PHILIPPINE PHARMA PROCUREMENT, INC. (FORMERLY: PITC PHARMA, INC.) v. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER CAESAR R. DULAY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OF TAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY ENBANC ********* PHILIPPINE PHARMA CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) PROCUREMENT, INC. Present: (FORMERLY: PITC DEL ROSARIO, PJ. , PHARMA, INC.), CASTANEDA, JR., UY, Petitioner, RINGPIS-LIBAN, MANAHAN, -versus- BACORRO-VILLENA, and MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, JJ. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER Promulgated: CAESAR R. DULAY, JAN 2 5 202 ~ Respondent. d:s~� ~. X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X DECISION UY, J.: This is a Petition for Review1 filed on July 4, 2019 by Philippine Pharma Procurement, Inc. (Formerly: PITC Pharma, Inc.) against the Bureau of Internal Revenue, represented by Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated March 7, 2019 and June 13, 2019, rendered by the Second Division of this Court, in CTA Case No. 9734, entitled , "Philippine Pharma Procurement, Inc. (formerly: PITC Pharma, Inc.), Petitioner vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, represented by Commissioner Caesar 1 EB Docket, pp. 1 to 18. ~

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) R. Dulay, Respondent." The dispositive portions thereof respectively read as follows: Resolution dated March 7, 2019: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. SO ORDERED." Resolution dated June 13, 2019: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (of the 7 March 2019 Resolution) is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED." THE FACTS Petitioner Philippine Pharma Procurement, Inc. (PPPI) is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) attached to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It is 60% owned by the Philippine International Trading Corporation and 40% owned by the National Development Company. Its primary mandate is to be the lead coordinating agency to make quality medicines available, affordable, and accessible to the greater masses of Filipinos. 2 Its office is located at 2"d Floor, NDC Building, 116 Tordesillas Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. 3 Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) heads the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), and is empowered to perform the duties of his office, including, among others, the power to decide, cancel, and abate tax liabilities pursuant to Section 204 (B) of the NIRC, R.A. No. 8424, as amended.4 On December 15, 2017, PPPI filed its Petition for Review before the Court in Division, assailing the SIR's Decision dated November 6, 2017, affirming the Final Decision on Disputed 2 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, p. II. 3 EB Docket, p. I. 4 EB Docket, p. 2. -~ 5 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 10 to 29. ~ _

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Assessment on the deficiency income tax assessment for TY 2007 against petitioner. On March 6, 2018, the BIR filed its Answef interposing, among others, the following special and affirmative defenses: 1. The case pertains to a tax dispute between government agencies, including GOCCs, involving purely questions of law. In such a case, the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction to settle or adjudicate the tax dispute. 2. If a court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, its only jurisdiction is to dismiss the case, and the court cannot decide on the merits. Thus, the Petition for Review should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 3. Pursuant to Section 34 (D) (1) (a) of the NIRC, losses should be sustained during the taxable year. Thus, the expired medicines should have been destroyed during the same year, in order to be allowed as a deduction. 4. Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith, and the taxpayer has the duty of proving otherwise. 5. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should be calculated without unnecessary hindrance. The case was set for pre-trial conference on May 24, 2018, and only the BIR filed its Pre-Trial Briet,? In view of the absence of PPI's counsel during the Pre-Trial Conference, and for failure of petitioner to file its Pre-Trial Brief, the oral motion of the SIR's counsel for the dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute was granted, and the Petition for Review was dismissed on May 24, 2018. 8 On May 29, 2018, the Court in Division received a copy of the Entry of Appearance (With Motion to Cancel Pre- Trial), filed by GOCC as counsel for PPPI, through registered mail on May 22, 2018_e Thereafter, PPPI filed its Motion for Reconsideration (of the 24 May 6 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 206 to 209. 7 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 238 to 241. 8 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, p. 245. 9 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 253 to 257~

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) 2018 Order) 10 on June 18, 2018, without the BIR's comment, despite notice, as per Records Verification 11 dated July 16, 2018. In the Resolution 12 dated August 3, 2018, PPPI's Motion for Reconsideration was granted, and the Pre-Trial Conference was held on October 11,2018. On November 6, 2018, the BIR filed a Motion to Dismiss, 13 alleging inter alia, that the applicable law between the parties is P.O. No. 242, and the Court in Division does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. For its part, PPPI filed its Opposition (to the Motion to Dismiss) 14 on January 11, 2019, alleging that the case of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 15 (PSALM case) does not apply, since the factual circumstances that gave rise to that case does not exist in connection with PPPI's Petition for Review. In the assailed Resolution16 dated March 7, 2019, the Court in Division granted the BIR's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. PPPI filed its Motion for Reconsideration (of the 7 March 2019 Resolution) 17 on April 3, 2019, without the BIR's comment, as per Records Verification 18 dated May 9, 2019. In the Resolution 19 dated June 13, 2019, the Court in Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Undaunted, PPPI filed the instant Petition for Revievl0 on July 4, 2019. In the Resolution21 dated November 7, 2019, the BIR was 10 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 261 to 266. 11 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, p. 270. 12 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 273 to 278. 13 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, pp. 441 to 445. 14 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. II, pp. 448 to 461. 15 G.R. No. 198146,August 8, 2017. 16 EB Docket, pp. 20 to 26. 17 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. II, pp. 470 to 483. 18 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. II, p. 486. 1 19 EB Docket, pp. 27 to 29. 20 EB Docket, pp. I to 18. 21 EB Docket, pp. 64 to 65. ( '

