CTA Case No. 6149 (Decision)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF TAX APPEALS

QUEZON CITY

FORTBONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

- versus - C.T.A. CASE NO. 6149

COMMISSIONER REVENUE, OF INTERNAL Respondent. MAR 0 5 2003 Promulgated: nOAaL

DECISION

This is a Petition for Review seeking for the cancellation of the deficiency

documentary stamp tax (DST) assessment, in the amount of P1,068,412,560.00, issued by

Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue against herein Petitioner, in connection

with the transfer and conveyance to Petitioner by the Republic of the Philippines of

portions of Fort Bonifacio, (herein referred to as the "Suhject Property') pursuant to

Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act

of 1992.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly registered and existing under Philippine

laws, with office address at Bonifacio Global City, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.

Petitioner was originally incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Bases

Conversion Developnient Authority ("BCDA") for the purpose of, among other

developing portions of Fort Bonifacio in accordance with the Fort Bonifacio

PAGE 2 CTA CASE NO. 6149 DECISION

Development Plan prepared by the BCDA. The BCDA, upon the other hand, is a wholly-

owned government corporation created by Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 7227 for the

purpose of accelerating the conversion of nilitary reservations/camps, which include Fort

Bonifacio, into alternative productive uses and raising funds through the sale of portions

of said military reservations/camps in order to promote the economic and social

development of the country in general.(Paragraph 1.03, Stipulation of Facts, Documents

and Issue

On February 8, 1995, by virtue of R.A. No. 7227 and Executive Order No.40

dated December 8, 1992, which was issued by the President of the Philippines to

implement the provisions of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7227 authorizing the President to

dispose of, among others, portions of Fort Bonifacio, the Republic of the Philippines

(Republic") sold, conveyed and transferred to Petitioncr portions of Fort Bonifacic

("Subject Property") for a total consideration of P71,227,503,200.00.(Paragraph 1.04

Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issue)

On September 15, 1998, the office of Respondent Commissioner of Internal

Revenue issued Letter of Authority No. 19135 authorizing the examination of Petitioner's

books of accounts and other accounting records covering all internal revenue liabilities

for taxable year 1995. (Paragraph 1.09, Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues)

As a result of the investigation, Petitioner was assessed for deficiency

documentary stamp tax ("DST") in the aniount of P1,068,412,560.00 pursuant to a final

notice of assessment covered by Assessnment No. ST-DST-95-0131-99 dated December

10199 . The said assessment was received by Petitioner on December 27

1999.(Paragraph 1.09, Stipulation of Facts, Docunients and Issues)

CTA CASE NO, G149 PAGE 3 DECISION

The deficiency DST was based on the sale of the Fort Bonifacio property by the

Republic to Petitioner on February 8, 1995 which, according to the BIR, is subject to

DST pursuant to Section 196 of the then Nationai Internal Revenue Code ("NIRC") and

BIR Ruling No. 34 (B) 000-00-19-95 dated February 13, 1995.(Paragraph 1.10

Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues)

On January 6, 2000, or within the reglementary period, Petitioner administratively

protested the said assessment by filing a request for reconsideration.(Paragraph 1.11,

Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues)

As of the date of the Petition in this case, Respondent had taken no action on

Petitioner's administrative protest of January 6, 2000.(Paragraph 1.14, Stipulation of

Facts, Documents and Issues)

Petitioner's request for reconsideration was filed with the Respondent

Commissioner on January 6, 2000 and the 180-day period provided for in Section 228 of

the NIRC expired on July 4, 2000. Thus, Petitioner had 30 days from July 4, 2000, or up

O August 3, 2000, within which to file an appeal with. the Court of Tax

Appeals.(Paragraph 1.15, Stipulation of Facts, Documents and Issues)

True enough, Petitioner, on August 2, 2000 filed a Petition for Review with this

Court praying for the cancellation of the final assessment notice covered by Assessment

