BRYAN M. TORREGOSA v. REGIONAL DIRECTOR BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, DAVAO CITY REVENUE REGION 19

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY En Bane BRYAN M. TORREGOSA, CTA EB NO. 2520 Petitioner, (CTA Case No. 9703) Present: DEL ROSARIO, P.J., RINGPIS-LIBAN, -versus- MANAHAN, BACORRO-VILLENA, MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, REYES-FAJARDO, CUI-DAVID, FERRER-FLORES, and REGIONAL DIRECTOR ANGELES,JJ BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE DAVAO CITY REVENUE REGION NO. 19, Respondent. X --------------------------------------------------------------------~------------------ X RESOLUTION M ODESTO-S AN PEDRO, J.: For the Court's resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion"), fi led on 10 August 2023, with respondent's Opposition (Re: Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 26 July 2023) ("Opposition"), fi led on 4 September 2023 . In his Motion, petitioner claims that this Court's Decision, dated 26 July 2023 ("Assailed Decision"), is wrong because (a) petitioner received the assailed Final Decision on Disputed Assessment ("FDDA") on 19 October 20 17, but to expect petitioner to prove such date when respondent refuses to produce the registry receipt is to burden petitioner with an impossible task; (b) the assessment is void and can thus be assai led at any time; (c) the circumstances around this case should have convi nced the Court to apply the ~

RESOLliTI0:-1 CTA �8 No. 2520 (CTA Case No. 9703) Page 2 of6 rules of procedure liberally; and (d) in any case, the assailed assessment is without basis in fact. In his Opposition, respondent merely reiterates the finding of the Court En Bane and in Division that petitioner filed his Petition for Review before the Court in Division late. The Motion must be denied. First, petitioner's contention, that proving the date of his second receipt of a duplicate copy of the FDDA is an impossible task, is easily disputed. He could have offered the testimony of his secretary, who allegedly had first-hand knowledge of petitioner's second receipt of a copy of the FDDA, as observed by the Court in Division in its Decision.1 Building on this observation, he could have offered any form of bookkeeping on his part to show that he did, indeed, receive a second copy of the FDDA on 19 October 2017. Neither of these involve offering a registry receipt that respondent allegedly refuses to produce, but both could have helped prove petitioner's contention, had he actually offered these as evidence. In fact, viable evidence already exists in the records of this case. Petitioner attached the second copy of the FDDA that he received to his "Reply (To Respondent's Answer) With Manifestation'? filed on 19 March 2018. Importantly, he also attached an envelope3 that appears to be marked as having been received by a Ms. Fernandez on 19 October 2017 at 1:42 p.m. This envelope in itself could have served as compelling evidence in support of petitioner's claim, had he actually offered it. Furthermore, the Rules of Court offer multiple forms of relief that petitioner could have utilized to bolster his claim. Rule 53 allows a party to file a Motion for New Trial, which is also allowed under Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, as amended. Petitioner could have used such a Motion to offer the additional evidence available to him even after failing to do so earlier. Even more relevant here is Rule 27, which provides for the filing of a motion for the production, by an adverse party, of a document sought by the filing party for the latter's inspection. Petitioner could have used such a motion to compel respondent to produce the controversial Registry Receipt that is supposedly at the center of this issue. If respondent still refused or failed to cooperate, petitioner could have also moved for the issuance ofa subpoena duces tecum, under Rule 21, and attempt to acquire said Registry Receipt from a representative of the Philippine Post Office from the relevant Postal Area.}� Decision, dated 9 September 2020, p. 15, Division Records, p. 417. /d., pp. 80-82. /d., p. 88.

