BRALEMAN CORPORATION as owner M/T Braleman 1 Vessel v. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY Third Division BRALEMAN CORPORATION CTA CASE NO. 12283 as owner MIT "Braleman 1" Vessel, Petitioner, Members: MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Chairperson, and -versus- FERRER-FLORES, JJ OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE Promulgated: BUREAU OF CUSTOMS (BOC), Respondent. MAY 0 R~0~ X -----------------------------------------------------------~---~'-- --tf9-=~------------------------- X RESOLUTION For the Court's resolution is petitioner' s Motion for Reconsideration, filed on March 27,2026, assailing this Cout1's February 5, 2026 Resolution,1 which dismissed the instant Petition for Review for lack ofjurisdiction.2 To recall, this Cout1 ruled that the instant Petition was filed late. Further, while petitioner had filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, the Court found that the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, as amended ("RRCTA") does not provide for such a remedy, thus preventing Us from allowing petitioner an extended period of time to file its Petition. Petitioner now contends that parties bringi ng a Petition for Review before this Cout1 can, in fact, raise motions for extension of time to file petitions. It observes that Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended (" CTA Law"), characterizes appeals before Us from rulings of the Commissioner of Customs as "analogous to that provided under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure", which allows for the extension oftime to file a petition. It further argues that Rule 42 of the Rules of Court sees suppletory application to the RRCTA, which lacks a provision on extensions of time to file petitions. The Motion lacks merit. Rollo, unpaginated. Considering that no Summons were issued to respondent, on account of the Petition' s dismissal upon its fil ing, this Court has opted to forego so liciting a comment to the instant Motion from respondent.

RE OLL'TIO~ CTA CASE 0 . 12283 Page 2 of5 In Government Service Insurance System v. Villaviza3 (" GSIS case"), which was later reaffirmed in Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp oration v. Gidwani,4 the Supreme Court explained that one set of rules sees suppletory application to a second set of rules onl y when the latter is "deficient" or " insufficient" : Petitioners primarily questi on the probative va lue acco rded to respondents' letters of explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. T he respondents never fi led their an swers to the fo rmal charges. T he petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the fo tmal charges that they fi led should have been deemed adm itted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court wh ich provides: SECTION 11. A llegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. - Materia l averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages, sha ll be deemed admitted when not specifica lly denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath. According to the petitioners, th is rule is appl icable to the case at bench pursuant to Rul e I, Section 4 of the Rules of Court w hich reads: SECTI O 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rul es shall not app ly to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalizati on and inso lvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided fo r, except by analogy or in a supplet01y character and whenever practicable and co nven ient. T he Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guide lines No. 178-04, specifically provides: If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, w hen requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to fi le an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution. A perusal of said section readi ly discloses that the failure of a respondent to fi le an answer mere ly translates to a waiver of "his right to fi le an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away w ith the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence. It is true that Section 4 of the Ru les of Court provides that the ru les can be applied in a ��suppletory character. " Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." It means that the provisions in the Rules ofCourt wiLl be made to apply only where th ere is an ins ufficiency in the applicable G.R. No. 18029 1, July 27, 2010. G.R. No. 2346 16, June 20, 20 18.

RE OLtTION CTA CASE NO. 12283 rule. Th ere is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case offailure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GS IS may ..render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecuti on.'� (Citations omitted ; Italics and emphasis supplied.) Applying the above to procedure in this Cout1, provisions of the Rules of Court can only be suppletorily applied to areas where the RRCTA is "deficient" or " insufficient." A similar discussion can be found in De Manguerra v. Risos5 ("De Manguerra") , where the Supreme Court refused to suppletorily apply a provision from the Rules ofCivil Procedure in a criminal case as the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure already had a relevant provision governing the situation at issue: Rule 11 9 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners' contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretati on. There is only room for application. Petitioners fut1her insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases. It is true that Section 3, Rule I of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civi l or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Crimina l Procedure. Considering tha t Rule 11 9 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. (Citations omitted; italics supplied.) Transposed to the current context, if the RRCTA already has a rule governing a specific situation, then there is no need to suppletorily apply the equivalent rule from the general Rules ofCourt. The above show why petitioner's argument regarding the suppletmy application of the Rules of Court is untenable. Rule 8, Section 3(a) of the RRCTA already governs the prescriptive period for filing a Petition for Review before this Court from the adverse ruling of the Commissioner of Customs, providing 30 days, and nothing more, for such. Indeed, this is taken from G.R. No. 152643 , Aug ust 28, 2008.

RESOLL"TJON CTA CASE 0 . 12283 Section 11 of the CTA Law, which provides for the 30-day period twice. Hence, it cannot be said that the RRCTA is "deficient" or " insufficient" when it comes to laying down a period for filing a Petition for Review. It cannot be said that the RRCTA lacks an applicable rule, since it already has Rule 8, Section 3{a). There is consequently no need or cogent reason to suppletorily apply any equivalent rule from the Rules ofCourt. Petitioner's position seems to be based on the fact that the RRCTA has no provision on the extension of time to file petitions from rulings of the Commissioner of Customs. It lacks a provision on such extensions. Yet such lack does not necessarily render the RRCTA "deficient" or " insufficient." It does not render the RRCTA silent on the prescriptive period for filing petitions, as Rule 8, Section 3(a). It simply means that such extensions are not allowed. In the GSIS case, the procedural rules of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") was not rendered "deficient" or "insufficient" because it lacked a provision which makes allegations not denied in an Answer deemed admitted, a provision present in the general Rules ofCourt. It simply meant that allegations not explicitly denied are not deemed admitted in cases governed by the GSIS' rules. In De Manguerra, the lack in Rule 119 ofthe Rules of Criminal Procedure of a provision allowing the use of depositions for witnesses too sick or infirm to appear in court does not render said rules "deficient" or " insufficient." It simply means that a party cannot resort to the use ofdepositions in criminal cases where a witness is too sick or infirm to appear in court, especially as said rule already allows for the conditional examination of such witnesses. Following these, the RRCTA 'slack of a provision on extensions oftime to file petitions does not render it "deficient" or "insufficient." It simply means that such extensions are not allowed. The same would be true even in light of the CTA Law characterizing appeals from rulings of the Commissioner of Customs as "analogous" to appeals raised under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Notably, said rule gives parties 15 days to file an appeal, while allowing an extension of no more than another 15 days. In total, then, and only when an extension is granted, a party has 30 days to file its appeal. Under the CTA Law and Rule 8, Section 3(a) ofthe RRCTA, the full30- day period is given immediately.Jt is as ifthe extension is already granted by default. Thus, to reiterate, there is no need to suppletorily apply Rule 42's provision on extensions. Pat1ies are already given an ample and extended period to file their petitions, a period longer by default than that of Rule 42.

RESOLL'TIO:'\ CTA CASE NO. 12283 Page 5 of5 As the provision on extensions of time provided by Rule 42 ofthe Rules of Court is not suppletori ly applicable here, the Court sees no etTor in Our finding that petitioner' s Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review was not allowed by the RRCTA. By extension, We remain unconvinced that petitioner filed its Petition on time. We thus stand by Our ruling that We lack jurisdiction over this case and must deny the admission of petitioner' s appeal. FOR THESE REASONS, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on March 27, 2026, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution, dated February 5, 2026, is AFFIRMED . SO ORDERED.