cta_resolution CTA Case No. 1127011270 2026-04-17

GE HEALTHCARE PHILIPPINES, INC., (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc)., v. CIR v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

CTA Form No.8 (For DCC) lllll llllll lll llllllllllll lllllllllll lllll llllllllllllllllll l llllll 23-000435-0052 REPUBLIC OF THE PIDLIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION CTA CASE NO. 11270 GE HEALTHCARE PIDLIPPINES, INC., (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.), Petitioner, -versus- NOTICE OF RESOLUTION COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. To: OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 134 Amorsolo Street, Legazpi Village Makati City ATTY. SYLVIA R. ALMA JOSE ATTY. AYESHA RANIA B. GUILTNG-MAT ANOG ATTY. MCLAIR D. GARCIA Bureau of Internal Revenue Room 703, Litigation Division, BIR National Office Buillding Sen. Miriam P. Defensor-Santiago Avenue Diliman, Quezon City CABRERA & COMPANY 28th Floor, AlA Tower (formerly Philam1ife Tower) 8767 Paseo de Roxas 1226 Makati City GREETINGS: You are hereby notified by these presents that on April 17, 2026, Resolution was rendered in the above-entitled case, copy of which is attached hereto. Quezon City, Philippines, April 21, 2026. Atty. Maria J&lt.,~an-Te Executive Cler rt III

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION GE HEALTHCARE CTA CASE NO. 11270 PHILIPPINES, INC. Members: (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.), Petitioner, -versus- BACORRO-VILLENA, Acting Chairperson, and CUI-DAVID, JJ. COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated: r.w INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. APR 1 7~ I llfl' -~ - X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------X RESOLUTION CUI-DAVID, J.: For this Court's consideration is petitioner's Omnibus Motion with Leave of Court (1) For Reconsideration of the Decision dated 28 October 2025; and (2) To Reopen Trial and to Recall Witness1 (Omnibus Motion), filed on November 19, 2025. Respondent filed his Comment/Opposition (Re: Omnibus Motion with Leave of Court 1. For Reconsideration of the Decision dated 28 October 2025; and 2. To Reopen Trial To Recall Witness) [Comment/Opposition] on January 21 , 2026. In its Omnibus Motion, petitioner prays that the Court: (1) give due course to the Omnibus Motion and set a hearing for the presentation of additional evidence; and 1 Docket- Vol. II, pp. 8 13- 826.

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc . (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Page 2 of9 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x (2) reverse and set aside the Court's Decision dated October 28, 2025 (assailed Decision) , 2 the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, the present Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit." In support of its Omnibus Motion, petitioner contends that the documentary evidence of record clearly shows a double payment of final withholding tax (FWT) . According to petitioner, the Court itself confirmed in its findings that, of the FWT remittance for July 2021 amounting to :P22,946,111.02, the amount of :P17,647,690.64 pertains to FWT withheld from royalty payable to GE Energy Switzerland GmbH (GE Switzerland) and that the FWT remittance of :P51 ,271 ,825. 70 for August 2021 includes :P47,972,225.78 pertaining to FWT withheld from royalty payable to GE Switzerland- the double payment being claimed by petitioner as erroneously or illegally paid FWT. Petitioner avers that while it failed to explain the nature and basis of the :P28,647,664.18 adjustment relating to GE Switzerland, it submits that such a finding of underpayment of taxes, if any, may be compensated with the present refund claim. Further, petitioner implores the Court to reopen the trial for the reception of evidence to further aid and guide the Court in reconsidering its findings in the assailed Decision. Petitioner further seeks the recall of its witness, Mr. Armando V. Dayag, Jr. (Mr. Dayag, Jr.), to identify and testify on the additional evidence to be presented. It likewise filed a Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mr. Armando V. Dayag, Jr. on December 11, 2025, which the Court noted in its Resolution dated January 8 , 2026 .3 As discussed in the assailed Decision, petitioner failed to establish that no other royalty fees were due to GE Switzerland on a monthly basis and that the entries in the July and August 2021 FWT returns pertain to identical transactions with GE !d. at 789-81 1. Docket- Vol. III, pp. 11 72-1173, Minute Resolution dated January 8, 2026; 993-995, Submission (Of the Supplemental Judicial Affidavit ofMr. Armando V Dayag, Jr.); 998- 1013, Supplemental Judicial Affidavit ofMr. Armando V. Dayag, Jr.