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) directed to file its Comment to the Petition for Review, within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent BIR, however, failed to file the required Comment, as per Records Verification22 dated January 14, 2020. In view thereof, the instant Petition for Review was submitted for Decision on February 7, 2020.23 Hence, this Decision. ISSUE Petitioner PPPI raises a sole issue for the Court En Bane's resolution, to wit: "WHETHER THE CTA HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR, TRY AND DECIDE THE PETITION FILED BY PPPI."24 Petitioner's arguments: PPPI contends that the PSALM case does not apply, since the factual circumstances that gave rise to that case does not exist in connection with PPPI's Petition. In the PSALM case, the filing of a petition for the settlement of claims before the Department of Justice (DOJ), pursuant to P.O. No. 242, as amended by Sections 66 to 71, Chapter 14, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code is not an appeal from the BIR assessment, but an original action. It was an arbitration proceeding agreed upon by PSALM and the BIR pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated August 30, 2007, executed together with the National Power Corporation (NPC). In this case, however, PPPI stresses that there was no MOA between PPPI and the CIR. Moreover, according to PPPI, R.A. No. 9282 and R.A. No. 9503 are later laws that effectively established the legislative intent to retain the CTA's exclusive appellate jurisdiction, even if the party involved is a government agency. Considering that PPPI protested the CIR's assessment, and the assessment ripened into a final decision on disputed assessment, the remedy provided by law is allegedly an appeal to the CTA. 22 EB Docket, p. 66. / f 23 EB Docket, pp. 68 to 69. 24 EB Docket, p. 5.

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Finally, PPPI avers that policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of the specialized expertise of the CTA. THE COURT EN BANC'S RULING The instant Petition for Review lacks merit. Sections 66, 67, and 68 of Chapter 14, Book IV of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, lay down the guidelines in settling disputes, claims and controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including GOCCs, to wit: "SEC. 66. How Settled. - All disputes. claims and controversies. solely between or among the departments. bureaus, offices. agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government. including government-owned or controlled corporations. such as those arising from the interpretation and application of statutes. contracts or agreements. shall be administratively settled or adjudicated in the manner provided in this Chapter. This Chapter shall, however, not apply to disputes involving the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions, and local governments. SEC. 67. Disputes Involving Questions of Law. - All cases involving only questions of law shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice as Attorney-General of the National Government and as ex officio legal adviser of all government-owned or controlled corporations. His ruling or decision thereon shall be conclusive and binding on all the parties concerned. SEC. 68. Disputes Involving Questions of Fact and Law. - Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only factual issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by: (1) The Solicitor General, if the dispute, claim or controversy involves only departments, bureaus, offices ,a and other agencies of the National Government as well as

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) government-owned or controlled corporations or entities of whom he is the principal law officer or general counsel; and (2) The Secretary of Justice, in all other cases not falling under paragraph (1 ). " (Emphases supplied) Based on the foregoing provisions, cases involving only questions of law, between and among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including GOCCs, shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). On the other hand, cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact, or purely factual issues shall be submitted to the Solicitor General if the latter is the principal law officer or general counsel of the parties, otherwise, the issues shall be submitted to and resolved by the SOJ. In the PSALM case, the interpretation of the foregoing provisions, and its predecessor, P.O. No. 242, which has substantially the same provisions, was elucidated upon by the Supreme Court En Bane, as follows: "The primary issue in this case is whether the DOJ Secretary has jurisdiction over OSJ Case No. 2007-3 which involves the resolution of whether the sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway Plant and Magat Plant is subject to VAT. We agree with the Court of Appeals that jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by the Constitution or by law, and not by the parties to an action. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or acquiescence of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court, quasi-judicial office or government agency that it exists. However, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that the DOJ is vested by law with jurisdiction over this case. This case involves a dispute between PSALM and NPC, which are both wholly government owned corporations, and the BIR. a government office, over the imposition of VAT on the sale of the two power plants. There is no question that original jurisdiction is with the CIR, who issues the preliminary and the final tax assessments. However, if th~

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) government entity disputes the tax assessment, the dispute is already between the BIR (represented by the CIR) and another government entity, in this case, the petitioner PSALM. Under Presidential Decree No. 242 (PO 242), all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and offices. including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and government agencies involved. As regards cases involving only questions of law, it is the Secretary of Justice who has jurisdiction. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of PO 242 read: Section 1. Provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus. offices. agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including constitutional offices or agencies. arising from the interpretation and application of statutes. contracts or agreements. shall henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That, this shall not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity of this decree. Section 2. In all cases involving only questions of law. the same shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, as Attorney General and ex officio adviser of all government owned or controlled corporations and entities, in consonance with Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. His ruling or determination of the question in each case shall be conclusive and binding upon all the parties concerned. Section 3. Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only factual fJ issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by:

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) (a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims [or] controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices and other agencies of the National Government; (b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or claims or controversies between or among the government-owned or controlled corporations or entities being served by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel; and (c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other disputes or claims or controversies which do not fall under the categories mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b). x x x The use of the word 'shall' in a statute connotes a mandatory order or an imperative obligation. Its use rendered the provisions mandatory and not merely permissive, and unless PO 242 is declared unconstitutional, its provisions must be followed. The use of the word 'shall' means that administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes and claims between government agencies and offices, including government-owned controlled corporations, is not merely permissive but mandatory and imperative. Thus. under PO 242. it is mandatory that disputes and claims 'solely' between government agencies and offices. including government- owned or controlled corporations. involving only questions of law. be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretarv of Justice. The law is clear and covers 'all disputes. claims and controversies solely between or among the departments. bureaus. offices. agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including constitutional offices or agencies arising from the interpretation and application of statutes. contracts or agreements.' When the law says 'all disputes, claims and controversies solely' among government agencies, the law means all, without exception. Only those cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity of PO 242 are not covered by the law.~

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) The purpose of PO 242 is to provide for a speedy and efficient administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes between government offices or agencies under the Executive branch, as well as to filter cases to lessen the clogged dockets of the courts. .. XXX XXX XXX The second paragraph of Section 4 of the 1997 NIRC, providing for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA as regards the CIR's decision on matters involving disputed assessments, refunds in internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under NIRC, is in conflict with PO 242. Under PO 242, all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and government agencies involved. To harmonize Section 4 of the 1997 NIRC with PD 242. the following interpretation should be adopted: (1) As regards private entities and the BIR. the power to decide disputed assessments. refunds of internal revenue taxes. fees or other charges. penalties in relation thereto. or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR is vested in the CIR subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA in accordance with Section 4 of the NIRC; and (2) Where the disputing parties are all public entities (covers disputes between the BIR and other government entities), the case shall be governed by PD 242. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 1997 NIRC is a general law governing the imposition of national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges. On the other hand, PD 242 is a special law that applies only to disputes involving solely government offices, agencies, or instrumentalities. .. XXX XXX XXX !d

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Page II of 14 Thus. even if the 1997 NIRC, a general statute, is a later act. PD 242. which is a special law, will still prevail and is treated as an exception to the terms of the 1997 NIRC with regard solely to intra- governmental disputes. PO 242 is a special law while the 1997 NIRC is a general law. insofar as disputes solely between or among government agencies are concerned. Necessarily, such disputes must be resolved under PO 242 and not under the NIRC, precisely because PO 242 specifically mandates the settlement of such disputes in accordance with PO 242. PO 242 is a valid law prescribing the procedure for administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes among government offices, agencies, and instrumentalities under the executive control and supervision of the President. XXX XXX XXX PO 242 is now embodied in Chapter 14, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, which took effect on 24 November 1989... " From the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, it is established that where the disputing parties are all public entities, the case shall be governed by PO No. 242 (which is now embodied in Chapter 14, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987), which requires that it shall be administratively settled or adjudicated in the manner provided therein, i.e., the matter shall be brought either before the Secretary of Justice or the Solicitor General, as the case may be. Moreover, the Supreme Court, sitting En Bane, was categorical in ruling that when the law says 'a// disputes, claims and controversies solely' among government agencies, the law means "all", without exception. It was, however, emphasized that PO No. 242 will only apply when all the parties involved are purely government offices and/or GOCCs. The Supreme Court En Bane, likewise noted the conflicting provisions of the NIRC of 1997 and PO No. 242. Under PO No. 242, it is provided that all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and offices, including GOCCs are within the jurisdiction of the SOJ, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporajvo

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Counsel, as the case may be. On the other hand, Section 4 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction as regards petitioner's decision on matters involving disputed assessments, refunds in internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under NIRC. In order to harmonize these seemingly conflicting laws, the Supreme Court adopted the following interpretation in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR, to wit: 1. As regards private entities and the BIR, the decision of petitioner is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court, in accordance with Section 4 of the NIRC; and 2. Where the disputing parties are all public entities, the case shall be governed by PD No. 242 (which is now embodied in Chapter 14, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987), where the dispute shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and government agencies involved. In fact, the foregoing summation of rules was subsequently affirmed and applied in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Secretary of Justice and Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), 25 where the Supreme Court likewise upheld the jurisdiction of the SOJ over the tax dispute between the BIR and Metropolitan Cebu Water District, a local water district, pursuant to PD No. 198, also known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. Thus, unless and until the foregoing interpretation is modified by the Supreme Court, sitting En Bane, this Court is mandated to apply the same, as judicial decisions applying or interpretin~ the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the law of the land.2 In this case, it is undisputed that both of the parties involved are public entities. Petitioner PPPI, is a GOCC,27 attached to DTI, while respondent BIR, is a government office. 25 G.R. No. 209289, July 9, 2018. f1J 26 See Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines. 27 Docket (CTA Case No. 9734), Vol. I, p. 11.

