PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SKI CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC. CLAUDIO B. ALTURA, ALBERT ALTURA CORNELIO V. CAEDO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY En Bane PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CTA EB CRIM. NO. 139 Plaintiff-Appellant, (CTA Crim. Case No. A-17) Present: -versus- DEL ROSARIO, P.J., RINGPIS-LIBAN, SKI CONSTRUCTION GROUP, MANAHAN, INC., CLAUDIO B. ALTURA, BACORRO-VILLENA, ALBERT ALTURA, CORNELIO V. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, CAE DO, REYES-FAJARDO, CUI-DAVID, Accused-Appellee. FERRER-FLORES, and ANGELES,JJ Promulgated: AUG 14 2025 X ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- X RESOLUTION MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, J.: For the Court's resolution is plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated February 17, 2025), filed via registered mail on March 6, 2025, with accused-appellee's Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated February 17, 2025), filed via registered mail on April 7, 2025. Plaintiff-appellant assails this Court's dismissal of its Petition for Review via the Decision, dated February 17, 2025. This Court had found plaintiff-appellant to have filed its Petition late, explaining that the prescriptive period for such filing must be counted from the receipt of the questioned Resolution by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), not from receipt by the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR"). Plaintiff-appellant disagrees, f arguing that (1) the case of National Power Corporation v. National Labor

RESOUITIO:\ CTA EB Crim. No. 139 (CT A Crim. Case No. A-17) Relations Commission 1 ("NAPOCOR") is inapplicable here as the public prosecutor in that case was the "active" counsel, while the "active'' counsel here were the lawyers from the BIR; and (2) the Court should relax procedural rules. Accused-appellee counters the above by arguing that (1) the Court was correct in finding that the public prosecutor continues to be the primary counsel even if private or special counsel is deputized; and (2) the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules is an exception to the general enforcement ofthe same. The Motion lacks merit. First, nothing in NAPOCOR states that service on the "active" counsel is binding. The discussion there is exclusively on primary and deputized counsels. It includes no indication that a distinction should be made between "active" and "inactive" counsels. The reasoning offered to justify the ruling is based purely on the Office ofthe Solicitor General's power to deputize private counsel. As such, the fact that the BIR lawyers were the "active" counsel here does not bar NAPOCOR's applicability to this case. The same is true of Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals2 ("Commissioner of Customs") and Baldovino-Torres v. Torres3 ("Torres")-two cases that reiterated NAPOCOR and that served as the primary basis for Our ruling in the assailed Decision. In any event, plaintiff-appellant offers no substantial reason or legal basis for treating participation as relevant to the issue at hand. We consequently see no reason to treat it as such. Furthermore, plaintiff-appellant's interpretation of the relevant procedural rules involves allowing the violation of related rules. Recall that, as discussed in the assailed Decision, Rule 9, Section 3 of the Revised Rules ofthe Court ofTax Appeals, as amended ("RRCTA"), states that " [a] 11 criminal actions [before the Court of Tax Appeals] shall be conducted and prosecuted under the direction and control ofthe public prosecutor." This means that even when private counsel is deputized, the public prosecutor is required to direct and control the prosecution of the criminal action. The public prosecutor shall direct and control said prosecution. If this Court were to adopt plaintiff-appellant's theory that service on the "active" counsel is decisive, We would have to allow for the possibility of the public prosecutor being "inactive" as counsel. However, this would mean f G.R. No. 90933-61, May 29, 1997. G.R. No. 132929, March 27,2022. G.R. No. 248675, July 20, 2022.

RESOUiTIO"' CTA EB Crim. No. 139 (CTA Crim. Case No. A-17) allowing a situation where the public prosecutor does not direct and control the prosecution of the criminal action. We would thus have to allow a direct violation of a procedural rule laid down in the RRCTA, one that does not identify any exceptions. This Court cannot condone an interpretation of a procedural rule that unavoidably leads to the violation of another rule. We must thus reject plaintiff-appellant's distinction between "active" and "inactive" counsels. As for plaintiff-appellant's plea for the relaxation of procedural rules, the Court notes that the Motion offers no specific reason for such relaxation, other than the observation that jurisprudence generally frowns upon the strict adherence to procedural rules. It does not explain why the rules should be relaxed in this specific case, despite said rules being enforced in specific jurisprudential cases such as NAPOCOR, Commissioner of Customs, and Torres. We thus see no reason to relax said rules in the specific case at bar, especially as plaintiff-appellant offers none. ACCORDINGLY, plaintiff-appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated February 17, 2025), filed via registered mail on March 6, 2025, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated February 17, 2025, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: Presiding Justice <av. ~ _., '--� MA. BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice ~ ~ A~---..J.. .e---- ~ CATHERINE T. MANAHAN Associate Justice

RESOLliTIO"i CTA EB Crim. No. 139 (CTA Crim. Case No. A-17) Page 4 of4 (' ~~0-VILLENA ~c~ate JEAN MA Justice M~. IV~ Y~.~~E~Ytb S-F~~ JARDO Associate Justice LANE~~~ID Associate Justice ~~~ CO~N G. FE~~-F};.PRES Associate Justice HENRY ~.~GELES Associate Justice