cta_resolution CTA Case No. 134134 1955-06-24

CTA Case No. 134 (Resolution)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS MANILA RE: PRarEST AGAINST ARBITRARY C.T.A. CASE NO. 134 lEVY OF D1PORT DUTIES ON GOODS COVERED BY ENTRY NO. 1304-C. YU TIONG & COMPANY, Petitioner, -versus - COMMJS SI: ONER CF CUSTO:M.S, Respondent, x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RESOLUTION This is in connection with the 11Motion to Dismiss" - filed on iune 2, 1955, Py counsel for respondent Commis- sioner of Customs, on the ground that the appeal or peti- tion for review of the decision of the latter was filed b,y the petitioner before this Court beyond the 30-day period prescribed by Republic Act No. 1125. It appears from the records of this case that on April 2, 1955, the petitioner Yu Tiong & Company received a copy of the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs in Customs Protest No. 31, Port of Cebu entitled 11Re Protest Against Arbitrary Levy of Import Duties on Goods Covered by Entry No. 1304-C, Yu Tiong & Company, Protestant-Appellant." On April 21, 1955, the petitioner, not being satisfied with the said decision, sent to this Court by registered mail from Cebu its notice of appeal. On May 16, 1955, the petitioner through counsel sent to this Court by registered mail from Cebu its petition for review of the decision of respondent Commissioner of Customs

RESOLUTION - C.T.A. CASE NO. 134 - 2- in Customs Protest No. 31 Port of Cebu. The said petition for review containing an assignment of errors allegedly com- mitted by the respondent bears the title of 11Appeal" � From the facts above stated which are uncontrovertible/ it can readily be seen therefore that the notice of appeal of the petitioner was actually filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the d~cision of the respondent Commissioner of Customs subject of the present appeal, but the petition for review or "Appeal" as petitioner's counsel denominates it, was submitted to this Court beyond the 30-day period prescribed by section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125. The only question to be resolved in this incident is, therefore, whether or not the "Notice of Appeal" which was filed by the petitioner on April 21, 1955, was a sufficient compliance of the requirement of section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 limit~g the period of appeal by the person, associa- tion or corporation adversely affected by a decision of the Commissioner of Customs to thirty (30) days from receipt of such decision. Counsel for the respondent contends that it is the pe- tition for review that should have been filed by petitioner with this Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of res- pendent's decision and that a mere notice of appeal cannot stop the period of thirty (30) days after which the decisi0n of respondent may become final and executory. Counsel fur- ther contends that a mere notice of appeal does not specif,y the findings and conclusions contained in respondent's deci- sion that are allegedly contrary to the evidence and law. Counsel concludes by saying that since the petition for re-

RESOLUTION - C.T.A. CASE NO. 134 - 3- view or 11Appeal11 of petitioner's counsel as filed beyond the 30-day period fixed b.1 section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, this Court l�cks jurisdiction to hear and decide the present case. We have carefully considered the contention of res- pondent's counsel, and are of the opinion that it is meri- torious. Pursuant to section 8 of Republic Act No. 1125, this Court, by i t s resolution of July 21, 1954, adopted in the interim for the guidance and observance of party liti- gants, the Rules and Regulations dated February 7, 1952 of the defunct Board of Tax Appeals. Rule 9 of the said Rules and Regulations provides as follows: 11\-lithin thirty (30) days from notice of an order or decision issued by the Collector of In- ternal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, or Provincial or City Board of Assessment Appeals in the cases enumerated in Section 8 of Executive Order No . 4 01- A, the aggrieved party may file with the Board of Tax Appeals (Court of Tax Ap- peals) a written petition for the review of such order or decision." (Underscoring supplied) ( Conformably to the above-quoted rule, we hold that pe- titioner Yu Tiong & Company failed to perfect its appeal with- ~ the time prescribed b,y section 11 af Republic Act No . 1125. The petitioner should have filed, not only its notice of ap- peal, but also its petition for review, within thirty (30) days tfter it received a copy of the decision of the Commis- sioner of Customs, or more particularly, on or before �~ 2, 1955. After May 2, 1955, the decision of respondent Commis- sioner of Customs became final and executory, and therefore not appealable. Moreover, after the lapse of the 30-day period fixed in section 11 of Republic Act No . 1125 from

RESOLUTION - C.T .A. CASE NO. 134 -4- the date of receipt of the questioned decision or ruling, this Court automatically losses jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue , Com- missioner of Customs and the Provincial or City Boards of Assessment ppeals. ) As in other civil cases and special proceedings , when the law provides a certain period within which the aggrieved party may appeal, it is to be understood that all the neces- sary acts for the perfection of such appeal would be done by the appellant within the period given such as the filing of the notice of appeal, the record on appeal itself and the appeal bond. As was decided by the Supreme Court in Salva vs. Judge Palacio et al, S.C. G. R. No. Ir-4247, January 30, 1952, 11!'ailure to file the appeal bond within the reglementary period is fatal, although the notice of appeal and the record on appeal may have been filed within such period." It has been held that the filing of a record on appeal on time necessarily im- plies the filing of a notice of appeal and is equivalent thereto (Lopez vs. IDpez, 43 O.G. 2040; Pablo vs. Enage et al, 53 Phil. 328, 330; Luengo vs. Herrero 17 Phil. 29), the reason being that the act of perfecting an appeal is more expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of notice to do so (Peralta vs. Solon 43 O.G. No. 12, PP� 5050). 1 Moreover, if we adopt a contrary rule, and consider the filing of the mere notice of appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision appealed from as a sufficient compliance of section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, without requiring the filing of the petition for review within the same period of time, a glaringly absurd consequence would ~7

RESOLUTION - C. T. A. CASE NO. 134 - 5- result. The aggrieved party, by the simple expedient o� filing only the notice of appeal within thirty days from recei pt of the decision, can arrogaP.e to himself the power to determine the period of time for filing the petition for review which may be one year, two years or any number of years. In fact , if such aggrieved party, after �iling the notice of appeal, decides not to file the petition for review, the decision which is the subject of the notice of appeal will never become final and executory.~ WHEREFORE, finding the rtMotion to Dismiss11 of counsel for respondent well- �ounded and meritorious , the same is hereby granted. Let this case be , as it is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. 80 ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, June 24, 1955. ~~ MARIANO NABIE Pr esiding Judge

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