COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. GRAND GEO SPHERES CONSTRUCTION CORP.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY En Bane COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL CTA EB NO. 2778 REVENUE, (CTA Case N o. 10207) Pet itioner , Present: -versus- DEL ROSARIO, P.J., RINGPIS-LIBAN, MANAHAN, BACORRO-VILLENA, MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, REYES-FAJARDO, CUI-DAVID, FERRER-FLORES, and ANGELES,JJ GRAND GEO SPHERES Promulgated: CONSTRUCTION CORP., JUL 12 202~ Respondent. X ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - ---------------- X DECISION MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a Petition for Review' ("Petition") filed by petitioner Commissioner oflnternal Revenue ("CIR") on July 27, 2023, with respondent Grand Geo Spheres Construction Corp.'s Comment (To Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue's Petition for Rev iew dated 25 July 2023)2 ("Comment"), fi led on October 16, 2023 . Petitioner seeks the nullification of the Decision,3 dated February 6, 2023 ("assailed Decision") and Resolution,'' dated June 19, 2023 ("assailed Resolution"), both rendered by the f irst Division of the Court of Tax Appeals ("Court in Division"), which granted respondent's Petition for Review and declarecy Rollo, pp. 6-25 . 2 /d.at 58-79. !d. at 26-46. 4 !d. at 47-50.

DECISIO:\ CTi\ �8 No. '2778 (CT/\ Case 1\o. I0::07J Page 2 or !3 the subject income tax ("IT") and value-added tax ("VAT'') assessments for calendar year 2010 void. The Parties Petitioner is the duly appointed CIR and is empowered to perform the duties of said office, including the power to decide on disputed assessments, claims for refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees, or charges, or penalties imposed in relation thereto, and other duties as provided by law.5 Respondent, meanwhile, is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and engaged in the construction of roads and bridges, flood control, river basins, dams and irrigation systems, water supplies, buildings, and other forms of infrastructurc.6 The Facts On November 29, 2011, a Letter Notice ("LN") was issued, alleging that respondent had underdeclared sales for calendar year ("CY") 2010, based on a discrepancy between the sales declared by respondent in its tax return and the purchases of MTD Construction (Philippines) Inc. ("MTIY') from respondent, as declared by MTD.7 Then, on January 19, 2012, Jonas D.P. Amora, OIC-Regional Director, Quezon City, issued a Letter of Authority ("LOA") for the audit and examination of respondent's records, along with a First Request for Presentation of Records. Revenue Officer ("RO") Melirose Trazona later issued a Second Request on February 21, 2012, followed by a Final Request for Presentation of Records on May 24,2012.8 Acting on the above, respondent submitted vanous records to respondent through a letter, dated June 4, 2012 9 Various notices were then issued against respondent: a Notice of Informal Conference on April 22, 2013; a Preliminary Assessment Notice ("PAN") on May 7, 2019; and a Formal Letter of Demand with Details of Discrepancy and Final Assessment Notices ("FAN") on June 10, 20 19j:1 See Decision, dated February 6, 2023. p. 2, id. at 27. See Decision, dated February 6. 2023, p. 1-2. id at 16-27. See Decision, dated February 6, 2023. p. 2. id at 27. !d. 9 See Decision. dated February 6. 2023. pp. 2-3. id at 27-28. 10 See Decision. dated February 6. 2023. p. 3. id at 28.

OECISIO'i CT A EB No_ 2778 {CT.t\ Cb~ No. 10207) Page J of 13 On October 7, 2019, respondent received a second LN demanding payment of alleged deficiency IT and VAT. This prompted respondent to file a Petition for Review before the Court in Division on November 6, 2019, with petitioner filing his Answer thereto on January 3, 2020. 11 After a full-blown trial, 12 the CoUli in Division granted respondent's Petition for Review through the assailed Decision on February 6, 2023. Petitioner then sought the reversal of the assailed Decision through a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 filed on March 1, 2023, but the same was denied in the assailed Resolution on June 19, 2023. Aggrieved, but unable to file a full Petition 15 days from his receipt of the assailed Resolution, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review 11 on July 10, 2023. The Court l~�n Bane granted said Motion via a Minute Resolution 15 on July 11,2023. Thus, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on July 27, 2023. After the filing of respondent's Comment 16 on October 16, 2023, the Court referred the case to mediation via a Minute Rcsolution 17 on October 23, 2023, but the parties decided to not have their case mediatcd. 1xThe Petition was consequently submitted for decision through a Minute Resolution 1 ~ on March 27, 2024. Hence, this Decision. The ;lssiac~ ned F~rrors Petitioner assigns the following errors to the assailed issuances of the CoUli in Division:20 (a) The Court in Division erred in declaring the subject assessments void for being violative or respondent's right to due process; (b) The Court in Division erred in ruling that the subject assessments lacked factual and legal basis; and (c) The CoUli in Division erred in finding that the subject assessments are barred by prcscription9- II fd. 12 See Decision. dated February 6. 2023. pp. 3-4. id. at 28-29. 1 ~ Division Records, pp. 436-4..J.6. " Rollo, pp. 1-4. 15 /d. at 5. "' !d. at 58-79. 17 /d. at 80. 1 ~ See PMC-CTA Form 6 ~No Agreement to Mediate. elated March 6. =:014. id. at 81. 19 lei. at 82. 10 Sue Petition for Revie,,-_ p 5. id at l0.