No. ST-DST-95-0131-99 dated December 10,1999 issued by the Bureau of Internal

Revenue against Petitioner and declaring that Petitioner is not liable to pay the assessed

deficiency DST amounting to P 1,068,412,560.00

PAGE 4 CTA CASE NO. 6149 DECISION

The legal basis relied upon by Respondent in issuing the deficiency documentary

stamp tax assessment against the Petitioner is Section 196 of the old NIRC, herein quoted

in part as follows:

property. - On all conveyances, deeds, instruments or writings, other than grants, patents, or original certificates of adjudication issued by the Government, whereby any lands, tenements or other realty sold shall be granted assigned or transferred, or otherwise conveyed to the purchaser, or purchasers, or to any other person or persons designated by such purchaser or purchasers, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax at the "Section 196. Stamp tax on deed of sale and conveyance of real

following rates:

X X X X

Two points of contention have been raised by the Petitioner in asserting that the

transaction is not subject to DST

First, the subject property was transferred and conveyed to the Petitioner by virtue

of the Special Patent issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, on

February 7, 1995, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows.

Manila,identified and more particularly described as Iot Nos.1,2 cnd 6 x x x. (Exhibit C, paragraph 5, CTA records p. 128) Coustitution of the Philippines, aud in conformity with the provisions CORPORATION ("FBDC"), the tracts of land of the public domain situated in Burangay Fort Bonifacio, Municipality of Taguig, Metro METERS, cnd Lot Nos. 17, 21, 22 and 23, Svo-00-001266, containing an EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (I,497,837) SQUARE METERS thereof and of Execntive Order No. 40, dated December 8. 1992. granted and comveyed unto the FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENI Swo-00-001265,contaiuing an area of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (673,979) SQUARE area Of ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDREDNINETYSEVENTHOUSAND supplemented by Conmomvealih Act No.141,as amended,there is hereby "NOW, THEREIORE, KNOW YE,that by unthority of the

CTA CASE NO. 6149 PAGE 5 DECISION -

Petitioner asscrts that the subject property, having been transferred by virtue of

the aforesaid Special Patent, is not subject to thc DST. Petitioner contends that Section

196 of the old Tax Code, which is the basis of the Respondent in the imposition of the

DST, does not apply to the foregoing transaction, since the wordings of the said law

categorically excludes transfers and conveyances made under "grants, patents, or original

certificates of adjudication" issued by the Government. On that basis, Petitioner opined

that Section 196 of the old NIRC does not cover the transfer and conveyance of real

property from the Government to the Petitioner, hence no DST may be imposed on the

said transaction.

Secoud, Petitioner asseverates that the subject transaction between the

Government and the Petitioner is exempt from all kinds of taxes, including documentary

stamp tax. This exemption, according to Petitioner, was confirmed and bolstered by

Republic Act No. 7917, which was passed by Congress on February 24, 1995 and

amended by Republic Act No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act),

particularly Section 8 thereof providing for the distribution and appropriation of the

proceeds of the sale of Metro Manila military camps. Section 1 of R.A. No. 7917

provides in part, as follows

otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 1. Paragraph (d), Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7227.

XXx XXX

"x x x The proceeds froni any sale, after deducting all expenses related to the sale, of portions of Metro Manila camps as authorized under this Act, shall be deemed appropriated for the purposes herein provided for the following purposes with their corresponding percent shares of proceeds

PAGE G DECISION CTA CASE NO. 6149

X

proceeds of the sale thereof shall not be diminished and, therefore, exempt from all forms of taxes and fees. The provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the

As patently manifested in the above cited provision, Petitioner contends that it

was the intention of' Congress to free the proceeds of the sale from any taxes that would

substantially diminish them, considering that such proceeds are intended to fund the

projects listed in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7227, as amended by R.A. No. 7917. The

imposition of any tax thereon, according to Petitioner, would in effect result in the

conversion of a portion of the proceeds of the sale from its intrinsic nature as funds

appropriated for purposes enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7227, as amended by R.A.

No. 7917, into and as part of the general appropriations fund of the government

disposable for purposes entirely different from what was intended by Congress. Thus,

Petitioner believes that to impose the DST on the sale of the land will unduly increase the

cost of the land, to the detriment of the social and economic objectives sought to be

attained by the Government.