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Considering that both parties are public entities under the Executive Branch of the government, it is evident that the instant case should be governed by PD No. 242 (which is now embodied in Chapter 14, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987) and not by the NIRC of 1997, as amended. Hence, jurisdiction over the case vests with the SOJ, and not with this Court. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated March 7, 2019 and June 13, 2019, rendered by the Second Division of this Court, in CTA Case No. 9734 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. ERLI~P.UY Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ( With Concur"Hf'ig Opinion ) ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO Presiding Justice S2~t:- c' ~'01..~ ~' JtiANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR. Associate Justice '~� ~ .-///~ ( With Dissenting Opinion ) MA. BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice /)~' ,..,._~ CA'THERINE T!n,ANAHAN Associate Justice

DECISION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Page 14of14 ~ MARIA BSTO-SAN PEDRO Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. L ROSARIO Presiding Justice

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY ENBANC PHILIPPINE PHARMA CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) PROCUREMENT, INC. Present: (FORMERLY: PITC PHARMA, DEL ROSARIO, P.J. , INC.), CASTANEDA, JR., UY, Petitioner, RINGPIS-LIBAN, MANAHAN , -versus- BACORRO-VILLENA, and MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, JJ. BUREAU OF INTERNAL Promulgated: REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER CAESAR JAN 2 5 20~= R. DULAY, ..3.~'l� ~ Respondent. X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X CONCURRING OPINION DEL ROSARIO, P.J.: I concur with the ponencia of my learned colleague, Honorable Associate Justice Erlinda P. Uy. I, however, wish to address the following : First- The fact that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) is vested by Republic Act (RA) No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282, with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, among others, does not reasonably justify non- observance of Presidential Decree (PO) No. 242 vis-a-vis Section 70, Chapter 14, Book IV of Executive Order (EO) No. 292. ~

CONCURRING OPINION CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA CASE No. 9734) Truth be told, Batas Pambansa (BP) Big. 129 vests exclusive original jurisdiction over specified cases to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Yet, the Supreme Court, in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1("PSALM"}, emphasized that controversies between or among any government entities shall be administratively settled, mindful of the exclusive jurisdiction of courts, obviously in recognition of the Constitutional power of the President to control all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Second - While EO No. 292, supra, declares the decision of the President as final, and expectedly will not be assailed by any Office under him, it is inaccurate to say that no judicial remedy is available to the government entity involved in the controversy. The Constitution is plain -- the Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, 2 all of which are available in instances where there is "no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The judicial power of the Supreme Court includes the duty to settle actual controversies and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. 3 All told, I CONCUR with the ponencia. ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO Presiding Justice 1 G.R. No. 198146, August 8, 2017. 2 Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution. 3 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES COURT OFTAX APPEALS QUEZON CITY ENBANC PHILIPPINE PHARMA CTA EB NO. 2096 PROCUREMENT, INC. (CL-\ Case No. 9734) (FORMERLY: PITC PHARMA, INC.), Petitioner, P resent: DEL ROSARIO, P.J., CASTANEDA, JR., -versus- UY, RINGPIS-LIBAN, MANAHAN, BUREAU OF INTERNAL BACORRO-VILLENA, and REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,JJ. COMMISSIONER CAESAR R. D U LAY, Pro mulgated: Respondent ~ ~ ~ ~-':J"A_"N-:~ 2~~ ~5~2~~ -~?=-::-_-::3~.', ff~~ot. X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DISSENTING OPINION RINGPIS-LIBAN, .[: With all due respect, I dissent fro m the majority ruling that the dispute between Petitioner, a government-owned and controlled corporation ("GOCC"), and the Bureau o f Internal Revenue ("BIR") is no t under the jurisdiction o f the Court o f Tax ~\ppeals ("CT.[\ "), and conseguently, the dismissal of CT.\ Case No. 9734 is proper. Indeed, following the provisio ns o f P residential D ecree ("P.D. ") No. 2421, the Supreme Court in Power Sedor Assets and L iabilities 1\fanagemen/ Corporation IJ. ~ Prescribing The Procedure For Administrative Settlement Or Adjudication Of Disputes, Claims And Controversies Between Or Among Government Offices, Agencies And Instrumenta lities, I ncl uding Government-Owned Or Controlled Corporations, And For Other Purposes, July 09, 1973 .

Dissenting Opinion CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Commissioner of Internal Revenut? ("PSALM v. CIR") decreed that "under Presidential Decree No. 242 (PD 242), all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be administratively setded or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues and government agencies involved". However, the doctrine in PSALM v. CIR should not be sweepingly applied to all cases involving disputes between government entities, especially in cases when the controversy is between a government agency or GOCC and the BIR. For one, the factual antecedents in PSALM v. CIR differs in the case at bar. The controversy arose in the said case when BIR demanded payment of deficiency value-added tax ("VAT") from National Power Corporation ("NPC") arising from the sale of two power plants. NPC indorsed BIR's demand letter to Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation ("PSALM"). Following this, the parties (i.e., NPC, PSALM and BIR) executed a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA"), agreeing on the following stipulations among others: 1) that NPC/PSALM shall remit under protest to the BIR basic VAT amounting to Php3,813,080,472.00, 2) that NPC/PSALM and BIR mutually undertake to seek final resolution of the issues on the deficiency VAT due by the appropriate courts or body, and 3) that any resolution in favor of NPC/PSALM by any appropriate court or body shall be immediately executory without necessity of notice or demand from NPC/PSALM. Moreover, a ruling from the Department ofJustice ("DOJ") that is favorable to NPC/PSALM shall be tantamount to the filing of an application for refund (in cash)/tax credit certificate (fCC), at the option ofNPC:/PSALM. PSALM did pay the deficiency VAT pursuant to the MOA it signed with BIR and the NPC. Thereafter, PSALM filed with the DOJ a petition for the adjudication of the dispute with the BIR to resolve the issue of whether the sale of the power plants should be subject to VAT. The DOJ ruled in favor of PSALM, declaring the deficiency VAT assessment null and void. The CIR then questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ via a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ("CA"), reasoning that the dispute involved tax laws administered by the BIR and therefore within the jurisdiction of the CTA. The CA declared that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the ruling for it was the CTA who had jurisdiction. PSALM appealed to the Supreme Court which decreed that the DOJ indeed has jurisdiction. ~ 2 G.R. No. 198146, August 08, 2017.