IJE(ISIO'\ CTA f~H No. 2778 (CTA Ca~e No 10207! lhe Arguments Petitioner raises the following arguments: (a) Petitioner sent the PAN and FANs through registered mail, a valid mode of serving such assessment notices, and did not receive any indication that respondent did not receive these, so said service was neither illegal nor erroneous; (b) The assessment has legal and factual bases, of which respondent was sufficiently apprised, as the same was based on sales to MTD that respondent did not declare on its tax return; and (c) The extended I 0-year period for assessments is applicable here as (i) respondent substantially undcrdeclarcd its sales; and (ii) it did not inform petitioner of any change of address or closure of business. Respondent opposes the above with the following contentions: (a) Petitioner's arguments arc a mere rehash of those raised before and already refuted by the Court in Division; (b) Petitioner failed to prove that respondent actually received the PAN and FANs; (c) Petitioner likewise !"ailed to comply with the requirements laid down in Revenue Memorandum Order ("RMO") Nos. 30-2003 & 46-2004; (d) As the assessment was based on a mere presumption, petitioner's insistence on using the extended I 0-year period for assessments is unjustified; (e) Even without a notice of change of address or closure of business, respondent could be reached through its board of directors, barring the suspension of the running ofthc statute of limitations; and (f) Petitioner cannot collect an amount from petitioner based on a void assessment. The Ruling ofthe Court The Petition for Review is bereft of merit. The Court En Bane has jurisdiction over the instant Petitionj(Jr Review Under Rule 4, Section (2)(a)( I) o. fthe Revised Rules o. fthe Court of Tax Appeals, as amended ("RRCTA"), the Cmn1 F.n Bane has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration promulgated by the Court in Division in cases arising from tbe Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BJR");y

DECISIO:\ CTA U3 No_ 2778 (CT1\ C1s~ Nu. 10207) Pagc5ofl3 SEC. 2. Cases within lhejurisdiclion o(lhe Courl en hanc. �-- The Court en bane shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following: (a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over: (1) Cases arising from administrative agencies Bureau of Internal Revenue. Bureau of Customs. Department of Finance. Department of Trade and Industry. Department of Agriculture: Meanwhile, under Rule 8, Section 3(b) ol the RRCTA, patiies seeking to protest such a decision or resolution of the Court in Division must file a petition for review before the Court En Bane within 15 days Ji�mn receipt of said issuance. Respondent filed its Petition for Review before the Court in Division to assail the assessment made against it by petitioner, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 21 The case bei(Jre the Court in Division thus arose from said administrative agency. Meanwhile, petitioner received the assailed Resolution on June 27, 2023.22 He then filed a Motion l(Jr Extension oC Time to File Petition for Review"' on July I 0, 2023, within the 15-day period mentioned above. The same was granted by the Comi En Bane via a Minute Resolution/' dated July II, 2023, which gave petitioner until July 27, 2023 within which to file his petition. As he filed his Petition for Review on July 27, 2023, he timely filed his appeal to the Court in Division's ruling. This Court En Bane thus has jurisdiction over the case at bar. Petitioner's assessment has j"actua! basis as an assessment based on third- party information does not require confirmation ifthe findings per ioN ore not refilted or protested Respondent has consistently insisted bei(Jre the Couti in Division and the Court En Bane that the assessment against it lacks any factual basis.25 It argues that Revenue Memorandum Order ("RMO") Nos. 30-03 & 46-04 require respondent to verify third-party information used in assessments made through the BIR's RELIEF system with said third parties. As petitioner based his detlciency assessment on purchases declared by MTD but did not confirm said findings with MTD, the� 21 See Petition for Review. filed November 6. 1019. p. 11. Division Records. p. 18. 22 See Notice of Resolution. dated June 22. 2023. iJ at '-' 72. D Rolla, pp. 1-4. 24 !d. at 5. 25 See Comment, pp. 9-15. id. nt 66- TJ.: ~�ee also Me111orandum. pp. 25-29. Division Docket pp. 400-404.

