CTA Case No. 4212 (Resolution)
/ REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY BPI FAKILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., (. Petitioner, C.T.A. CASE NO. 421 2 - versus - ~ Promulgated: MAR 17 1995 � COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, --------X Respondent. X- - RESOLUTION This is a Resolutibn on the Motion :for Reconsideration :filed by both the Petitioner and the Respondent on Our Decision dated September 3 0, 1994 the dispositive portion o� which is quoted, thus! WHEREFORE, in view o� all the :foregoing circumstances, respondent is hereby ORDERED to issue a Tax Credit Ceiti�icate in the amount o:f P12,512.75 in :favor o� the Petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. On October 19, 1994, Respondent :filed her Motion :for Reconsideration o� said Decision bringing to this Court's att ention the f~ct that the alleged refundable amount o:f . � I ��~ � � t; as Tax Credit to Thus, according to '' � . 156
I RESOLUTION - C.T.A. CASE NO. 4212 -2- her, "it is presumed that petitioner has applied the alleged refundable amount of P24,541.41 as tax credit to the Succeeding year 1986. Since it failed to present in evidence its 1986 income tax return in order to show that it did not in fact automatically credit the said amount to taxable year 1986, such presumption has not been overturned. Hence, Petitioner is not entitled to a refund; otherwise, it would be refunded twice for the same amount" <Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2, citing Paseo Real.ty Devel.opment Corp. vs. Commissioner o:f Internal. Revenue, CTA Case No. 4693, Resolution dated October 21, 1993 and BPI Famil.y Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal. Revenue, CTA Case No. 4694, December 24, 1993. > in the above - cited cases by the Respondent, this Court held, thus: "Note should be taken that the amount of P54, 104. 00 is already part and parcel of P172,477.00 which presumptively was already applied as tax credit to the Succeeding taxable year 1990. Such presumption, of course, could have been overturned had the petitioner submitted its 1990 Corporate Income Tax Return showing that it did not automatically credit the said amount for the said taxable year 1990. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to submit that vital document which could have unlocked his e ntitlement for the elusive claim for refund sought for. Failure on the part o� the petitioner to sustain his claim is fatal to its cause following the time- !""'.. 15 7 .� ~- :.. �~
I RESOLUTION - C.T.A. CASE -NO. 4212 .I -3- t ested doctrine that claims for re�und are strictly construed against claimant <Commissioner of Internal. Revenue va. Ledesma, G.R. No.� L-17509, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 95>. And rightly so. We therefore deem i t imperative �or Us to reconsider the questioned Decision as \tie overlooked the �act that Petitioner failed to submit its 1985 income tax return which indeed would have determined whether or not the amount claimed had been applied for that year. Absent said return, We presume that the amount claimed has been indeed automatically credited for that year. It has been noted by this Court that the counsel o� the present case was the same counsel who committed the same error o� not presenting the much-important income tax return in the two previous ly cited cases, i.e. , Paseo Realty Development Corp., vs. CIR, <CTA Case No. 4593 > and BPI Family S avings Bank, Inc. , vs. CIR, <CTA Case No. 4694 >. In its Opposition to Respondent's Motion �or Reconsideration filed on October 27, 1994, Petitioner intimated that this Court "take judicial notice" on the evidence presented in CTA Case No. 4325 involving the same parties which already became �inal and executory. In that case, it was established that "herein petitioner calendar year had a net loss o� P10,493! ~oo,p o and t per e�ore the r e w~s no income tax due. I ,
I RESOLUTION - C.T.A. CASE NO. 4212 - 4- It also noted that petitioner h~s a 'prior year's excess credit of P24, 514. 41 (which is the amount involved in this 1985 refund case at bar) and a 1986 creditable withholding tax of P95, 190. 53" ( CTA Records, p. 134). In fine, Petitioner's counsel virtually placed this Court in a bind "forcing" Us to take judicial notice of the records of that case. We cannot do that. We refuse to fall into the trap clandestinely laid by Petitioner's counsel~ In the case of Tabuena vs. Court o:f Appea1s, 196 SCRA 650, it was . ruled that "Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of case pending be:fore them of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notvithstanding the fact that . both cases may have been heard or actually pending before the same judge. "<Emphasis supplied) The fatal procedural flaw committed by the Petitioner's counsel cannot be cured by compelling this Court to submit to the records of another case in order to salvage his own case ~ Such legal maneuver is bereft of honesty and fair play. ,. . Much as We wanted to grant every peso du~ and claimed by Petitioners seeking assistance from this Court, We are also equally bound to protect every centavo already in the coffers of the government. 159 ...... '
RESOLUTION - C.T.A. CASE NO. 4212 - 5- WHEREFORE; in view of the foregoing discus si ons, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by. the Peti tioner on November 3, 1994, is hereby denied. Accordingly, the . Decision dated September 30, 1994 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and a new ruling entered DISMISSING this case for lack of me r it. SO ORDERED. ~~~~ ERNESTO D. ACOSTA Presiding Judge Associate ~EL: � GRUBA Associate Judge '�' 160
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