[ G.R. No. 19533. October 31, 1963 ]

[ G.R. No. 19533. October 31, 1963 ]

[ G.R. No. 19533. October 31, 1963 ]

ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Alfredo V. de Ocampo filed on June 29, 1960 an application for the registration of two parcels of land known respectively as lot No. 817 of the Cadastral Survey of Sagay and Lot No. 2500 of the Cadastral Survey of Escalante, both of Negros Occidental, stating in said application that the Bureau of Public Schools, thru the Division Superintendent of Public Schools, Bacolod City, is claiming said parcels of land.

On December 28, 1960, the court a quo issued an order

of general default against the whole world with the excep

tion of the Bureau of Public Schools and one Eugenio

Cordero, a mortgagee of the lands, setting the hearing of

the petition on January 10, 1961, which was postponed to

May 15, 1961.

On May 13, 1961, the court a quo issued an order declaring the Bureau of Public Schools as having waived

its claim to the property for its failure to file an answer

in the absence of any reasonable excuse, at the same time

transfering the hearing to July 6, 1961, The court again

motu proprio postponed the hearing to August 8, 1961.

On July 27, 1961, the applicant filed a motion to declare

the Bureau of Public Schools as having completely abandoned its right to file an opposition and to allow him to

present his evidence, but on August 5, 1961, the court

a quo issued an order stating in substance as follows: it

appearing that the Bureau of Public Schools represented

by the Solicitor General has not yet filed its opposition to

the petition despite the fact that the hearing was set for

August 8, 1961, and the provincial fiscal was required to

communicate with the above official to inquire if he is still

interested in pressing the claim of the Bureau of Public

Schools, postponing again for this purpose the hearing to

September 16, 1961, the court warned that if on that date

the Solicitor General has not yet filed his opposition, the

claim of the Bureau of Public Schools shall be deemed definitely abandoned and the court shall proceed with the

hearing of the evidence of the applicant.

On September 7, 1961, the Solicitor General filed the

requisite opposition wherein he stated that the lands in

question belonged to the Republic of the Philippines by

virtue of a legacy made by the late Esteban Jalandoni

in favor of the Bureau of Education as evidenced by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6010. On September

22, 1961, the applicant filed a motion to dismiss" the opposition, but it was denied in an order issued on December

18, 1961. This order reads: "Finding the opposition by

the Office of the Solicitor General to be meritorious, the

order of this Court dated May 13, 1961 is hereby ordered

set aside, motu proprio, and the hearing of this case is

hereby set on January 30, 1962, at 8:30 in the morning."

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, the

applicant took steps to appeal from said order. The

Solicitor General tried to oppose the appeal thru the Office

of the Provincial Fiscal alleging that the order in question

was merely interlocutory and is not appealable, but, thru

an oversight, the provincial fiscal failed to ask for postponement of the hearing for which reason the opposition

of the Solicitor General came late. And so on February

3, 1962, the court a quo approved the record on appeal,

and subsequently denied the motion to dismiss the appeal

on the ground that it has already lost jurisdiction over

the case.

And on April 13, 1962, the Solicitor General reiterated

before this Court his motion to dismiss the appeal on the

same ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory and not appealable, but this Court deferred action

thereon until the case is decided on the merits.

The order subject of the present appeal is quoted hereunder for ready reference:

"Finding the opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General

to be meritorious, the order of this Court dated May 13, 1961 is

hereby ordered set aside, motu propio, and the hearing of this case

is hereby set for January 30, 1962, at 8:30 in the morning.'

The order mentioned therein dated May 13, 1961, reads:

"It appearing from the records that on December 28, 1960, which

was the initial hearing of this case, the Bureau of Public Schools,

represented by the Provincial Fiscal, has not filed an answer to the

claim of the petitioner. Following the ruling of the Supreme Court

in the case of Omandan vs. Director of Lands, 50 Off. Gaz., page

4220, September, 1954, it is to be considered that the Bureau of

Public Schools has waived whatever claim over the property and

is hereby barred from filing an answer in the absence of any reasonable excuse. (Italic supplied)

As may be seen, both orders are merely interlocutory

because they were issued as an incident of the main case. The order of May 13, 1961 was entered into because of

the failure of the Bureau of Public Schools to file its

answer despite the fact that the case has long been set for

hearing for which reason the court barred said Bureau

from filing any answer unless a "reasonable excuse" is

shown, and acting on the suggestion made by the court a quo that the Solicitor General be inquired as to

why he has failed to file his answer in behalf of the government, the Solicitor General lost no time in registering

the opposition of the government on September 7, 1961.

And on December 18, 1961, the court a quo readily reconsidered its former stand, and admitted the answer of the

government. This is the order from which the applicant

is now appealing. Verify, this order is merely interlocutory for the same point can still be raised after the case

has been decided on the merits.

"An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending

action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court

(Mejia vs. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 572; Insular Government vs. Roman

Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil. 487; People vs. Macaraig, 54 Phil. 904). In other words, a final order is that which

gives an end to the litigation (Olsen & Co. vs. Olson, 48 Phil. 238).

The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is:

does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect

to the merits of the case. If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does

not, it is final (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1,

3rd ed. pp. 806-807). A final order is that which disposes of the

whole subject-matter or terminates the particular proceedings or

action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what

has been determined (2 Am. Jur., section 22, pp. 861-862)." (Reyes

vs. De Leon, G. R. No. L-3720, June 24, 1952)

We find, therefore, no merit in the present appeal.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. Cost

against appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,

JJ., concur.