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc. (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Page 3 of9 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Switzerland. As such, petitioner argues that these findings warrant the reception of additional evidence. Citing Cabarles v. Hon. Maceda (Cabarles), 4 petitioner asserts that a motion to reopen for further reception of evidence is permitted and shall be governed by the guideline of paramount interest of justice. Petitioner likewise cites Section S(f) , Rule 305 of the Rules of Court as a basis for reopening the case, asserting that doing so would prevent a miscarriage of justice and the government's retention of taxes not legally due. On the other hand, in his Comment/ Opposition, respondent vehemently opposes the motion to reopen the case as petitioner not only conceded that it "failed to explain the nature and basis" of the P28,647,664.18 adjustment pertaining to GE Switzerland, but also failed to: (1) prove that no monthly royalty fees were due to GE Switzerland; (2) present competent corroborating evidence establishing the entries in the July and August 2021 FWT returns pertained to identical transactions with GE Switzerland; and (3) submit supporting documents, such as a schedule of royalty payments, proof of actual transfer, or other relevant filings. Respondent emphasizes that allowing the case to be reopened would permit petitioner to retroactively build a case it failed to establish initially, thereby prejudicing respondent, who defended against the evidence as originally presented. He argues that petitioner now attempts to cure evidentiary deficiencies by presenting additional documents already in its possesswn and control during the trial, which cannot be considered newly discovered evidence but rather forgotten evidence. For respondent, a motion to reopen cannot be used to remedy a party's failure to present essential evidence. Granting its reopening would encourage laxity in preparation for litigation and undermine Court decisions. He underscores that litigation is not a "trial and error" process, and piecemeal presentation of evidence is repugnant to orderly justice. \( Cabarles v. Hon. Maceda., G.R. No. 16 1330, February 20, 2007 [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. Sec. 5. Order of trial.- Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 31 , and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order and shall proceed as follows: (t) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons and in the furthera nce ofjustice, permits them to add uce evidence upon their original case[.) (Emphasis supplied)

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc. (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc. ) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Page 4 of9 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Finally, respondent argues that a justification must accompany every plea for liberal construction of the rules. However, petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance nor has shown compelling grounds rooted in newly discovered evidence or the paramount interest ofjustice, but merely seeks to supplement deficient evidence to overturn the decision. Petitioner should not be allowed, in the guise of equity, to benefit from its own negligence. Accordingly, the instant Omnibus Motion must fail. As to its Motion For Reconsideration of the Decision dated 28 October 2025 (Motion for Reconsideration), petitioner merely raises that it clearly paid the FWT for July 2021 twice when it was allegedly included again in the August 2021 FWT return. While the Court indeed found that petitioner remitted and paid the total amounts of P22,946, 111.02 and P51,271,825.70 as reflected in its FWT Returns for July and August 2021 , respectively, the Court nonetheless denied petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate amounting to P47,972,225.78, because it failed to prove that the government erroneously or illegally collected such FWT. Considering the totality of evidence offered and admitted, the assailed Decision unde rscores that petitioner still failed to establish that the FWT withheld from GE Switzerland for July and August 2021 pertained to identical transactions. This showing is vital in ascertaining whether there was, in fact, any double payment of FWT during the relevant period. Notably, petitioner failed to address this crucial finding in its present Motion for Reconsideration without resorting to the presentation of additional documents or records. Ultimately, in seeking reconsideration, petitioner urges the Court to allow it to reopen the case for the reception of additional evidence and to recall its witness. However, petitioner's Motion with Leave ofCourt To Reopen Trial and to Recall Witness (Motion to Reopen) deserves scant consideration.

