Reconstitution of Lost Titles: SC Clarifies Evidence Rules Under RA 26

The Supreme Court recently clarified the evidentiary standards for judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title in Faustino Co Shu Kiam v. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 279277, June 29, 2026). The ruling provides practical guidance for property owners and practitioners navigating the requirements of Republic Act No. 26, particularly when original title records have been destroyed by calamities such as fires or typhoons.

Background of the Case

The petitioner sought judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-23536 covering a 14,233-square-meter property in Pandi, Bulacan. The original title on file with the Register of Deeds (ROD) was destroyed when fire gutted the ROD building on March 7, 1987. The owner's duplicate copy was likewise lost when Typhoon Ondoy submerged the house of the custodian in 2010.

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed, applying the strict guidelines from Republic v. Bercede (932 Phil. 851 [2023]). The CA found the petitioner's documentary evidence insufficient, particularly the ROD certifications and the deed of sale. The Supreme Court reversed the CA and reinstated the RTC decision.

The Statutory Framework: Section 3 of RA 26

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 enumerates the acceptable sources for reconstitution of transfer certificates of title, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate; (c) A certified copy previously issued by the ROD; (d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry containing the property description, showing original registration; (e) A document by which the property is mortgaged, leased, or encumbered; and (f) Any other document which the court deems sufficient and proper.

The Court in Bercede held that resort to paragraph (f) requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that documents listed in paragraphs (a) through (e) are unavailable. This ensures that the most reliable sources are exhausted first, preventing reconstitution based on fraudulent documents.

Applying Bercede to This Case

The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Bercede. In Bercede, the petitioner presented only a photocopy of the title and a certification that the original was lost, without proving the owner's duplicate was also missing. Here, the petitioner presented an Affidavit of Loss executed by the custodian, establishing that the owner's duplicate was destroyed during Typhoon Ondoy.

The Court emphasized that a notarized Affidavit of Loss carries the presumption of regularity, which the government failed to rebut. Since no evidence showed the affidavit was forged or executed under duress, it sufficiently proved the loss of the owner's duplicate.

Certifications from the Register of Deeds

The CA faulted the petitioner for not presenting the ROD records officer as a witness and for the certification's failure to categorically state that TCT No. T-23536 existed before the fire. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, noting that when an entire ROD building is destroyed by fire, all records—including logbooks and lists of titles—are also lost. Requiring the ROD to certify the existence of a title from records that no longer exist would be impossible and unreasonable.

The Court cited Rule 132, Section 28 of the Rules of Court, which allows proof of lack of record through a written statement by the officer having custody. This provision, together with the realities of mass document destruction, supported the sufficiency of the ROD certification.

The Kasulatan as a Valid Source Under Section 3(d)

The Court found that the Kasulatan ng Tuluyang Bilihan ng Isang Lagay ng Lupa (Deed of Absolute Sale) executed in 1958 qualified as a source under Section 3(d) of RA 26. The deed's dorsal portion contained the ROD's certification that TCT No. 19405 was cancelled and TCT No. T-23536 was issued pursuant to its registration.

Notably, the Court applied Rule 130, Section 4(c) of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which allows a duplicate to be admitted as the original unless a genuine question exists about the original's authenticity. Since the government did not question the deed's authenticity, it was admissible.

The Court also gave weight to the Land Registration Authority's report confirming that the technical description and sketch plan pertained to the same property described in the petition, addressing the CA's concern about the discrepancy in the predecessor's name ("Tis" versus "Tomas" Delos Santos).

Practical Takeaways

• Exhaust the statutory order of sources. Petitioners must prove by clear and convincing evidence that earlier-listed sources under Section 3 of RA 26 are unavailable before resorting to "other documents" under paragraph (f).
• A notarized Affidavit of Loss is powerful evidence. It enjoys the presumption of regularity and can establish the loss of an owner's duplicate, unless the government presents clear and convincing evidence to rebut it.
• ROD certifications must be read realistically. When an entire registry is destroyed by fire, the ROD cannot be expected to certify the existence of specific titles from records that no longer exist. Proof of the fire and the ROD's statement of total destruction may suffice.
• Deeds of sale with ROD annotations are strong evidence. A deed showing registration, cancellation of the prior title, and issuance of the new title can serve as a valid basis for reconstitution under Section 3(d).
• LRA verification carries significant weight. A report from the Land Registration Authority confirming the technical description and plan can cure minor discrepancies in names or descriptions.

This article is general information and not legal advice. For your specific situation, consult a lawyer or ask ASG Legal AI.