DECISIO:\ CTA ER No. 2778 (lTA Cas-: No_ 10207) assessment included in the first LN is void. This position was adopted by the Court in Division, who thus declared the assessment to be without factual basis.26 The Court En Bane, however, disagrees. The first relevant proviSion here is Section E(3}(B)(B.3)(a.2) of Revenue Memorandum Order No. 30-03, which states: E. At the RDO/LTDO/LTAID At the TFD lor ��Preprocessed�� RELIEF DATA 3. Determine appropriate action on the LNs issued to taxpayers with RELIEF data discrepancy B. If there is no existing audit case. serve the LN to the concerned taxpayers within live (5) clays ti"om receipt thereof 8.3. !/the taxpayer is refitting the accuracy olthejigures in the LN. together with the DTCS a. Validate the ligures against the VAT/Income Tax returns, etc. tiled by the taxpayers. a.l If the discrepancy is a result of erroneous encoding. update the ITS data and submit report to AITEID for the latter to validate the same in the ns. a.2 If the discrepancy is on the data submitted by a third party. forward the LN to the SCG for confirmation of the figures from the TPI source by sending a �'Confirmation Request" (CR) Annex "C..). The conlirmation by the TPI source should be embodied in a �'Confirmation Certificate"(CC) (Annexes ��G.. & G-1") After the receipt of the "Confirmation Certificate'', the LN, together with the CR. shall be retransmitted to the RDO/LTDO/L TAID by the SCG with an instruction as to the next course of action to take. If there is no response on the CR. the SCG shall recommend appropriate action on the case. (Emphasis supplied)J/ 16 See Decision. dated February 6. 2023. pp. 1'1-17. Rullo. pp. 39-42.

DECISIO\ CTA L/3 Nll. '2778 (CT/\ Case No. I0207) Pag~ 7 or 13 The second relevant provision is Section Ill of RMO No. 46-04, a specific p01iion of which states: Action on Protested LNs due lo TPJ discrepancy The Revenue Officer assigned to handle the Letter Notice shall: J0 . Obtain Sworn Statements li�om TPI sources (Annexes "B" and "C") attesting to the veracity of the data provided (Emphasis in original) Consistent with respondent's interpretation, the above provisions require petitioner to verifY the third-party information he uses in his assessments by, for example, sending Confirmation Requests to the third parties involved, creating Confirmation Certificates using the confirmation of said third pa1iies, and/or obtaining sworn statements from these third-party sources. This would imply that petitioner should have solicited statements and other forms of confirmation from MTD. Note, however, that the requirement in RMO No. 30-03 is preceded by a conditional: "[i.Jfthe taxpayer is refuting the accuracy of the figures in the LN." Note also that the equivalent requirement in RMO No. 46-04 falls under the heading "Action on Protested LNs due to TPI discrepancy," a heading conveniently excluded by respondent when quoting said issuance in its Memorandum before the CoUli in Division and in its Comment before the Court /:'n Bane. Given the foregoing, verification by a third party is required only when two conditions concurrently obtain: (a) When the assessment is based on third-pmiy information; and (b) When the assessed taxpayer refittes or protests the part ofthe LN based on third-party information. The first condition is present here, as petitioner based his assessment on MTD's declared purchases from respondent. The second condition, however, is not. Respondent never alleged to have protested the first LN, which contained the assessment based on MTD's purchases, and certainly never presented any proof of such. Indeed, its version of events begins with its 2019 receipt of the second LN, remaining silent on the events before that.n Its only responses to the assessment in general were to (a) submit documents requested by the BIR; and (b) file a Petition for Review before the Court in Division. Neither of these can be considered refutingv n See Petition for Revie\',-. pp. 3-4. Division Records. pp. 9-10: see also Judicial Affidavit of Veronica M. Bautista. id. at 102-105.