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc. (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x In Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (PNB) , 6 citing Alegre v. Reyes 7 and Cabarles, the Supreme Court clarified the circumstances under which a motion to reopen may be allowed: In Alegre v. Rey es, this Court declared that a m otion to reopen m ay properly be presen ted only after eith er or both pa r ties have forma lly offered , a n d clos ed th eir eviden ce, bu t before judgm en t. In Cabarles v. Maceda, the Court further expa nded t h e ins ta n ces wh en a m otion t o r eopen can be a llowed , i.e., "before judgm ent is r endered , a nd even a fter p romu lgation but before finality of judgm ent a nd the only cont rollin g guideline governing a m otion to reopen is the param ou nt interest of ju stice." (Citation s omitted) Furthermore, in PNB, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of Philippine National Bank's alternative prayer to reopen the proceedings before the CTA in Division so that it could present additional evidence was proper because Philippine National Bank sought to present forgotten evidence, viz.: In the case a t b ar , h owever , what PNB seeks is essentially the presentation of forgotten evidence which , in a case, was defined in t h e following m anner: Forgotten evidence refers to evidence already in existence or available before or during a trial; known to and obtainable by the party offering it; and could have been presented and offered in a seasonable manner, were it not for the sheer oversight or forgetfulness of the party or the counsel. Presentation of forgotten evidence is disallowed, because it results in a piecemeal presentation of evidence, a procedure that is not in accord with orderly justice and serves only to delay the proceedings. A con trary ruling m ay open th e flood gates to a n endless review of d ecisions, wh eth er through a m otion for reconsidera tion or for a new trial, in the guise of n ewly d iscovered evidence. Apart from the bare invocation of the interests of substantial justice, wh ich is not a m agic wand that will autom atically compel this Court to su spend procedura l rules , PNB has failed to demonstrate any compelling reason for �' the grant of its alternative prayer. (Em ph asis supplied , citations omitted) G. R. Nos. 242647 et at., March 15, 2022 [Notice, First Division]. G. R. No. L-56923, May 9, 1988 [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc. (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Page 6 of9 X------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X The Supreme Court in PNB stressed that, beyond a bare invocation of substantial justice, no compelling justification was shown for reopening. In the instant case, petitioner seeks to reopen the case to present supplemental evidence and to recall its witness, Mr. Dayag, Jr., purportedly to guide and assist the Court in reconsidering its findings in the assailed Decision and to substantiate its claim of double payment of FWT. These additional documents refer to Monthly Remittance Forms afFinal Income Taxes Withheld (BIR Form No. 0619-F) for taxable year (TY) 2021, Quarterly Remittance Returns of Final Income Taxes Withheld (BIR Form No. 1601-FQ) forTY 2021 , Annual Information Return of Income Taxes Withheld on Compensation and FWT (BIR Form 1604-CF) for TY 2021, Monthly and Annual Alphalist of Payees for TY 2021, BIR Acknowledgment Receipt of DAT Files, eFPS Payment Details, 2021 Audited Financial Statements, and other relevant documents such as billing statements, invoices, proof of payment and schedule of royalty. Petitioner asserts that such additional evidence is necessary to support its claim for refund and to uphold substantial justice. While the Cabarles case recognizes that a motion to reopen may be filed even after promulgation but before finality of judgment, and the only controlling guideline in resolving such motion is the paramount interest of justice, which is subject to the Court's sound discretion, due regard must still be given to the nature of evidence sought to be introduced and the justification offered by petitioner for its omission. It bears stressing that such a reopening remains exceptional and is warranted only for justifiable reasons. Lamentably, a thorough review of the additional evidence that petitioner seeks to present reveals that it undeniably constitutes forgotten evidence. Petitioner already had access to these documents during trial and even before the filing of its Petition for Review, and the same were known to petitioner and readily obtainable. Yet petitioner did not present them despite having the full opportunity to do so. Accordingly, these documents cannot be considered newly discovered and are y not proper subjects of a motion to reopen.