Petitioner further argues that R.A. No. 7917 was intended to apply retroactively to

the subject transaction. Although R.A. 7917 was enacted on February 24, 1995, and the

subject transaction took place on February 8, 1995, the said amendatory law was

specifically enacted to correct and address the need to redistribute the proceeds from the

sale of military camps in order to meet the greater and wider needs of public service.

Petitioner even pointed out that at the time of the deliberation, Congress was fully aware

that the sale of the subject property to Petitioner had taken place. Thus, it can be inferred

CTA CASE NO.6149 DECISION PAGE 7

from the surrounding circumstances that R.A. 7917 was a curative law specifically

intended by its authors to be applied retroactively

On October 5, 2000, Respondent filed an Answer to the instant Petition for

Review, and raised the following Special and Affirmative Defenses (CT'A records, pp.71-

72), Lo wit:

"5. The Deed of Absolute Sale With Quitclaim executed on February 8, transferring to the latter the real property mentioned therein is subject to the documentary stamp tax imposed under Section 196 of the Tax Code (BIR Ruling No. 019-95 dated February I3, 1995). 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and petitioner

1 Since the Republic of the Philippines is exempt from the documentary

is not exempt, is directly liable for the tax pursuant to Section 173 of stamp tax imposed under Section 196 of the Tax Code, petitioner, who the Tax Code.

Ie The tax exemption provided under R.A. No. 7917 extends only to the

include the documentary stamp tax on the deed covering the sale. proceeds of the sale of Metro Manila military camps. Since the law for the creation, revision or termination of specific legal al., G.R. No. 119446, January 21, 1999), said exemption does not documentary stamp tax is not a tax on the proceeds of the sale but a tax Hoine Assurance Corp. vs. Hon. Coinmissioner of Internal Revenuc, et levied on the exercise by persons of certain privileges conferred by relationships through the execution of specific instruments" (Philippine

R.A. No. 7917 was enacted on February 24, 1995, while the Deed of the tax exemption provided therein cannot be applied retroactively Absolute Sale with Quitclaim was executed on February 8, 1995. There being no express provision for the law's retroactive application.

Tax exemptions are construed strictly against taxpayers (Collector vs 9

Manila Jockey Club,98 Phil. 670)

10. The assessment was issued in accordance with law and regulations

I All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of tax assessments

Asia, Inc., 145 SCRA 671) (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Construction Resources of

PAGE 8 CTA CASE NO. G19 DECISION

Considering the foregoing aiguments and disquisitions of both Parties, this Court is

now tasked to resolve the following issues stipulated upon by the Parties, thus:

1. Whether Section 196 of the Nutional Internal Revemne Code, which writings, other tham grants, putents,or original certificutes of persons designated hy such purchaser or purchuasers" udjudication issued by the Govermnent, whereby any lands, tenements or other realty sold shall be graonted, assigned, trasferred, or otherwise Philippines to petitioner. imposes a stamp tuxfofu all comveyauces, deeds, instrumnens, or comveyed to the purchaser, or purchasers, or to auy other person or transfer und couvevmce of the Subject Property bythe Repnblic of the applies to Hhe

II Corollary to the foregoing issue,whether the proviso in Section

document enjoys exemption from the taxx x x,the other party 173 of the NIRC that"whenever oue purty to the iaxable thereto who is not exempt shall be the one directly liable for the tax ", is applicable to the transoction in question.

2. Whether the transactiou suhject of the instant case is exempt from the documentary stup tux.

2. Corollary to the above, whether the last sub-paragraph of the sale shuall be exempt from all forms of tuxes und fees, applies to the subject trunsuction. Paragraph (d),Section 8,of Republic Act No.7227,as ameded hy Republic Act No.7917,which providesthat the proceeds of

2.2 Likewise corollary to the above, whether the last sub-paragraph

amemded by Republic Act No. 7917, may he applied retroactively. of Paragraph (d),Section 8. of Republic Act No.7227, as

Before proceeding to the pivotal part of the instant controversy, this Court finds it

proper to first discuss the factual background surrounding the case at bar.