Dissenting Opinion CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) The instant petition, on the other hand, involves Petitioner, a GOCC, and the CIR, as head of the BIR. There was an assessment in the form of an FDDA, which was issued by the CIR as a result of its findings. As there was a final decision on the assessment on the part of the CIR, Petitioner found recourse to this Court pursuant to the judicial remedy laid down for taxpayers in Section 7(a)(1) of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282. In both cases, the taxpayers involved pursued remedies made available to them by law, given their factual circumstances. In PSALM v. CIR, there was no decision or inaction (on a disputed assessment) to speak of as the actions of the parties were governed by the Memorandum of Agreement. Hence, PSALM could not have appealed to the CTA, even if it wanted to, as the CTA would have no jurisdiction over the same. That is not the situation involved in the instant case wherein Petitioner sought legal redress granted to them by law, specifically Section 7(a)(1) of R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, a law not even remotely discussed in PSALM v. CIR as focus therein was on Section 43 of the National Internal Revenue Code ("NIRC") of 1997, as amended, which dealt with the powers of CIR and not the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Accordingly, in the absence of any agreement between the parties on the voluntary submission of the tax issues to the DOJ, the default provision on CTA's exclusive appellate jurisdiction should prevail. Thus, in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, and Regional Diredor, Revenue Region No. 64, the Supreme Court ruled that the petition for review before the Cl'A was filed out of time, despite the fact that the party with a tax issue with the CIR (i.e., P AGCOR) is a GOCC. For that matter, the said case made no mention of P.D. No. 242, but it was unequivocally established that an appeal to an assessment issued by the BIR against a taxpayer, should be lodged with the CTA. In ascertaining whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction in this particular case, what ought to be weighed against P.D. No. 242 is R.A. No. 9282 which amended R.A. No. 1125. R.A. No. 9282, expanded the jurisdiction of the CTA and elevated its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction./V' 3 SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. -The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance. The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. 4 G.R. No. 208731, January 27, 2016.

Dissenting Opinion erA EB No. 2096 (erA Case No. 9734) The difference between a special law and a general law was discussed in Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortttne Tobacco Coporation": "A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only. A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication."(� P.D. No. 242 is a general law on the authority of the Secretary of Justice to setde and adjudicate all disputes, claims and controversies between or among national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including GOCCs while R.A. No. 9282 is a specific law vesting exclusive appellate jurisdiction on the CTA in cases pertaining to disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC of 1997, as amended. Furthermore, P.D. No. 242 was issued on July 09, 1973. The Administrative Code of 1997 which embodies the provisions of P.D. No. 242 took effect on November 24, 1989. On the other hand, R.A. No. 9282 which expanded the jurisdiction of the CTA and elevated its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction took effect on April23, 2004. Therefore, R.A. No. 9282, the special law that was passed later, must be regarded as an exception to or qualification of P.D. No. 242, the prior general law. / 5 G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007. 6 Emphasis supplied.

Dissenting Opinion CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) From the foregoing, it would seem that P.D. No. 242 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have been repealed by R.A. No. 9282, albeit partially, considering that not only is it the later enactment, having taken effect on April 23, 2004, but it is also a special law that must prevail over the general one. And yet, in the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle, embodied in the maxim, "ut res magis valeat quam pereat', that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without violence to the spirit and language of an act, so interpret the statute to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.7 Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare fegibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.8 In light of the foregoing doctrine, the only way to harmonize two (2) seemingly contradictory laws is to declare that when the controversy between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including GOCCs involve any of the matters listed in Section 7(a) ofR.A. No. 9282, then it is the CTA who has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. All other controversies between or among the aforementioned parties that do not involve taxation matters or interpretation of the provisions of the NIRC: of 1997, as amended, may properly follow the procedure for administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes laid down in P.D. No. 242 and the A.dministrative Code of 1987. r/ 7 Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs and Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969 citing 50 Am. Jur. 358-359. 8 AKBAYAN- Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II- Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, Patricia Q. Picar, Myla Gail Z. Tamondong, Emmanuel E. Ombao, Johnny Acosta, Archie John Talaue, Ryan Dapitan, Christopher Oarde, Jose Mari Modesto, Richard M. Valencia, Edben Tabucol v. Commission on Election, G.R. Nos. 147066 & 147179, March 26, 2001.

