DENSO PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY First Division DENSO PHILIPPINES CTA Case No. 10046 CORPORATION, Petitioner, Members: -versus- DEL ROSARIO, P.J., Chairperson, FABON-VICTORINO , and MANAHAN, JJ. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL Promulgated: REVENUE, Respondent. ){ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - RESOLUTION This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration1 filed on October 29, 2019 praying that this Court's Resolution dated October 2, 2019 (assailed resolution) be reversed and set aside. The dispositive portion of the assailed resolution reads as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent's Motion for Early Resolution on the Issue of Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Petition for Review under CTA Case No. 10046 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED." Petitioner faulted the Court in ruling that its Petition for Review was filed late thereby mistakenly applied Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 54-2014 instead of RMC No. 49-03, and Revenue Audit Memorandum Order (RAMO) Nos. 1-91 and 1-99, in contravention of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 01 - 17. Petitioner insists that the thirty (30)-day period of appeal should have been reckoned from respondent's Notice of Denial dated January 11, 2019 which denied its value-added ta){ (VAT) Refund Application and that the 120-day under Section 1 Dock et , CTA Case No. 10046, pp. 1379- 1388.

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 10046 112(C) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, from the time of its complete submission of documents should not be made applicable to its refund application. Petitioner also avers that its petition still falls under this Court's "Other Matters" jurisdiction. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction in its petition. On the other hand, respondent, in his Comment2 , which was filed on November 21, 2019, argues that this Court was correct in dismissing the instant petition for lack of jurisdiction and that even it is within this Court's jurisdiction on "Other Matters", said petition was filed out of time. We deny the instant motion. Petitioner was totally mistaken when it interpreted that the assailed resolution had applied RMC No. 54-2014. On the contrary, the disquisitions in the assailed resolution citing the ruling in Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenufi3, had impliedly stated that said regulation is not applicable in the instant case considering that the factual antecedent herein occurred prior to such issuance, to wit: "Prior to June 11, 2014, the issuance date of RMC No. 54-2014, the applicant/claimant had thirty (30) days within which to submit the complete documentary requirements sufficient to support his claim, unless given further extension by the respondent. Then, upon filing by the taxpayer of his complete documents to support his application, or expiration of the period given, the CIR has 120 days within which to decide the claim for tax credit or refund. If, however, the applicant/claimant manifests that he no longer wishes to submit any other additional documents to complete his administrative claim, the 120-day period shall begin to run from the date of filing." Petitioner is also mistaken in assuming that the filing of its appeal should have been reckoned from the date when respondent issued said Notice of Denial. It is clear from the cited case in the preceding paragraph that petitioner as a claimant for refund of excess and/ or unutilized input value- added taxes (VAT) had 30 days to submit its complete 2 Docket, Comment (On Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October 20 19), pp. 1393-1402. 'G.R. No. 207112, December 08,2015.

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 10046 documentary requirements sufficient to support his claim unless given an extension of time, and upon submission of such documents, the 120-day period within which respondent had to act, shall commence. In the instant case, it is the petitioner itself who alleged that the date of filing of each VAT refund application was the same date when it submitted its complete supporting documents, thus, the assailed resolution ruled on the following prescribed dates, to wit: In the instant case, petitioner did allege that the date of filing of each VAT refund application was the date when it submitted its complete supporting documents. Thus, the reckoning date for the two (2)-year period and 120-day period shall be counted from the date of filing of the administrative claim for input VAT refund, to wit: Quarter Last day of filing of Date of Filing of Last day of the Ending claim for refund Administrative 120-day period March 31, 2005 December 31, 2005 March 31, 2007 Claim May 29,2007 March 31, 2006 December 31, 2007 January 29, 2007 May 29,2007 June 30, 2006 January 29, 2007 May 29,2007 December 31, 2006 March 31, 2008 January 29, 2007 May 29,2007 June 30, 2007 June 30 2008 January 29, 2007 March 26, 2009 September 30, 2007 December 31, 2008 November 26, 2008 March 26, 2009 March 31, 2008 June 30, 2009 November 26, 2008 January 21, 2010 September 30, 2009 September 23, 2009 July 28, 2010 March 31, 2010 March 30, 2010 XXX XXX XXX Applying the above-mentioned provision of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, and cases above-cited, petitioner has 30- days from the last day of said 120-period to file an appeal before this Court or until the following dates, to wit: Quarter Last day of the Last day of the 30-day Ending 120-day period period to Appeal March 31, 2005 May 29,2007 June 28 2007 December 31, 2005 May 29,2007 June 28, 2007 March 31, 2006 May 29,2007 June 28, 2007 June 30, 2006 May 29,2007 June 28, 2007 December 31 2006 March 26, 2009 April 25, 2007 June 30 2007 March 26, 2009 April 25, 2007 September 30, 2007 January 21, 2010 February 20, 2010 March 31, 2008 July 28, 2010 August 27, 2010 Petitioner should be aware that its allegation that respondent "was in the middle of verification process" on its refund application is of no moment in the running of the prescription period for filing an appeal before this Court after the lapse of the 120-day period to act on said application

RESOLUTION CTA Case No. 10046 because any intervening event will not affect the running of said prescriptive period. Lastly, as to the jurisdiction of this Court on "other matters" in the 1997 NIRC and other laws implemented by the respondent, it is true that this Court has jurisdiction on said issue as provided under Section 7(a)(1) of Republic Act (RA) No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282. However, such jurisdiction is not absolute but preconditioned that the appeal has not yet prescribed at the time of its filing. In the instant case, the appeal, through the filing of petitioner's petition for review on March 8, 2019, has already prescribed. Hence, even if the issue raised was within the ambit of "other matters" on jurisdiction, this Court was already precluded from taking cognizance of the instant case since the appeal was filed out of time, hence, vesting no jurisdiction on the court. There being no other new issues or matters raised by the respondent in the instant motion, this Court finds no compelling reason to reverse the ruling in the assailed resolution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Resolution dated October 2, 2019 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Presiding Justice ~ ~�r-~ . FASON-VICTORINO CATHERINE T. MANAHAN ciate Justice Associate Justice