OECISIO'\ ClA EB No. 2778 (CT/\ Case No_ I0207) or protesting the assessment contained in the first LN. The submission of the documents was made in connection with the LOA,28 not in suppmi of a protest respondent never raised. The Petition for Review, meanwhile, is a judicial protest of the second LN, not an administrative protest of the first, and cannot retroactively require petitioner to have verified the third-party information he used nearly a decade pnor. The above is consistent with petitioner's claim, uncontroverted by respondent, that he issued a Follow-up Letter after issuing the first LN. This is in line with Section E(3)(B)(B.4) of RMO No. 30-03, which requires a follow-up letter to be issued when a taxpayer fails to respond to the LN. The situation covered by subsection B.4, however, is distinct from that covered by subsection B.3. This implies that petitioner never received any form of protest against the first LN and that respondent simply failed to reply to it. Given that respondent never actually protested the first LN, petitioner was never actually required to verify his third-party information with MTD. His use of such third-party information was considered unrefuted and in no need ofverifieation. Consequently, his assessment against respondent cannot be declared void for being based on unverified presumptions, as it was based on uncontroverted facts. Unfortunately for petitioner, the above cannot correct the procedural lapses in his assessment against respondent. In particular, it cannot negate his violation of respondent's right to due process by not ensuring that respondent actually received his issuances. Respondent did not rece1ve the PllN and rANs, in violation of" its right to due process As found by the Court in Division, respondent did not receive the PAN or FANs. Such non-receipt renders an assessment void, as repeatedly held by the Supreme Comi in cases such as Commissioner of Internal R<?venue v. Reyes,l'J Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Metro Star Superama,311 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Unioil Co1poration;; 1 and Commissioner ofinternal Revenue v. Next Mobile, Inc.,32 among others. This is consistent with the Supreme Couti's "[declaring] void any assessment that [fails] to strictly comply with the due process requirements set forth in Section 228 o(the Tax Code and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99.';)1 2 ~ See Judicial Affidavit Melirose R. Trazona, p. 8. id. at 114: see also Exhibit .. R-8'". id. at 129. " G.R. Nos. 159694 & 163581. January 27. :2006. '" G.R.No.I85371.Dccember8.:!010. :II G.R. No. 204405. August-~. :20:21. ~ 2 G.R. No. 232055 (Notice). April 27.2022. '-' Commissioner qj"Jnternal Renmue ,._ .-h�on Products .\ lum(/itcturing. Inc., G .R. Nos. 101398-99 & 201418-19, October 3. 2018.

DECISIO~ CTi\ F:H No. 2778 (CT.I\ C1st: No. 10207) rage 9 of IJ Significantly, the above-cited cases stress that a taxpayer must actually receive assessment notices issued against it for the service of such notices to be proper. The Supreme Court, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. T-Shuttle Services34 ("T-Shuttle Services") has even deemed registry receipts insufficient to prove a taxpayer's receipt of assessment notices when the CIR failed to show that the signatures on said receipts belonged to the taxpayer's authorized representatives. Such receipt, however, must be differentiated from the mere act of mailing or sending assessment notices. This is demonstrated, for example, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Yumex Philippines C01poration 35 There, the CIR posted a PAN via registered mail to Yumex Philippines Corporation on December 17, 20 I0 before mailing a FAN to said taxpayer on January I0, 20 II, leaving more than 15 days between each mailing. The Supreme Court still found this insufficient to comply with the 15-day grace period, provided under Revenue Regulations ("RR") No. 12- 99, between a taxpayer's receipt of a PAN and the issuance of the FAN. This finding was based on the fact that Yumex Philippines Corporation received the PAN and FAN on the same day. As such, the CIR did not issue the FAN I5 days after the taxpayer's receipt of the PAN; indeed, he issued it before said receipt. This shows that the CIR's mailing of an assessment notice, even by registered mail, cannot be equated with a taxpayer's receipt of the same. In any case, the imp01iance of actual receipt by a taxpayer stems from the very due process rights at issue here. As emphasized in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Avon Products Manufacturing, Inc. ,36 administrative due process "is anchored on fairness and equity in procedure" in that it is "satisfied if the party is properly notified of the charge against it and is given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend itsel L" IIowever, when a taxpayer does not even receive the relevant assessment notices, it is obviously not notified of such assessment. It has nothing J1�om which it can learn the details of the assessment, may not even know that said assessment exists, and is consequently deprived of the opportunity to explain or defend its case against the assessment. Logically, then, due process is not satisfied so long as the taxpayer has not actually received the relevant assessment notices. The above reveals petitioner's arguments to be in error. His mailing of the assessment notices, even via a "valid mode of service," is of secondary concern to the issue at hand. What is imp01iant here is the fact that respondent did not receive the PAN and FANs and was thus not notified at all of the assessment against it. Considering this, petitioner clearly violated respondent's right to due process. Petitioner's presentation or registry receipts is unconvincing as well. The Couti in Division already found that the said receipts did not comply with the requirements set by Section 3.1.6 of RR No. 12-99, as amended by RR No. 18-13,~ -------~-~~--- :>.! G.R. No. 240729 (Resolution). August 2--1, 2020. Js G.R. No. 2:21476. May 5. 2021. "' G.R. Nos. 201398-99 & 20 1418-19. October 3. 20 18. -' 7 See Decision, dated February 6. 2023. pp. 13-1"1, Rullo. pp. 38-39.