Dissenting Opinion CTA EB No. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) To say otherwise would have adverse effects not only on the jurisdiction of the CTA, but also on the remedies available to the CIR. This was discussed in the Dissenting Opinion ofJustice Mariano C. Del Castillo in PSAIM v. CIR: "It must be pointed out that to allow the Secretary ofJustice to have jurisdiction over the instant case would not only deprive the CTA of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction but would also deprive respondent CIR of any judicial remedy. The Majority Opinion recommends that 'since the amount involved in this case is more than one million pesos, respondent CIR may appeal the DOJ Secretary's Decision to the Office of the President in accordance with Section 70, Chapter 14, Book IV of EO 292 and Section 5 of PD 242.' However, if the appeal to the Office of the President were denied, respondent CIR would have no judicial recourse. Respondent CIR would not be able to appeal the decision of the Office of the President to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court because the CA has no jurisdiction to review tax cases. Neither can respondent CIR ftle a Petition with the CTA because the CTA has no jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of President or the Secretary ofJustice." There can be no doubt that the CTA, by the very nature of its functions, has developed an expertise on the subject of taxation because it is a specialized court dedicated exclusively to the study, consideration and resolution of tax and customs cases 9 As such, it would be somewhat incongruent to conclude that the intention of the lawmakers is to divide the authority over tax appeal cases between taxpayers who are government offices, agencies and instrumentalities on one hand and private entities and individuals on the other. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases applies to both types of taxpayers. From all the foregoing, I vote to REVERSE the Resolutions dated March 07, 2019 and June 13, 2019 in CTA Case No. 9734. The instant Petition for Review should be GRANTED. Accordingly, this case should be REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division for further proceedings on the merits of the assessment case. ~- ~ --'). t..___ MA BELEN M. RINGPIS-LIBAN Associate Justice 9 See Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 168856, August 29, 2012; Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of The Bureau Of Customs, G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Court of Tax Appeals QUEZON CITY En Bane PHILIPPINE PHARMA CTA EB NO. 2096 PROCUREMENT, INC. (CTA Case No. 9 734) (FORMERLY: PITC PHARMA, INC.), Petitioner, Present: DEL ROSARIO, P.J., CASTANEDA, JR., UY, -versus- RINGPIS-LIBAN, MANAHAN, BACORRO-VILLENA, and MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, JJ BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY COMMISSIONER CAESAR R. Promulgated: DULAY, --------------------R---e--s-p--o---n--d-e--n--t-.-----J---A---N-----2---5----2--0--~ -~�� ::n~:.-~cY-":~ ~ x -------------------------- DISSENTING OPINION MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, J. : With due respect, I dissent from the Decision penned by my honorable colleague, Associate Justice Erlinda P. Uy denying the present Petition for Review and affirming the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Second Division (" Court in Division") in CTA Case No. 9734, dated 07 March 2019 and 13 June 2019, respectively. In dismissing the original Petition for Review for lack of jurisdiction, the Court in Division relied in Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal R evenue (hereinafter referred to as "PSALM Case'') 1 invoking Presidential Decree No. 242 ("PD No. 242'').2 In the said case, the Court in Division ruled thatt 1 G. R. No. 198 146, 8 August 201 7. 2 Prescribing the Procedure for Administrati ve Settle ment or Adjud ication of Disputes, C laims and Controversies Between or Among Government Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities, Including Governme nt-Owned or Controlled Corporations, and for Other Purposes, 9 July 1973.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB NO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Page 2 of IO the CTA has no jurisdiction over all disputes, claims, and controversies between departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government, including GOCCs (hereinafter referred to as "National Government Entities"). The specific portion relied upon by the Court in Division, is hereby quoted, to wit: Section 1. Provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including constitutional offices or agencies, arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That this shall not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity of this decree. Section 2. In all cases involving only questions of law, the same shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, as Attorney General and ex officio legal adviser of all government-owned or controlled corporations and entities, in consonance with section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. His ruling or determination of the question in each case shall be conclusive and binding upon all the parties concerned. Section 3. Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only factual issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by: (a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices and other agencies of the National Government; (b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or claims or controversies between or among the government-owned or controlled corporations or entities being served by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel; and (c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other disputes or claims or controversies which do not fall under the categories mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).3 However, a perusal of the aforementioned provision proves that not all controversies between or among National Government Entities fall under the mandate of PD No. 242. The case of Orion Water District, et. a/. v. The Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as "Orion Case''), 4 citing the case of Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC), et. a/. v. Judge Velet illustrates this point, to wit: "As properly held by the CA, the provisions of E.O. No. 292 are inapplicable in the instant case. It bears to stress that not all r controversies between or among government offices, departments or instrumentalities fall under the mentioned provisions of E.O. No. 292. 3 Emphasis supplied. 4 G.R. No. 195382, 15 June 2016. 5 G.R. No. 84295, 18 July 1991.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB NO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) To fully understand the scope of the law, reference must be made to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 242, the precursor of Chapter 14, Book IV ofE.O. No. 292, from which the entirety of the provisions in question was lifted. Under P.D. No. 242, it was clearly articulated that it only applies to particular instances of disputes among government offices. Section 1 thereof states: SEC. I. Provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including constitutional offices or agencies, arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That this shall not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity ofthis decree. (Emphasis ours) That the law is not all-encompassing was elaborated in Philippine Veterans Investment Develooment Corporation (PHIVIDEC) v. Judge Velez, where the Court emphasized that P.D. No. 242 applies only to certain cases of disputes. It does not intrude into the jurisdiction of regular courts as it "only prescribes an administrative procedure for the settlement of certain tvpes of disputes between or among departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities ofthe National Government, including !GOCCs], so that they need not always repair to the courts for the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements." Section I ofP.D. No. 242 is now Section 66, Chapter 14, Book IV ofE.O. No. 292. Although there was a noticeable change in the language of the law, there was no indication of an intention to broaden its scope far larger than the original law. Section 66 reads as follows: SEC. 66. How Settled.-All disputes, claims and controversies, solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, such as those arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated in the manner provided in this Chapter. This Chapter shall, however, not apply to disputes involving the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions, and local governments. Following the ejusdem generis rule on statutory construction, disputes that should be referred to administrative arbitration must relate to the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements, or any other cases of similar nature. The usage of the phrase "such as those arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements" in the provision means that the situation must be held similar or analogous to those expressly enumerated in the law in question. ~