On March 13, 1992, R.A. 7227 was enacted to accelerate the conversion of

military reservations into alternative productive uses; to create the Bases Conversion and

CTA CASE NO. GY49 PAG ECSO

Development Authority (BCDA) and to raise funds through the sale of portions of

military reservations specified therein. Said law likewise authorized the President to scll

said lands, which are declared alienable and disposable. The proceeds of the said sale

were specially earmarked by the said law for various purposes. On February 24, 1995,

R.A. 7917 was enacted specifically amending Section 8 of R.A. 7227 with regard to the

appropriation of the proceeds of the sale of military camps expanding the coverage of its

use. Thus, by virtue of R.A. 7227 and the provisions of Executive Order no. 40, the

President then sold, conveyed and transferred the portion of the Fort Bonifacio to herein

Petitioner for a total consideration of P 71,227,503,200.00. A special patent was issued

on February 7, 1995 and a deed of sale was executed on February 8, 1995 to evidence the

transaction. This now became the subject of the controversy, after the BiR assessed

herein Petitioner of DST on the deed of sale executed between the Parties.

After a circumspect study of the facts, arguments and law applicable to this case,

this Court finds the assessment to be in order.

We do not subscribe to the argument of the Petitioner that the transfer and

couveyance of the subject propcrty is not subject to the DST under Section 196 of the

NIRC because said property was transferred by way of a Special Patent, which is

specifically excluded firom the coverage of the said section.

We do not deny the fact it is the issuance of the Special Patent which prompted

the conveyance and transfer of the subject property. Because of the peculiar nature of the

land involved, the President, by virtue of the authority vested in him by RA 7227, issued

a Special Patent to dispose of the subject land to be transferred to a private individual. A

patent is an instrument by which a state or government grants public lands to an

CTA CASE NO.6149 PAGE IO DECISION

individual (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition). The day afler the issuance of the said

special patent, a deed of sale was executed between the government and herein Petitioner

Respondent imposed a DST on this deed of sale, which is now being contested by the

Petitioner.

In the case at bar, two instruments were executed. The issuance of the patent.

which according to Petitioner is the operative act by which the beneficial title was

conveyed, and the other, the execution of the deed of sale which embodies the exchange

of subject matter and consideration between the parties. From their own peculiar nature,

said instruments should be treated distinctively and separately from the other, as far as

their tax consequence is concerned. It is significant to note that what is being taxed by the

Respondent, is the deed of sale and not the Special Patent issued by the President. As

can be inferred from the language used in the said docunents, both have the tenor of

conveying and transferring the subject property, thus:

Special Patent

Bonifacio Development Corporution (FBDC), the tracts of lnd of the puhlic domain x x x "x x x there is hereby granted and conveyed uto the Fort

Deed of sale

hereby irrevocably and absolutely sells, conveys and transfers the snbject property, in favor of the Buver x x x "For and in consideration of the total anount of x x x, the Seller

Both instruments are equai in force and in effect. One is not necessarily

subservient to the other. Their difference lies on their taxability. If the law expressly

exempts the patent from DST, then so be it. But Petitioner should not dwell on this fact

CTA CASE NO. (I49 PGE DECISION

alone as to altogether exempt itself from payment of DST. Exemption of a particular

document does not necessarily mean exemption of the other from DST.

We agree with the Respondent that the document embodying the contract of sale

between the parties is subject to DST. This is even buttressed by Section 196 of the Tax

Code, where a deed of sale is expressly subjected to DST. What is taxed in this particular

case is the privilege to transact the contract of sale, which is effected through the issuance

of a specific document such as the decd of sale. Thus, as held by the Court of Appeals in

the case of Philippine Home Assurance Corporation, et al vs. Court of Tax Appeals,

SP-32531, April 27, 1994, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Philippine Home

Assurance Corporation vs, The Hon. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR No