RESOLUTION CTA Ca se No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc. (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Page 7 of9 X------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X To reiterate, the presentation of forgotten evidence is disallowed as it leads to the piecemeal presentation of evidence, a procedure that is not in accord with orderly justice and serves only to delay the proceedings .8 The rationale behind this rule is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the administration ofjustice.9 Even if treated as a motion for new trial, the additional evidence adduced by petitioner does not meet the standard for newly discovered evidence. In Alamayri v. Pabale} Io the Supreme Court stressed that parties must present every argument and all available evidence supporting their respective positions before the case is deemed submitted for decision, and only in truly exceptional circumstances may additional evidence be received thereafter, to wit: The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered judgment; otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide a ny explanation wh y she did not present h er evidence earlier . Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to a bide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxat ion in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was n ever intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litiga tion is t/ not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed Supra note 6. Rep ublic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G. R. No. 152375, December 13, 20 II [Per J. Brion, En Bane]. 10 G. R. No. 15 1243, April 30, 2008 (Per Chico -Nazario, Third Division].

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines, Inc. (formerly General Electric Philippines, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue X---- ------- ------------- ------------ ------- ----------- --------------------------------- ---------X procedure to insure an orderly a nd speedy administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied , citations omitted) Here, petitioner candidly admitted that it was in "firm, honest and genuine belief that the presentation of its evidence revolving only in these two months would suffice to establish its present judicial claim for refund."l l Also, it categorically stated that it indeed "failed to explain the nature and basis of the deduction of the 1>28,647,664.18 adjustment pertaining to GE S w i t z e r l a n d . " l2 Evidently, petitioner was negligent in failing to exercise reasonable diligence in the preparation and examination of the documents supporting its refund claim before their submission to the Court. An entitlement to a tax refund is for the taxpayer to prove and not for the government to disprove.13 Corollarily, petitioner was expected to have fully assembled and presented all its evidence at the time of filing its judicial claim. However, it was only after this Court rendered the assailed Decision unfavorable to petitioner that it sought to introduce additional supporting documents. Such a belated submission highlights petitioner's lack of due diligence and does not justify the reopening of the proceedings. Respondent is indeed correct in asserting that procedural rules cannot be relaxed to accommodate petitioner's negligence. Neither may petitioner be allowed to rebuild its case after an unfavorable ruling. Notably, apart from the bare invocation of the interest of substantial justice, which is not a magic wand that will automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules,14 petitioner has failed to advance any compelling reason to justify its Motion to Reopen or the belated submission of additional evidence. Instead, petitioner merely attempts to supplement the case records to cure evidentiary deficiencies arising from its own failure to establish its case in the first y instance. 11 Omnibus Motion with Leave ofCourt (I) For Reconsideration ofthe Decision dated 28 October 2025; and (2) To Reopen Trial and to Recall Witness, par. 30. 12 /d. at par. I I 13 Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Far East Bank & Trust Company (Now Bank ofthe Philippine Islands), G.R. No. 1738 54, March 15, 20 10 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]. 14 Dobes v. Court ofAppeals, G. R. No. 26 16 10, August 9, 2023 [Per J. Kho, Jr., Second Division] citing Philippine Savings Bank v. Papa, 823 Ph il. 725, 736 (2008) [Per J. Martires, Third Division).

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 11270 GE Healthcare Philippines , Inc. (former ly Gen er al Electric Philippines, Inc. ) v. Commis sioner of Internal Revenue Page 9 of9 x----- ---------------------------------- --------- ----- --------------- ------------------------- ---x Thus, the Court agrees with respondent that petitioner cannot be permitted to benefit from its own negligence in failing to adduce sufficient evidence. Given the denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the trial and in the absence of any new or persuasive argument in petitioner's plea for reconsideration, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse or modify the assailed Decision. In any event, even if the Court takes a second look at the facts of the case, it would still reach the same conclusion. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's Omnibus Motion with Leave ofCourt (1) For Reconsideration ofthe Decision dated 28 October 2025; and (2) To Reopen Trial and to Recall Witness is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ~~AAC/;nl LANt:~~~UI-DAVID Associate Justice !CONCUR: /\#f/C/~ JEAN MA . BACORRO-VILLENA

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