DECISIO'\ CTA EB No_ 2778 (CTA Case No 10207) requirements clearly included to ensure that registry receipts properly prove that the concerned taxpayer actually receives the mailed matter. Notably, petitioner did not acknowledge such finding, much less refute it. The registry receipts consequently fail to show that the assessment notices were properly served to respondent. The Comi En Bane thus sees no reason to depart from the Couti in Division's finding that petitioner violated petitioner's right to due process when he failed to ensure that petitioner actually received the PA.N and FANs. This alone would be enough to void petitioner's assessment against respondent. It is not, however, the only problem with the assessment in the case at bar. Petitioner's right to assess most of respondent's tax liabilities had prescribed when he issued his assessments Petitioner argues that the falsity in respondent's tax return justifies the use of the extended I0-year period for assessments provided by Section 222 ofthe National internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended ("NJRC') rather than the regular three- year period provided by Section 203 of said law. The Court in Division shot this argument down on account of its finding that the assessment had no factual basis, meaning that the substantial under-declaration alleged by respondent to use Section 222 lacks basis as well. However, the Court/~n Bane now finds that the assessment does, indeed, have factual basis, as discussed above. Is petitioner's invocation of the extended I 0-year period thus justified? The Comi En Bane rules in the negative. While petitioner alleges falsity on the pati of respondent's return, he neither alleges nor proves willful intent. In McDonald �s Philippines Realty Co1poration v. Commissioner ofinternal Revenue38 ("McDonald's"), the Supreme Comi En Bane declared that intentional errors, i.e. willful intent, must be proven to justify the usc of the extended 10-ycar period. As such, falsity alone is insufficient to extend the period to assess. McDonald's, however, acknowledges that the above has not always been the Supreme Comi' s position on the matter. Indeed, the High Court has occasionally ruled that substantial under-declaration is enough tojustify usc of the extended 10- year period, such as in Commissioner of internal Revenue v. Asa!us Corporation39 and Samar-! Electric Corporation v. Commissioner oflnterna! Revenue40 ("Samar- F'), to name a few cases. Given these changes in jurisprudence, the Court En Bane must look to the prevailing jurisprudence during the periods relevant to the present assessment to determine if petitioner was allowed to use the extended I 0-year period.,_. ~s G.R. No. 247737. August 8_ 2023. 10 G.R. No. 221590. Februar0� 22.2017. ' 0 G.R. No. 193100. May 10.2014.