4208-4211, January 21, 1999,

stamp tax as in the nature of an excise tax. As such, it is inposed on the business or transaction itself. x x x This means then that the docunentary stamp tax accrues when the privilege is exercised. As the respondent document and not on the property, which it desc ibed, the documcntary stamp tax is not intended to be a tax on the document alone. The law taxes privilege of conducting a particular business or transaction and noi on the Court stated, while it is tiue that a documentary stamp tax is levied on the the docunent because of the transaction so that the tax becomes due and payable at the tinie the transaction is had or accomplished, in this case, at the time of the issuance of the document." "The respondent court correctly characterized a docunentary

In the same manner, the DST is not imposed upon the business transacted but is.

an excise upon the privilege, opportunity or facility offered at exchanges for the

transaction of the business. It is an excise upon the facilities used in the iransaction of the

business separate and apart fron the business itself. As Justice Learned Hand pointed out

in one case, documentary stamp tax is levied on the document and not on the property

CTA CASE NO. (I49 PAGE 2 DECISION

which it described.(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Heald Lumber Co., 10

SCRA 372, 1964 citing Empire Trust Co vs. Hoey, 103 F 3d, 430)

Predicated on the foregoing dictum, DST, with respect to the deed of sale, is

levied upon the privilege of entering into a transaction, as effected through the execution

of the said deed. It is imposed, regardless of the money received or property conveyed.

for what is taxed is the privilege, opportunity and the facility to enter into a transaction.

the transaction being the contract of sale.

Anent the issue of whether Section 173 of the NIRC is applicable to the

transaction in question, we rule in the affirnative.

Documentary stamp tax is an indirect tax, which is susceptible of being shifted

and thus it can be paid indifferently by either party, such that if one party to the

transaction enjoys exemption from the tax, the other party thereto who is tiot exeinpt shall

be the one directly liable to pay the tax. This is true in the case at bar. Since the other

party is the governinent, then the burden to pay the tax should be shouldered by the

private party who does not enjoy the said privilege. It must be noted that tax exemption

of government entities and the political subdivision of the State seems to be a well settled

principle and this exemption from taxation is a matter of public policy (51 Am. Jur. 503)

Suffice it to say in this regard that Petitioner cannot be considered as likewise enjoying

this privilege. Aithough they are a wholly-owned subsidiary of BCDA which is a

government agency created by law, the fact remains that they are still considered a

private entity duly incorporated in accordance with the Corporation Code of the

Philippines (Exhibit A)

With regard to the second issue, we rule in the negative

CTA CASE NO. 6149 PAGE 3 DECISION

We do not agree with the contention of the Petitioner that the transaction subject

of the instant case is exempt from all kinds of taxes, including the documentary stamp

tax, pursuant to the amendatory law (R.A. No. 7917), the pertinent portion of which reads

as follows:

X X X

proceeds of the sale thereof shall not be dimiuished and, therefore exempi from all forms of taxes and fees. "The provisions of koe to the contrary nowithstunding. the

Contrary to the assertion of the Petitioner, the proceeds of the sale will not be

diminished by the payment of the DST. The law explicitly provides "x x x the proceeds

from any sale, after deducting all expenses related to the sale, of portions of Metro

Manila military camps as authorized under this Act, shall be deemed appropriated for the

purposes herein provided x x x". What is appropriated by law for a certain purpose is

merely the proceeds of the sale. The term "proceeds", means incoine, yield, receipts x x

x or other thing or value arising or obtained by the sale of property. (Blacks Law

Dictionary, 6" edition). Proceeds do not include the cost, or expenses as these were

already excluded therefrom. The DST imposed upon the subject transaction is not part of

the proceeds but should be part of the expenses, which should have been anticipated by

the parties in the first place.