RESOLlTIOl\ CTA EB No. 2520 (CTA Case No. 9703) Page 3 of6 In sum, both perfectly viable evidence and various forms of procedural relief were available to petitioner. The so-called "impossible" is thus easily achievable. However, even if this Court, whether En Bane or in Division, were to spontaneously agree with petitioner that he received a second copy of the FDDA on 19 October 2017, the same would be of no aid to his case. To review, under Section 228 ofthe National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, a taxpayer has thirty (30) days from receipt of an adverse decision within which to file its judicial protest with the Court of Tax Appeals: "SEC. 228. Protesting of Assessment.- x x x X X X If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt ofthe said decision, or from the lapse of the one hundred eighty (180)-day period; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory, and demandable." (Emphasis supplied.) The above law pegs the start of the thirty (30)-day period to appeal to a taxpayer's receipt of the adverse decision. Notably, it is completely silent on multiple receipts. It does not say that the period is reset ifthe taxpayer receives a second, third, or n1h copy of the decision. It countenances only a singular receipt by the taxpayer of an adverse decision. The clearest, simplest, and most logical construction of the rule, then, is that the period begins upon a taxpayer's.first receipt ofthe adverse decision. Any later receipt of any further copies of such decision is thus of no moment. Petitioner has never addressed this silence. He has not explained why the Court should ignore the obvious and standard construction of the rule and adapt his own interpretation. He has merely insisted, impliedly or otherwise, that his second receipt of the FDDA is more relevant and controlling than his first, without providing any law, jurisprudence, or reasoned argumentation that could serve as direct basis for this view. Meanwhile, respondent already proved, through testimony and documentary evidence, that petitioner received a copy of the FDDA on 14 September 20 I7. As it is indisputable, even tautological, to say that such receipt is a receipt by a taxpayer of an adverse decision, said receipt is the controlling event that tolled the running of the prescriptive period here. The 9-'

RES0Ll'TI01\ CTA EB No. 2520 (CT A Case No. 9703) Page4of6 Court in Division thus correctly ignored the 19 October 2017 receipt as the same is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Especially considering that the two (2) copies are identical and of one and the same FDDA, any later receipt of the same does not abolish the proven fact that petitionerfirst received the decision on 14 September 2017. And qua receipt by petitioner of the adverse decision on his protest to the assailed assessment, such receipt marked the beginning of the prescriptive period for filing a judicial protest before the Court in Division. The Court En Bane is thus constrained to reject petitioner's contention that he filed his Petition for Review on time. As for petitioner's claims that a void assessment can be assailed at any time or that the assessment here is, in any event, devoid of factual basis, addressing the same would require inquiring into the merits of the case. However, the Court is barred from performing such. The Court in Division never acquired jurisdiction over the case. And as already mentioned in Our 26 July 2023 Decision, said lack of jurisdiction likewise prevents this Court En Bane from ruling on the merits. Finally, Our 26 July 2023 Decision already contained a reminder that an invocation of the general liberality in applying rules of procedure cannot simply brush aside said rules.4 Moreover, matters of jurisdiction are not merely technical rules of procedure; they serve as the foundation for any action taken by a court. As the Supreme Court has held in the past, "[a]ny decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is void".5 The Court in Division thus did not err when it cited Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau ofCustoms6 in saying that when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the case. The Court is not unsympathetic to petitioner's plight. After the stresses of an assessment, after the tribulations of the pandemic, to have one's judicial appeal fail due to a late filing would be frustrating and disheartening beyond words, especially for an individual business owner. However, the Court cannot ignore the facts, laws, and jurisprudence relevant to this case. The Court in Division thus had no choice but to dismiss the case, the only course of action within its power, and the Court En Bane cannot ascribe any real error to said dismissal. � 4 Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. The Court of Appeals and Heirs of Manuel Bolanos. G.R. No. 221636, II July 2016. City ofLapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, G.R. Nos. 184203 & 187583,26 November2014. 6 G.R. No. 209830, 17 June 2015.

RESOLFrtO~ CTA EB No. 2520 (CTA Case No. 9703) Page5of6 All told, the instant Motion lacks merit and cannot be granted by the Court En Bane. WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on 10 August 2023 is hereby DENIED for Jack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 26 July 2023, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. -SAN PEDRO WE CONCUR: ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO Presiding Justice ~- ..,�4.,w. 7'\-.__ MA. BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice ~~'J: Au~... CATHERINE T. MANAHAN ....".c''-"."""""- - Associate Justice I JEAN JVIA~J<\ ~ ~ f ~ �f~Mr.~o MARIAN IVY4. REYiS-FAJ~RDO Associate Justice LANE~1J?JD Associate Justice

RESOLllTION CTA EB No. 2520 (CTA Case No. 9703) Page 6 of6 co~<f~~ s Associate Justice HEANsRsYof/:t:jtN~GtiEcLeES