PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO A. PAZCOGUIN and RODELITO M. BIAG

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY SECOND DIVISION **************** PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CTA CRIM. CASE NO. 0 - 222 Plaintiff, For: Violation ofSec. 3601 of the - versu s - of the TCCP in relation to Executive Order 156 REYNALDO A. PAZCOGUIN, RODELITO M. BIAG , Members : Accused . CASTANEDA, JR., Chairperson CASANOVA, and MINDARO-GRULLA, JJ. Promulgated: MAY 1 6 2012 / x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RESOLUTION This resolves accused Rodelito M. Biag's Motion to Dismiss fi led on March 27, 2012, with plaintiff's Joint Comment/Opposition (To the Accused' Motion to Dismiss) filed on April 2, 2012. Accused Biag alleges that more than five (5) months have elapsed since the Court acquired jurisdiction over his person and he still had not been brought for arraignment due to the inordinate failure of the prosecution to appear despite due notice. He claims that this case was reset four (4) times already or on October 26, 2011, January 18, 2012, February 15, 2012 and March 14, 2012 for failure of the public prosecutor to appear on the said schedu led date of arraignment. Thus, accused Biag submits that it is high time that his rights be now upheld and recognized, which has been grossly violated and prejudiced by the inveterate

RESOLUTION CTA CRIM . CASE NO . 0 -222 absence of the prosecution to appear on four (4) successive hea ring dates thereby causing unreasonable delay in its disposition . To support his allegation, Accused Biag cited Rule 116, Section 1(g) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures, Republic Act No . 8493, otherwise known as th e "Speedy Trial Act of 1998" and Supreme Court Circular No . 38-98, in conjunction with the constitutional right of the accused to du e process and to speedy disposition of case. In vi ew th ereof, accused Biag now prays that the case against him be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute . On th e other hand, the public prosecutor strongly and vigorously opposes accused Motion arguing that there were no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify the dismissa l of the case. The prosecution explains that a rec ent structural reorganization at the Department of Justice, National Prosecution Service (NPS) Task Force on Anti -Smuggling occurred which led to the replacement of one of its members Assista nt State Prosecutor Micha el A. Vito Cruz, the supposed handling trial prosecutor of the case; and that th ere was temporary hiatus on the trial prosecutor who will continuously handle the active prosecution of the ca se due to pressures of work and heavy volumes of assignment at the NPS. To this the prosecution deeply apologizes . The prosec ution also attached to its Joint Comment/Opposition Office Ord er No . 246 dated March 26, 2012 designating Assi stant State Prosecutor Ramon Chito R. Men doza as the handling trial prosecutor of the case in li eu of Assistant State Prosecutor Micha el A. Vito Cruz. The prosecution further avers that even assuming for th e sake of argument that there was "delay" in the proceedings, accused Biag does not appear to have

RESOLUTION CTA CRIM . CASE NO . 0 -222 been unduly and excessively prejudice since he was never incarcerated in vi ew of the fact that he had posed bai l. Lastly, th e prosec ution points out that the participation of the accused in the protracted proceeding such as his filing of a Motion to Suspend Proceedings also contributed in the delay . Accord ing to the prosecution, the accused is not entirely faultles s. In the ca se of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan1, the Supreme Court ex pound ed on th e con stitutional right of an accused to speedy trial and speedy disposition of a case, the pertin ent portion of which read s: It cannot be overstressed that the accused in all criminal prosecution s are entitl ed to due process as much as the prosec ution. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, we held that substantial adherence to the requirem ents of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantia l compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by th e prosecutor, is part of th e procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fund amental law . This ruling clearly appli es to rei nvestigations authorized by th e trial courts, including the Sandiganbayan . The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of th e case against him wa s designed to prevent the oppression of the ci ti ze n by holding criminal prosec ution suspend ed over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of ju stice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonabl e dispatch in the trial of criminal cases . Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification . The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be defi nitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it 1 Corpuz vs. Sandi ga nbaya n, G.R. No . 1622 14, November 11, 2004

RESOLUTION CTA CRIM . CASE NO . 0 -222 does not preclude the rig hts of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are sh ields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent. A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered : (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; a nd (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibi lity that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.2 The above-jurisprudence enumerated four factors in determining whether th e accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, namely: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Thus, the Court shall determine whether accused Biag has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial on the basis of the four factors herein stated. It should be recalled that the arraignment of accused Biag on October 26, 2011 was reset to December 11, 2011 in view of the Court's resolution granting accused Biag's Motion to Defer Further Proceedings. However, it should also be I Ibtd

RESOLUTION CfA CRIM. CASE NO. 0 -222 noted that during the hearing set on December 14, 2011, the arraignment of the accused was again postponed, now due to the prosecution's fai lure to appear on the said hearing date. Likewise, the subsequent hearings on January 18, 2012, February 15, 2012 and March 14, 201 2 set for th e arraignment of the accused were also postponed still du e to the prosecution's failure to appear on sai d hea ring dates despite notice. We order the pub lic prosecutor to explain, within fifteen days from receipt of th e February 15, 2012 Resolution, the reason for his absence during the scheduled arraignment but the Court did not receive any response from the prosecution . In its Joint Comment/Opposition, the prosecu tion finally and belated ly explained the alleged structura l reorgani zation at the Departm ent of Justice, NPS Task Force on Anti -Smugg ling and th e alleged pressures of work and heavy volum es of assignm ent at the NPS. While these reasons may justify the absence of the prosecution during the hea rings set for arraignment3, the Court has no mean s to verify the truthfulness of such allegation. Accordingly, the same shall be considered as merely se lf-serving . Moreover, the Court do not find merit in the prosecution 's contention that accused Biag does not appear to have been unduly and excessively prej ud ice given the fact that he had posted bail and that he was never incarcerated during the almost five (5) months that elapsed. 3 In the ca se of Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 109271, March 14, 2000, the Supreme Court held that whi le the petitioners in that ca se certainly have th e right to a speedy di sposition of their ca se, the structura l reorgani zation of the prosecutorial agencies, the procedural chang es brought about by the Zaldivar case as well as th e Sandiganbayan' s heavy ca se load certain ly are va li d reasons for the delay in the di spositi on of petiti oners' case. For those reason s, the delay ce rtainly ca nnot be con sid ered as vexa ti ous, ca pri ciou s and oppressive. Neither is it unreasonable nor inordinate.

RESOLUTION CTA CRIM . CASE NO. 0 -222 To re-echo the ruling of the Supreme Court, prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, one of which is to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial . In fact, the Supreme Court stated that even if the accused is not imprisoned, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy . 1 In view of all the foregoing, the Court is convinced that there was unreasonable delay in the proceedings of this case . Thus, accused Biag's constitutional right to speedy trial was indeed violated. WHEREFORE , the instant Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED . Accordingly, the case against accused RODELITO M. BIAG is hereby DISMISSED . SO ORDERED . ikrilltc.~A~n;r. � Associate Justice CAESAR A. CASANOVA ~ N. ~�~- C..-JL Associate Justice CIEUTO N. MINDARO- GRULLA Associate Justice 1 Note 2, supra.