As regards the retroactive effect of RA 7917, again we do not subscribe to the

point propounded by the Petitioner. The proviso contained in the amendatory law (RA

7917) which provides that the proceeds of the sale shall be exempt from all forms of

taxes and fees, does not apply to the subject transaction. It is worthy to stress that R.A

CTA CASE NO(9 PAGE DECIO

7917 was enacted on February 24,1995 and the subject transaction took place on

February 8, 1995. It is the contention of the Petitioner that R.A. 7917 was intended te

apply retroactively to the subject transaction as it takes the guise of a curative statute

intended to correct and address the need to redistribute the proceeds from the sale of

military camps in order to meet the greater and wider needs of public service. According

to Petitioner, at the time of its deliberation, Congress was fully aware that the sale of the

subject property to Petitioner had already taken place. It was in fact the only transaction

from which, proceeds from the sale of a military camp were realized by the Republic

Thus, Petitioner contends that R.A. 7917 is a curative statute intended by its authors to be

applied retroactively

Said argunent deserves scant consideration.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as

having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature to give them a

retroactive affect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from ihe language used

(Moutilla vs. Sagules, 24 Phil 220, 1913). The presumption is that all laws operate

prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably

expressed or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved

against the retroactive operation of law. The presumption applies whether the statute is in

the form of an original enactment, an aniendment or a repeal (Comimissioner of Internal

Revenue vs.Fil;ipinas Campania de Seguros107Phil 1055,1960)

As can be gleaned from the minutes of the Senate deliberations on the matter.

nothing was ever said about the law being retroactively applied to the recently concluded

transaction involving the sale of Fort Bonifacio. Neither do thg words therein take the

PAGE15 CTA CASE NO. (9 ECISON

guise of a curative statute. For all intents and purposes, a curative statute is a form of

retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to operate upon past events, acts

or transactions in order to correct crrors and irregularities and to render valid and

effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose

intended (Developnent Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,96 SCRA 342,

Fehruury 28, 1980). In the instant case, nothing could be said with respect to any crrors

or irregularities, which attach to the transaction that took place. The contract between the

government and herein Petitioner was a valid contract, devoid of any defect. There can

be no doubt that RA 7917 which amended Section 8 of RA 7557 looks forward and was

not intended to be applied retroactively as to impair vested rights.

Exemptions from taxation are highly disfavored in iaw, and he who clainis an

exemption from his share of the common burden in taxation inust justify his claim by

showing that the legislature intended to exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken

(Surigao Consolidoted Mining Co., Ine., vs. Collector of Internol Revenue, et al, L

14878, Decemher 26, 1963). The law frowns upon exemption from taxation. For this

reason, statutes granting tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the

taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. The basis for the rule of strict

construction is to minimize the different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and

equality of treatment among taxpayers (Maceda vs. Macaraeg 197 SCRA 771, 1991).

As aptly ruled by the Supreme Court in the case entitled Comuissioner of

Iuternal Revenue vs. Construction Resources of Asia, Inc. 145 SCRA 671 Novemher

25, 1986, citing Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Bohol Land Transportation Co., 107

P 965, 9

CTA CASE NO. 6149 DECISION PAGE 1G

actions are presumed. consideration all the facts to which their attention was called. presumption can be indulged that all of the public officials of the state in the various counties who have to do with the assessnent of property for assessments. taxation will knowingly violate the duties imposed upon them by law. "All presumptions are in favor of the correciness of tax The good faith of tax assessors and the validity of their They will be presumed to have taken into No

show clearly that the assessment was erroneous, in order to relieve himself from it (51 AM.Jur, pp 620-621). of assessments, when such assessments are assailed, the burden of proof is upon the complaining party. It is incumbent upon the property owner to As a logical outgrowth of the presumption in favor of the validity

WIIEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to PAY the amount of

P1,068,412,560.00 representing the deficiency documentary stamp tax for the year 1995

SO ORDERED

GUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR. auLo@.Castaneaa Associate Judge

WE CONCUR:

A1 ERNESTO D. ACOSTA Presiding Judge

LOVELL R.BAUTISTA Associate Judge

DECISION - CTA CASE NO. G9 PAGE 17

CERTHFICATION

I hereby ccrtify that the above decision was reached after due consultation with the

members of the Court of Tax Appeals in accordance with Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution.

ERNESTO D. ACOSTA Wxle- Presiding Judge C