DECISIO" CTA F.B No. 2778 (CT/\ Case No. 10207) Page ll ofl3 As found by the Court in Division, the prescriptive periods for assessing respondent's deficiency IT for the year 2010, deficiency VAT for the 1st quarter of 2010, and deficiency VAT for the 2"d quarter of 201 0 began on April I5, 2011, April 26, 2010, and July 26, 2010, respectively. 11 At the time, the prevailing jurisprudence regarding the prescriptive period to assess was Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. BF Goodrich, Phils., Inc. "12 ("Goodrich"), promulgated on February 24, 1999, which required willful intent to be proved when using the extended I0-year period. Without the presence of willful intent, then, the three-year period would apply, and the last days for petitioner to assess the deliciency taxes listed above were on April 15, 2014, April26, 2013, and July 26,2013, respectively. Goodrich was the prevailingjurisprudence for over a decade before any of the prescriptive periods in this case began. The necessity of proving willful intent was only ovetiurned by Samar-/ on May 10, 2014, afl.er the latest deadline of April 15, 2014. Petitioner, however, could not have predicted the future judgment of the Supreme Court in Samar-/. Even if he did, he should not have retroactively applied a judgment that had yet to be promulgated. As such, petitioner should have determined with cetiainty that willful intent was behind the falsities in respondent's tax returns before allowing himself to enjoy the extended 10-year period. The same is true of petitioner's issuance of the FANs, which he mailed to respondent on June I 0, 2019. The Supreme Court promulgated Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Inc.-13 on March 22, 2017, a case where the High Couti once again declared willful intent to be necessary for the use of the extended 10-year period. As this was the prevailing jurisprudence at the time, petitioner should have known, when he issued the FANs, that his use of the extended Hl-year period would be unjustified unless respondent had willfully falsified its tax returns. Petitioner has not alleged, much less proven, willful intent on the part of respondent, whether before the Court in Division or the Cowi F.n Bane. His reliance on the extended I 0-year period is thus unjustified. Consequently, his right to assess respondent for the relevant taxes has prescribed. Neither can petitioner hide behind Section 223 ofthe NIRC, which states that the prescriptive period for assessments is suspended "when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by Iit I in the return filed upon which a tax is being assessed or collected." The same contradicts petitioner's own position before the Court in Division and in a different argument he raises before the Comi En Banc.y 1 See Decision, dated February 6, 2023. pp. 18-19. Rollo. pp. 43--t-t. The Court in Division found that (a) the copy _. or respondent's VAT Return for the 3'd quarter of~O!O "�c1s illegible: and (b) neither party submitted a copy of or respondent's VAT Return for the 4'11 quarter ~0 I 0. Vie are thus unable to determ inc the start of the prescriptive period for assessing respondenrs deficiency VAT f'or theY" and 4111 quarters o!':ZOIO. Consequently. We shall make no pronouncement as to whether or not petitioner"s right to assess respondent's detlciency VAT for said periods has prescrihed. Said assessments. of collrSt'. arl' sti II void. on account of respondent" s non-receipt of the PAN and FANs. " G.R. No. I04171. February 14. 1999. .j~ G.R. No. 213943. March 22.2017.

CT/\ EB No. 277R (CIA Case No 10207) Page 12 or 13 Recall that petitioner mailed the I'AN and FANs to a specific address. He further argues that he received no indication that respondent did not receive the PAN and FANs mailed to said addrcss. 11 The implication here is that petitioner believed said address to be respondent's actual address, where the latter could be located. This contradicts petitioner's current position. If petitioner genuinely believed that respondent received the PAN and FANs, then he cannot be said to have been unable to locate respondent, as he was aware of(what he believed to be) respondent's actual address. On the other hand, if petitioner genuinely believed that he could not locate petitioner during the assessment period, then he should not have mailed the PAN and FANs to an address at which he knew respondent could not be located, before treating such mailing as valid service. The argument is Lhus unconvincing, belied by petitioner's previous arguments, and seemingly made in bad faith. Given that (a) the assessments for respondent's alleged deficiency IT for 20 I0, deficiency VAT for the I'1 quarter of 20 I0, and deficiency VAT for the 2m1 quarter of 2010 are simultaneously void and barred by prescription; and (b) the assessments for respondent's alleged dellcicncy VAT for the 3'" and 4111 quarters of 2010, while not conclusively barred by prescription, arc still void, the Coll!i Fn Bane sees no reason to disturb the ruling of the Court in Division. ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's Petition for Review, !!led on July 27, 2023, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision, dated February 6, 2023, and the Resolution, dated June 19, 2023, both rendered by the Court in Division in CTA Case No. 10207, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. MARIA RO WE CONCUR: (1 concur solely on gmund1�, alec on pp. 8-12.) ROMAN G. DF:L ROSARIO Presiding Justicc ~~ See Petition for Review. p. 8. Rollo. p. IJ.

DH:ISIO'\ CTA EB No. 2778 (CTA Case NP. I 0207) Page l3ofl3 ~. ~ 7 \....._____ MA. BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice ~~ '7-//UWo~-- (I concur sole~ g;'OZ~;d~ provided in pp. 8-12.) CATHERINE T. MANAHAN Associate Justice ~ 8:M t ~ . ro.;(Ar)o (I concur solely on ~unds as s9ated in pp. 8- I 2.) MARIAN IVY F. REYES-FAJARDO Associate Justice l,runitn~ LANEE S. CUI-DAVID Associate Justicc Associate Justice (I concur solely on a.tnds on pp. 8-12.) HENRYS. ANGELES Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII. Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. Presiding Justice