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB NO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Page4ofl0 It does not need further elaboration that the instant case does not partake of the instances contemplated in Section 66. The complaint filed by GSIS does not concern the interpretation of a law, contract or agreement between government agencies. It is a complaint for collection of sum of money, specifically to unremitted premium contributions which by law, the OWD, as the employer, is mandated to deliver to GSIS within the prescribed period of time. There is no obscure question oflaw or ambiguous provision of a contract involved that resulted to a discord between GSIS and OWD, which could have warranted the application of Section 66. On the contrary, the law is unequivocal with respect to the duty of GSIS to ensure the prompt collection of contributions and OWD's responsibility, as an employer, to deduct and remit contributions to the system. Unfortunately, OWD reneged in its obligation and refused to comply despite repeated notices; hence, the filing of a complaint for collection of unremitted contributions by GSIS. In the Orion Case, the Supreme Court ratiocinated that PD No. 242 is merely an administrative procedure which does not intend to cover all claims or disputes between and among the different National Government Entities. It is only limited to cases involving the settlement of controversies arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts or agreements. Following the doctrine in the Orion Case, it is clear that the herein case is not within the scope of PD No. 242 since the original Petition for Review does not involve the interpretation of statute, contract or agreement but an issue questioning the correctness of the assessment issued by respondent against petitioner. Furthermore, to affirm the ruling of the Court in Division dismissing the instant case for lack ofjurisdiction runs against the constitutional mandate of the judiciary under Article VIII, Section I ofthe 1987 Constitution which states: "Section I. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."6 Judicial Power is defined as "the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts ofjustice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights".7 The concept behind the same was further elaborated by the Supreme Court in the case of Lopez v. Roxas,8 to wit:~ 6 Emphasis supplied. 7 Lopez v. Roxas, L-25716, 28 July 1966. 8 Ibid

