LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY FIRST DIVISION LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED CTA Case No. 10163 MINING COMPANY, Petitioner, Members: -versus- DEL ROSARIO, P.J., Chairperson, FABON-VICTORINO, and MANAHAN, JJ. COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated: INTERNAL REVENUE, NO" � �~{ _9;)3 .,_ Respon~~~t~ ____" ___ ~- ______ _x X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RESOLU On September 27, 20 19, the Court dismissed the Petition for Review for lack ofjurisdiction. On October 23, 2019, p etitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court's Resolution dated 27 September 2019), praying that the Resolution dated September 27, 2019 be reversed and set aside. Petitioner states that its Petition for Review was timely filed under Section 112(C) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963. Petitioner states that on August 9, 2019, it received a copy of the letter denying its claim for refund, thus, the Petition for Review was timely filed on September 9, 2019. We disagr ee and reiterate our findings in the assailed Resolution, to wit: Petitioner states that it filed its administrative claims on February 1, 2 01 3 and August 1, 201 31 with the One Stop Shop Inter -Agen cy Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Dep a rtment of Finance (DOF- OSS). Petitioner also states that it submitted the I Docket, PFR, p. 2. a-

RESOLUTION CTA CASE No. 10163 complete required documents in support of its application on the same dates.2 Counting 120 days from February 1, 2013 and August 1, 2013, the CIR had until June 1, 2013 and November 29, 2013 within which to act on petitioner's claim for refund. Considering that respondent CIR/DOF- OSS failed to act thereon within the 120-day period, petitioner had thirty (30) days after the lapse of the 120- day period or until July 1, 2013 and December 29, 2013 within which to file its judicial appeals before this Court. It should be noted that a denial of the claim of refund made after the 120+30 day period is not considered in counting the period for judicial appeal. This is because the inaction of the CIR during the 120-day period is "deemed a denial", and without a timely appeal, said inaction which is "deemed a denial" becomes final and unappealable. 3 Here, petitioner's Petition for Review was filed only on September 9, 2019, clearly, several years after the lapse of the 120+30 day period to file a judicial claim. The receipt of the denial dated July 30, 2019 of the claim for refund on August 9, 20 19, which is after the 120-day period is inconsequential, even with the effectivity of the TRAIN law. It should be noted that the "deemed a denial" became final long before the TRAIN law became effective on January 1, 2018. Petitioner's reliance on Revenue Regulations No. 1-20174 is misplaced. Nothing therein modified the periods to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as it merely stated the respective jurisdictions of the CTA and the BIR in evaluating claims for refund. WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court's Resolution dated 27 September 2019) is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Presiding Justice 2 Docket, PFR, p . 2. 3 Chemrez, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA EB No. 1448, May 30, 2016 . 4 Prescribing the Regulations Governing Applications for Value-Added Tax (VAT) Credit/Refund Filed under Section 112 of the Tax Code, as Amended, Prior to Revenue Memora ndum Circ ular No. 54 -20 14 da ted June 11 , 2 014.-

RESOLUTION I ,-. CTA CASE No. 10 163 {'~ / - CATHERINE T . MANAHAN ciate Justice Associate Justice