were four (4) conditions to the pardon, namely: (1) that Kamlon was to report monthly to the nearest constabulary or Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon would assist the authorities in the surrender of firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow himself to be visited by any authority of the Government and allow him to question him freely; and (4) that he would cooperate with the Government in the surrender and apprehension of wanted persons in Luuk.

Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon brazenly violated the same. He did not only fail to report regularly to the authorities as required; he even violently prevented legitimate government agents from visiting and questioning him. It was these lawlessness and defiance which ultimately precipitated and resulted into the various criminal prosecutions enumerated at the start of this decision, including this one on appeal.

In view of all foregoing, this Court affirms in full

the findings and judgment of the lower court. The crime

committed is kidnapping complexed with murder. We

find the death penalty as well as the idemnity in the

amount of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law and

affirm the same with costs against the defendant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal,

JJ., concur.