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB NO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Page 5 of!O "This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but "the" judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts", subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamentallaw."9 Based on the foregoing, the lower courts' exercise of authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes is dependent on legislative action, meaning the jurisdiction ofthe lower courts must first be defined by Congress through a law before it can exercise its judicial power. However, it is also undeniable that, once said right is granted, the lower courts' power to decide on cases is absolute, except if limited by the constitution or by law. As in the case of the CTA, Congress enacted Republic Act ("RA'') No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282 and RA No. 9503 (hereinafter referred to as "CTA Law''),10 which is the law defining the jurisdiction of the CTA over the following relevant instances, to wit: "Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise: a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: 1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; 2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by thef Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code 9 Emphasis supplied. 10 An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, as amended, 5 July 2008.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB NO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial; xxx" To reiterate, the original Petition for Review involves an issue questioning the correctness of the assessment issued by the authorized representative of the Commissioner oflnternal Revenue. The CTA Law does not provide for an exception or limit as to the jurisdiction of the CTA over disputed assessments. Hence, the case clearly falls under Section 7(a)(1) of the CTA Law. Aside from the CTA Law, Section 4 ofthe National Internal Revenue Code of1997, as amended is also clear that disputed assessments fall under the jurisdiction of the CTA, to wit: "SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance. The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals." Notwithstanding the doctrine in the Orion Case, PD No. 242 cannot divest CTA of its judicial power to exercise jurisdiction over the present controversy. From the way the relevant provisions in PD No. 242 are worded, it serves as a general rule that all disputes, claims, and controversies between National Government Entities shall be settled by either the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel or the Secretary of Justice. RA No. 9282 works as an exception, that is, when it comes to the inaction and decisions of the CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the CTA shall have jurisdiction. It is worthy to emphasize that jurisdiction over tax cases between National Government Entities is either with the CTA or with the DOJ; it cannot be with both. Therefore, "[e]ither the two laws are reconciled and harmonized or, if they cannot, the earlier one must yield to the later one, it being the later expression oflegislative will." 11 Further emphasizing this need to reconcile contradictory laws is Section 17 of the CTA Law, which states,f- to wit: 11 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, Fifth Edition 2003, p.272, citing City ofNaga v. Agna, G.R. No. L-36049, 31 May 1976, and Erafia v. Verge! de Dios, G.R. No. L-3393, 23 November 1949.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EBNO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) Section 17. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, executive issuances or letter of instructions, or any part thereof, inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed repealed, amended or modified accordingly. Accordingly, CTA Law must prevail. It is instructive that in PNOC v. CA, et. al. (hereinafter referred to as "PNOC Case''), 12 the Supreme Court considered PD No. 242 as a general law and the CTA Law as a special law. It expounded, thus: "When there appears to be an inconsistency or conflict between two statutes and one of the statutes is a general law, while the other is a special law, then repeal by implication is not the primary rule applicable. The following rule should principally govern instead: Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the same subject unless it clearly appears that the provisions of the two laws are so repugnant that the legislators must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier legislation. The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land. (Ex Parte United States, 226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S., 556; 27 L. ed., I 030; Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.) Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or provision, especially when such general and special acts or provisions are contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict. (Crane v. Reeder and Reeder, 22 Mich., 322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77 Am. St. Rep., 928.) It has, thus, become an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails - Generalia specialibus non derogant. Sustained herein is the contention of private respondent Savellano that P.D. No. 242 is a general law that deals with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Its coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims and controversies. It has I been incorporated as Chapter 14, Book IV ofE.O. No. 292, otherwise known/"" 12 G.R. Nos. 109976 and 112800, Apri126, 2005.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EBNO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1125 is a special law dealing with a specific subject matter the creation of the CTA. which shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the tax disputes and controversies enumerated therein. Following the rule on statutory construction involving a general and a special law previously discussed, then P.D. No. 242 should not affect Rep. Act No. 1125. Rep. Act No. 1125, specifically Section 7 thereof on the jurisdiction of the CTA. constitutes an exception to P.D. No. 242. Disputes, claims and controversies, falling under Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 1125, even though solely among government offices, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, remain in the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. Such a construction resolves the alleged inconsistency or conflict between the two statutes, and the fact that P.O. No. 242 is the more recent law is no longer significant." 13 Therefore, to insist that the original Petition for Review falls under the jurisdiction of the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, or the Secretary of Justice is an anathema to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, established laws and jurisprudence. Indeed, upholding the assailed Decision and Resolution effectively deprives the CTA of its judicial power to decide on disputes clearly falling under its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is worthy to stress that the CTA is in the best position to handle tax cases effectively and efficiently due to its expertise on the subject. This is evident in the Abstract of House Bill No. 6673 where it is shown that the CTA Law (specifically RA No. 9282) was enacted to avoid delays in the final disposition of tax cases, to effectively change and maximize the development of jurisprudence and judicial precedence on all tax matters, and to improve tax collection, to wit: "The bill seeks to lodge with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) both criminal and civil jurisdictions over tax and customs cases in order to avoid needless delays in the final disposition of such cases. The vesting of both criminal and civic jurisdictions of a tax case in one court will likewise effectively change and maximize the development of jurisprudence and judicial precedence on all tax matters which is of vital importance to revenue administration. The bill also seeks to elevate the rank of the CTA to the level of the Sandiganbayan, widen its organizational structure and expand its jurisdiction. The approval of the bill is seen to improve the tax collection efficiency of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Bureau of Customs and other revenue collecting agencies of the government." 14 This expertise of the CTA in tax matters was stressed in Macario Lim Gaw, Jr. v. CIR, 15 where it was stated that the "CTA has developed an expertise on the subject of taxation because it is a specialized court dedicated,... 13 Emphasis supplied. 14 Emphasis supplied. 15 G.R. No. 222837,23 July 2018.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EB NO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) exclusively to the study and resolution oftax problems." This was, in fact, the basis of the Dissent of the honorable retired Justice Mariano del Castillo in the PSALM Case: "xxx Unlike the Secretary of Justice, the BIR and the CTA have developed expertise on tax matters. It is only but logical that they should have exclusive jurisdiction to decide on these matters. The authority of the Secretary of Justice under PD 242 to settle and adjudicate all disputes, claims and controversies between or among national government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, therefore, does not include tax disputes, which are clearly under the jurisdiction of the BIR and the CTA." Finally, it is worthy to point out that the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the CTA's jurisdiction over cases involving controversies among government offices and corporations. The High Court, in a 2016 case entitled Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Secretary of Justice, and Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 16 abided by the jurisprudence set by the PNOC Case, stating that, under no uncertain terms, that the Secretary of Justice has no jurisdiction to review disputed assessments despite PD No. 242, jurisdiction of which belongs exclusively to CTA. In a 2017 case also involving PAGCOR, which is a duly created government instrumentality, the Supreme Court remanded to the CTA the determination of the final tax amounts to be paid by PAGCORP Most recently, in a July 2019 case involving PSALM itself entitled PSALM v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 18 the Supreme Court cancelled an assessment made by respondent without divesting the CTA of its jurisdiction. Clearly, to date, and despite the ruling in PSALM Case, the Supreme Court acknowledges the CTA's exercise of jurisdiction over tax cases between the National Government and/or GOCCs. All told, to rule that the CTA has no jurisdiction over tax cases between and among the National Government Entities will create a dangerous precedent and raise the question as to whether similar cases already decided by the CTA should be voided. We must not lose sight of the prevailing rule that where there is want ofjurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, whichf... 16 G.R. No. 177387,9 November 2016. 17 PAGCOR v. CIR, G.R. Nos. 210689, 210704 and 210725, 22 November 2017. 18 G.R. No. 226556,3 July 2019.

DISSENTING OPINION CTA EBNO. 2096 (CTA Case No. 9734) neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. 19 MARIA M<Wi>ESTO-SAN PEDRO 19 Sebastian v. Spouses Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 220940,20 March 2017.